

DISSERTATION APPROVED BY

6/29/2022

Date

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Carly Speranza', written over a horizontal line.

Carly Speranza, Ed.D., Chair

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Todd Darnold', written over a horizontal line.

Todd Darnold, Ph.D., Committee Member

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Leah Georges', written over a horizontal line.

Leah Georges, Ph.D., Program Director

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Mardell A. Wilson', written over a horizontal line.

Mardell A. Wilson, Ed.D., RDN, Provost

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS AND EMPLOYEE ENGAGEMENT DURING COMPLEX
CHANGE EVENTS:
A QUALITATIVE STUDY OF U.S. DEFENSE JOINT INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
CENTERS

By

KARALEE G. PICARD

A DISSERTATION IN PRACTICE

Submitted to the faculty of the Graduate School of Creighton University in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the degree of Doctor of Education in
Interdisciplinary Leadership

Omaha, NE

June 10, 2022

Copyright (2022), Karalee G. Picard

This document is copyrighted material. Under copyright law, no part of this document may be reproduced without the expressed permission of the author.

Abstract

This qualitative study was designed to examine how Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) civilian employees experience leadership behaviors and characteristics during re-organizational changes in U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Combatant Command (CCMD) intelligence organizations, known as Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOCs, pronounced j-EYE-ock). More specifically, this study's goal was to create best practices for leaders to prepare for organizational change. Fourteen DIA civilians who work in three geographically separated JIOCs in senior analyst or division leadership roles were interviewed, resulting in two major themes and 13 sub-themes. First, JIOC culture must be considered in leaders' behaviors and decision-making for engaging in multiple areas across the complex JIOC organization with two chains of command, intelligence analysts with high intellectual curiosity, and a transient workforce. Second, the use of a military planning model should be employed for a successful, coherent re-organization. This study resulted in a strong list of best practices for JIOC leaders to employ for diverse member engagement, unambiguous, transparent communications in numerous venues, member buy-in, a diverse planning team, clearly outlining vision, goals, and requirements, and creating champions of change. This study adds to the limited body of work on major, complex organizational change in hierarchical or bureaucratic DoD joint intelligence commands.

Keywords: champions, complex organization, culture, Department of Defense (DoD), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), hierarchical structure, intelligence analysis, Joint Intelligence Operations Command (JIOC), leadership behaviors, major complex organizational change, matrixed organization, planning

Dedication

To Michael & Kathryn – we have been on many adventures together.

Michael, my lobster, you make me a better person – listening, offering advice, contributing humor and logic, caring for our (extended) family, and for being “my guy.” Even though you cannot seem to remember how to pronounce *phenomenological*, you are stuck with me for life! As I finish this dissertation and your next adventure awaits, it is now my turn to support your growth, your dream, and helping you to realize your full potential.

Kathryn, the reason I breath on this earth. Bean, keep loving and believing in yourself, think critically, keep your intuition and common sense, take care of your inner self, do not compare yourself to others but be conscious of others, surround yourself with trustworthy people, enjoy your journey through life, and do the right thing (even when no one is looking). If I can complete this dissertation, you can do anything you put your mind to. I cannot wait to see where the future takes you!

While I completed this dissertation with my own perseverance and tenacity, I could not have done it without your love, patience, and support. You listened to my crazy ideas, my triumphs, my many challenges, and cooked and cleaned for yourselves many nights and weekends! You two made this degree possible!

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank my chair, Dr. Carly Speranza, who has patiently assisted me in this process through many academic hurdles, review board delays, and personal challenges. She provided exceptional guidance during this 20-month dissertation process. You are the sole reason I had a positive experience through this dissertation process.

I am also grateful to Dr. Todd Darnold, who served as a committee member. Your skillful eye was very helpful in creating a succinct and easy to understand dissertation.

To my parents, who have always valued education and demonstrated that going to college at any age is valuable and time well spent. To my brother and sister, who have always supported my life journey and have always provided me with a steady shoulder to lean on when needed.

To my friends, (Santha, Paul, Tonya, Angela, Blake, John, Pedro, April, to name a few) – thank you from the bottom of my heart for your presence and support through this process. I have missed a lot in the past several years; thank you for sticking with me through this journey.

I cannot forget my fellow Creighton EdD students: Tony, Kenya, Dania, and Javier. We started together, ended separately, and you motivated me throughout!

A ginormous thank you to all the DIA civilians who participated in this study – I see you. Not only did you help create this dissertation, but you pushed my limits and helped me grow overall because of our time together. Your leadership, experience, and commitment to the U.S. intelligence mission will serve you well in this ever-changing world. Your leadership (at any level) and commitment to public service will guide you and your followers to great success.

Table of Contents

	Page
Abstract	iii
Dedication	iv
Acknowledgments	v
Table of Contents	vi
List of Tables	xi
List of Figures	xii
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION.....	1
Background	2
Formation of the JIOCs.....	2
The Defense Intelligence Enterprise (DIE).....	4
Culture of a Military Intelligence Organization.....	6
Statement of the Problem.....	7
Purpose of the Study	8
Research Question	8
Aim of the Study.....	9
Definition of Relevant Terms	9
Methodology Overview	21
Delimitations, Limitations, and Personal Biases	22
Reflections of the Scholar-Practitioner	23
Summary	24
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW.....	25

Bureaucracy	25
Government Institutions.....	26
Intelligence Institutions.....	27
Complex Organizational Structures	27
Tall (Hierarchical) Structures	29
Matrixed Tasks.....	31
JIOCs as Complex Organizations	33
Organizational Change.....	35
Revolutionary vs. Evolutionary Change.....	35
Burke-Litwin Model of Change.....	36
U.S. Joint Military Planning Model.....	37
Steps in a Change Model	37
Organizational Culture.....	39
United States Intelligence Institutions	41
The Defense Intelligence Agency and the Defense Department	44
Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOCs)	45
Leadership Behaviors.....	47
Leadership Theories.....	47
Complexity Leadership Theory (CLT).....	48
Leadership in Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS).....	50
Leader-Member Exchange (LMX)	51
Leader's Attributes.....	52
Transformational Leadership	53

Transactional Leadership	54
Group Dynamics	54
Common Goals	55
Employee Engagement	55
Adaptive Leadership	57
Leadership in Bureaucracy	61
Summary	63
CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY	64
Research Question	64
Method	64
Research Design Overview	65
Participants	66
Data Collection	68
Data Collection Procedures	68
Data Collection Tools	69
Data Analysis	71
Methodological Integrity	74
Ethical Considerations	75
Professional Relationships	76
Institutional Review Board Approval	76
Confidentiality and Anonymity	77
Summary	77
CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS AND FINDINGS	78

Results.....	79
Participants.....	80
Data Analysis	81
Findings.....	83
Theme 1: Culture	83
Theme 2: Planning	103
Summary.....	121
CHAPTER FIVE: PROPOSED SOLUTION AND IMPLICATIONS	122
Summary of Study	122
Aim Statement	123
Proposed Solution.....	124
Evidence that Supports the Proposed Solutions.....	128
Culture, Including Complexity, Diversity, and Members’ Skills.....	129
Communicate for Workforce Buy-In, Building Trust and Champions ...	135
Use a Planning Model for Enduring Culture	138
Best Practices for JIOC Re-Organizations.....	142
Evidence that Challenges the Solutions.....	147
Implementation of the Proposed Solution.....	149
Factors and Stakeholders Related to the Implementation of the Solution.....	150
Timeline for Implementation of the Solution	151
Implications.....	152
Practical Implications for Practice	152
Implications for Future Research.....	152

Implications for Leadership Theory and Practice	153
Strengths	154
Limitations	155
Summary of Dissertation in Practice	155
References	157
Appendix A. List of JIOCs	177
Appendix B. List of U.S. Intelligence Community Organizations	178
Appendix C. Intelligence Community Directives (ICDs).....	180
Appendix D. Study Participant Information Letter.....	181
Appendix E. Bill of Rights.....	183
Appendix F. Semi-Structured Interview Protocol	184
Appendix G. Participant Survey	185
Appendix H. IRB Approval	186
Appendix I. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Approval	188

List of Tables

Table 1. Participant Demographic Information and Pseudonyms	81
Table 2. References for proposed solutions by sub-topic	126

List of Figures

Figure 1. Tall vs. Flat Organizational Hierarchy	31
Figure 2. Organizational Change Planning Model	38
Figure 3. JIOC and DIA Chains of Command.....	46
Figure 4. Map of JIOC Locations	68
Figure 5. Summary of Major Themes and Sub-Themes.....	83
Figure 6. Summary of Major Themes and Sub-Themes.....	123
Figure 7. Proposed Solutions and Best Practices.....	129
Figure 8. JIOC organizational complexity in terms of processes.....	132
Figure 9. JIOC organizational complexity in terms of roles.....	135
Figure 10. Organizational Change Planning Model	139
Figure 11. Best Practices.....	147

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS AND EMPLOYEE ENGAGEMENT

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

The goal of this study was to examine which leadership behaviors have been employed to engage employees during a complex change event in the organizational structure in three of the 11 U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Combatant Command (CCMD) intelligence organizations, known as Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOCs) (see Appendix A for list of JIOCs). DoD organizations are hierarchical and bureaucratic and frequently experience changes in policy due to changes in the U.S. administration's priorities every four to eight years when presidential administrations change. JIOC leaders, typically a military officer with a civilian deputy, require the ability to effectively lead and navigate change, including gaining support of civilian employees. DIA civilians are the backbone of the JIOCs, and long-term civilian employees, who are in one location for 6 to 10 years, may be inclined to resist change related to their culture or the way they do things (Burke, 2018; Deal & Kennedy, 1982; Van Dam et al., 2008).

While flattened organizational structures have become more common in the past 20 or more years (Kaufman et al., 2018), U.S. government organizations have remained organized in hierarchical (or tall) structures, which have been popular across the U.S. since the 1950s (Greenberg & Baron, 2003); subsequently, U.S. military organizations remain hierarchical and bureaucratic (Kaufman et al., 2018; USAGov, 2020). Hierarchical structures have been found to create a silo mentality (or groupthink) with invisible barriers that fragment organizations (Cilliers & Greyvenstein, 2012; Janis, 1972); coupled with the hierarchical structure, organization and internal communications processes vary in each JIOC (Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General [DoD IG], 2018), but are based on hierarchy and organized by military rank or equivalent civilian paygrade (Army Study Guide, 2020; Federal Pay, 2020). This not only affects

civilian employees' use of the matrixed, hierarchical chain of command when coordinating analysis, it also impacts communications when a major, complex organizational change event is executed. Leadership engagement with civilian employees during change events has varied by organization, and there is a lack of scholarly research to inform JIOC leaders of the best practices for civilian engagement.

Background

The U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) is a complex, hierarchical, bureaucratic enterprise. JIOCs are only a small piece of the larger U.S. defense enterprise and national Intelligence Community. To understand the JIOCs' organizational cultures, which are all different (DoD IG, 2018), the overarching government system that created and continues to influence JIOCs will be outlined here.

Formation of the JIOCs

The War and National Defense Act of 1947 created the National Security Council (NSC), a Secretary of Defense with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) under the NSC (Lowenthal, 2020). The CIA was run from under the DCI (Lowenthal, 2020). The DCI was viewed by some members of the Kennedy administration as too political, so in the early 1960s, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was created under the Secretary of Defense (DIA, 2020; Lowenthal, 2020). The CIA was the primary source of intelligence for the administration, and while DIA reported to the Secretary of Defense, the White House rarely received conflicting intelligence from the DIA due to the DCI having a seat on the NSC (Lowenthal, 2020). This political divide likely caused several intelligence failures, in which both CIA and DIA analysts held dissenting opinions that were never provided to the White House (Lowenthal, 2020).

Following the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, then-Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, mandated the creation of JIOCs at DoD CCMDs (Costa, 2006). This mandate was aimed at improving “all-source intelligence analysis” that depended on Air Force, Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard military intelligence organizations coordinating with defense and national agencies, such as the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and National Security Agency (NSA) to name a few (see Appendix B for a full list of IC agencies and departments). At the time, all the military services and agencies had individual policies, procedures, capabilities, and separate databases that were challenging to navigate (Costa, 2006; Jeszenszky, 1992).

All U.S. intelligence personnel work under a culture, underpinned by a signed contract, of requiring “a need to know” before being able to read or work on intelligence issues (Costa, 2006). Historically, this has created a culture of risk aversion and not sharing critical information outside the small circle of trust and up the chain of command (Costa, 2006). While each national and defense agency has separate chains of command through which intelligence flows, they were not discrete establishments (DeVine, 2020). Rumsfeld’s goal was to shift the “need to know” culture to a “need to share” culture to avoid another catastrophe like 9/11 (Costa, 2006).

In 2004, Congress elevated the position of the Director of National Intelligence, which had been dual-hatted with the head of the CIA, with the passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004. With IRTPA, Congress created a separate organization to lead the U.S. National Intelligence Community – the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) under the National Security Council and equal to the CIA and the Secretary of Defense (Lowenthal, 2020).

The ODNI was tasked to ensure the 18 intelligence organizations (see Appendix B) collaborated and coordinated efforts diligently to close intelligence gaps and to disseminate products to personnel with the proper level of security clearances across the government in a timely manner (DeVine, 2020). This structure was reinforced with Executive Order (EO) No. 12333 (2008), in which the law and order was established with “general duties and responsibilities for each element of the IC [or Intelligence Community]. Other laws, executive orders, and policy issuances may establish additional duties and responsibilities for particular IC elements” (DeVine, 2020, p. 1). Since 2006 when DIA JIOCs were first formed, collaboration and coordination between intelligence organizations has become slightly easier, and after 2008, DIA took over authority from the military services for sourcing, training, and equipping most of the civilian personnel at JIOCs, which improved the ODNI’s implementation of Intelligence Community Directives (ICD) Number 203 (DoDIG, 2018; ODNI, 2007).

The Defense Intelligence Enterprise (DIE)

For defense intelligence analysis, the Under-Secretary for Defense Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S)) is tasked with oversight of ensuring analysis is aligned with the Defense Intelligence Enterprise (DIE) and IC’s concepts, methodologies, and standards of intelligence analytic tradecraft, including training personnel to standards (U.S. Department of Defense, 2008 [U.S. DoD], 2008; DoD IG, 2018). These tasks include providing products and services on “foreign military capabilities, plans and intentions, orders-of-battle, disposition of forces, and the political, cultural and economic factors influencing the environment in areas of actual or potential military operations” (DeVine, 2020, p. 1). The Defense Intelligence Enterprise (DIE) is comprised of the Joint Staff, DIA, CCMD JIOCs or Joint Intelligence Centers, and the military services intelligence elements (DIA, 2020). Together, these organizations develop tactical,

operational, and strategic intelligence assessments in support of military strategy, planning, and operations.

Congress funds JIOC personnel through the Military Intelligence Program (MIP) DoD with the USD(I&S) having authority and responsibility over resources for DIA and all intelligence and security units across the U.S. DoD (2008). In addition to leading the DIA headquarters in the National Capital Region, the USD(I&S) tasks DIA with providing civilian personnel, resources, and oversight to the JIOCs across the military's ten Combatant Command (CCMD) structure and U.S. Forces Korea (Gilmore, 2006; U.S. DoD, 2008).

DIA sources most of the government civilian analysts who work in the JIOCs, and DIA retains administrative control over these civilians while they are assigned to the JIOCs (DoD IG, 2018, p. 3). Some civilian personnel are provided by the military services, which varies within each JIOC (DeVine, 2020). As a DoD Combat Support Agency (CSA), DIA is tasked with abiding by the intelligence cycle (collecting, processing, analyzing, producing, and disseminating) to provide analysis on foreign military intelligence to policymakers and the military (DIA, 2020; Heuer, 1999). DIA (2020) is tasked with researching, analyzing, producing, and disseminating military intelligence to inform combat and peaceful military missions and are a primary intelligence producer and manager for the Combatant Commands, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense.

Based on 2019 data from the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), JIOCs are considered small organizations (between 100 and 999 employees) in terms of U.S. government size groupings. While JIOCs are not large in terms of U.S. government organizations they are complex organizations with diverse missions, skill sets, hierarchy, and suborganizations. Because JIOCs have both operational and analytic missions, there are two functional hierarchies

with matrixed functions that operate in the same organization simultaneously (Burke, 2018; Cilliers & Greyvenstein, 2012; U.S. DoD, 2008; Meredith et al., 2017). First, there is a traditional military chain of command with an overlapping non-military structure to ensure personnel collaborate and coordinate analytic work with peers throughout the IC (Costa, 2006; DeVine, 2020; Gilmore, 2006). Finally, the JIOC structure is matrixed with subject matter experts across the organization who are responsible for issues related to a specific region, country, or weapons system, as well as collections, planning, and resources (Burke, 2018; Cilliers & Greyvenstein, 2012; Lowenthal, 2020).

Culture of a Military Intelligence Organization

While U.S. military organizations each have a chain of command through which information flows on a “need to know” basis, the IC’s unique culture adds an additional layer of “need to know” to military intelligence organizations’ culture (Hearns, 2019). Military personnel start out their career in the service they joined and are trained on the terminology used in that service. Also, military personnel are transient members of the centers as they move between duty stations every two to four years, depending on their service, whereas civilian personnel are not required to move unless they are temporarily stationed overseas or desire to move (Jeszenszky, 1992; Tilghman, 2015). While civilians are the mainstay of intelligence organizations’ workforce and are trained to understand and abide by the military chain of command, military-civilian communication has been a dilemma with the military seen as only temporary manpower and not subject matter experts who will not need to understand the problem sets on a long-term basis (Hearns, 2019; Jeszenszky, 1992). Military and civilian cultures both follow the “need to know”; however, each has circles of trust with whom they may share information more often (Jeszenszky, 1992).

Both military and civilian personnel find it challenging to navigate a matrixed, dual hierarchical organization, which has been found as a common theme in other research (Jeszenszky, 1992). More specifically, the culture is complex in that the mixed members (civilian and military) of the organization follow a military (hierarchical or tall) chain of command, and there is an overlapping analytic chain of analysis tasking and editing (similarly hierarchical), and the organization has matrixed functions, tasks, and expertise (Burke, 2018; Cilliers & Greyvenstein, 2012; Costa, 2006; DeVine, 2020; Gilmore, 2006; U.S. DoD, 2008; Vanderslice, 1988). This is further complicated as employees also are required to collaborate and coordinate intelligence analysis internally and externally with other intelligence agencies, services, and sometimes with allies and partners (Costa, 2006; Lowenthal, 2020). Finally, altering an organizational structure and culture, such as a JIOC, is extremely challenging with the long-term civilian employees who hold the institutional knowledge and the transitory nature of military service members who rotate every two to four years. The sub-cultures built by the civilians and the military leaders are inculcated with that transitory military culture and both military and civilians surround themselves with compatible confidants (Vanderslice, 1988).

Statement of the Problem

The lack of scholarly research about experiences of leadership during major, complex organizational change in JIOCs could place national security at risk. For organizations to function most efficiently during and after complex change, the experiences of the members must be examined to understand leadership through the evolution of change (Tichy, 1983). When organizational change is planned in a complex, matrixed organization and national security is at risk, leaders' communications are vital for success (Meredith et al., 2017). Communication with

key personnel, including civilian employees, is particularly important when change is coupled with members who tacitly counter-act new culture or ways of doing things (Tichy, 1983).

JIOC members who have a silo mentality (or groupthink) and who interact more in like-groups (or homophilous groups) can create real barriers to change as they can fragment the workforce to resist leaders' intentions and plans to change (Cilliers & Greyvenstein, 2012; Currarini & Mengel, 2016; Janis, 1972). These homophilous groups can create invisible barriers that present as lacking a vision of the larger organization, as an unconscious denial of any need for improvements. This could also manifest and cause the workforce to split into long-term employees who fear their work networks will change for the worse, and the newer employees who may feel isolated yet eager for improvements (Cilliers & Greyvenstein, 2012; Currarini & Mengel, 2016; Janis, 1972).

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this qualitative, phenomenological study was to examine which leadership attributes have been employed to engage civilian employees during a major, complex organizational change event. The ultimate goal of this research study was to create best practices for leaders to prepare for change.

Research Question

The following primary research question was used to guide this qualitative study:

How do DoD civilian employees experience leadership behaviors during major, complex organizational change?

In addition, the following sub-question supports the primary research question:

Which leadership characteristics appeared to exert the greatest impact over civilian employees during the change event?

Aim of the Study

The aim of this Dissertation in Practice (DIP) is to create a set of evidence-based best practices and behaviors or actions to enhance how JIOC leadership engages with civilian employees throughout a major, complex organizational change event. DIA and the CCMDs may find that best practices would be useful for all JIOCs, which could cause a new policy to be developed for cross-JIOC engagement before executing a major, complex organizational change event. Ultimately, I aimed to fill a gap in current research to examine how leaders can engage civilian employees, and develop best practices for leadership for major, complex organizational change. This research could also apply to numerous U.S. and international organizations for successful change events.

Definition of Relevant Terms

The following terms will be used in this study:

Adaptive leadership: The practice of collectively marshalling people to confront tough challenges, generate solutions, and thrive; leaders must know what is valuable and must be preserved, as well as how to motivate and mobilize change through focusing others' attention on the needs of the organization (Heifetz et al., 2009).

Adaptive, enabling leadership: The practice of being agile and adept in the face of complexity; intuitively assembling people and creating space for people to tackle tough challenges, create innovative solutions, and flourish; keeping valuable policies and processes, and motivating and mobilizing change (Heifetz et al., 2009; Uhl-Bien & Arena, 2017).

Authentic leadership: "A pattern of leader behavior that draws upon and promotes both positive psychological capacities and a positive ethical climate, to foster greater self-awareness, an internalized moral perspective, balanced processing of information, and relational

transparency on the part of leaders working with followers, fostering positive self development” (Walumbwa et al., 2008, p. 94).

Bureaucracy: An organizational phenomenon that has a specialized division of labor with highly routine operating tasks (Gajduschek, 2003), “strictly formalized rules and regulations, centralized authority, narrow spans of control, and decision making that follows the chain of command” (Robbins & Judge, 2018, p. 253).

Buy-in (by organizational members): Commitment by organizational members to support change, partnering with leadership and working together toward new mission, vision, goals, or restructuring; members come together to support the organization, coalescing to form a guiding coalition for change, allowing decision to be weighed collectively, particularly important when orderly decision process is needed (Carzo & Yanouzas, 1969; Kamara, 2018); leadership must provide the resources, training, and time necessary to implement new mission, vision, goals, or restructuring (Smith, 2018).

Chain of command: The line of authority and communication from top management to the lowest level, so an employee receives orders and instructions from one superior and is responsible to only one superior; aimed at ensuring strong authority and discipline, loyalty to the organization, preventing conflicts over hiring and promotions, and reducing communications pitfalls (Fayol, 1949; Friebe & Raith, 2004).

Chain of command (military): A system of arranging hierarchical organizations that assists commanders at all levels to accomplish their unit’s assigned mission, while simultaneously taking care of property and personnel in their charge; ensures proper, simple, effective avenues of communication with all orders issued through the chain of command; a

person can have only one immediate commander who issues orders and provides instructions (Vargas, 2016).

Champion: “Individuals who informally emerge to actively and enthusiastically promote innovations through the crucial organizational stages, are pivotal to the successful implementation of an innovation” (Howell & Boies, 2004, p. 124); understands their role in the middle of the organization and with no positional authority unearths members’ motivation to evoke support (Callahan, 2017; Uhl-Bien et al., 2007); demonstrates personal commitment, promotes the idea through informal networks, and willingly stakes their position and reputation to ensure success; galvanizes support, displaying enthusiasm, demonstrating commitment, and involving others while engaging in coalition building; establishes and maintains contact with top leadership to keep them informed (Howell & Boies, 2004; Maxwell, 2011).

Change: “Change is the movement away from a present state toward a future state” (Fox-Wolfgramm et al., 1998, p. 87); “the crystallization of new action possibilities (new policies, behaviors, patterns, methodologies, etc.) based on reconceptualized patterns of the organization. The architecture of change involves the design and construction of new patterns, or the reconceptualization of old ones, to make new, and hopefully more productive, actions, possible” (Kanter, 1983, p. 279).

Climate, organizational: See “Organizational Climate”

Complex adaptive systems (CAS): “Open, evolutionary aggregates whose components (or agents) are dynamically interrelated and who are cooperatively bonded by common purpose or outlook” (Uhl-Bien et al., 2007, p. 302).

Complex organization: A system of behaviors with patterns of matrixed linkages that vary depending on: external environment, mission and strategy, leadership, management

practices, human resource practices, organizational culture (values and beliefs), subcultures, working climate (including members' feelings), structure, communications processes, systems, tasks and skills, individual values and needs, motivational level, and individual and general performance (Burke & Litwin, 1992; DoD IG, 2018; Svyantek & Brown, 2000; Tichy, 1983).

Complex organizational change: An organizational change model “that attempt[s] to account for organizational functioning and change at the same time,”... includes a high “degree of complexity, coherence, and predictability (e.g. causality),” (Burke & Litwin, 1992, p. 526); change accounts most, if not all, of the following 12 variables, including (a) external environment, (b) mission and strategy, (c) leadership, (d) organizational culture, (e) structure, (f) management practices, (g) systems (policies and procedures), (h) work unit climate (including members' feelings), (i) tasks and individual skills, (j) motivation, (k) individual needs and values, (l) individual and organizational performance (Burke & Litwin, 1992; Svyantek & Brown, 2000).

Complexity leadership theory (CLT) (or complex leadership theory): “A leadership paradigm that focuses on enabling the learning, creative, and adaptive capacity of complex adaptive systems (CAS) within a context of knowledge-producing organizations” (Uhl-Bien et al., 2007, p. 298); the paradigm explores the role of leadership as an evolving competency – not only of people and tasks, but also of ideas, which exist among the mental power (or knowledge and skill) – that arises from dynamic interdependent interactions in organizations where individuals merge into a collaborative enterprise and work toward a collective mission (Lichtenstein et al., 2006; Marlon & McGee, 2006).

Complexity leadership: Three types of leadership are needed for adaptability, including operational leadership, entrepreneurial leadership, enabling leadership; the three are not unique

to any one individual or position but a single individual could engage in any or none of three functions in principle. Operational leadership: formal systems designed to facilitate processes to capably execute ideas and transform them into productive results; Entrepreneurial leadership: source of novel ideas, innovation, growth for the organization; Enabling leadership: authorizing of conditions that successfully support and maintain adaptive space (Uhl-Bien & Arena, 2017).

Culture, organizational: See “Organizational Culture”

Dual hierarchical organization: An organization with the foundation of a military hierarchical (or tall) chain of command with a simultaneous, overlapping, hierarchical analytic chain of analysis, including tasking and editing, which extends outside the immediate organization to external organizations for collaboration and coordination (Burke, 2018; Cilliers & Greyvenstein, 2012; Costa, 2006; DeVine, 2020; Gilmore, 2006; Lowenthal, 2020).

Employee engagement: The emotional commitment to roles in an organization; employees who are actively participating in the workplace and find purpose and meaning from their work, including those who “employ and express themselves physically, cognitively, and emotionally during role performance” (Kahn, 1990, p. 694); leaders’ actions and interactions with employees to deliver “information, [offer] opportunities for participation, and [build] trust in those managing the change” (Van Dam et al., 2008, p. 327).

Enabling leadership: Enabler(s) of operational systems and innovative ideas; creates space for supporting and sustaining adaptive space; “A unique form of leadership introduced by complexity thinking... helps organizations be agile in the face of complexity (i.e., operate as complex adaptive systems)” (Uhl-Bien & Arena, 2017, p. 14).

Groupthink: “A psychological drive for consensus at any cost that suppresses dissent and appraisal of alternatives in cohesive decision making groups” (Janis, 1972, p. 6); particularly in foreign policy decision-making in national security failures (Janis, 1972).

Heterophily: “The degree to which two or more individuals who interact are different in certain attributes, such as beliefs, education, social status” (Rogers, 2003, p. 36), including “communication between dissimilar individuals [which] may cause cognitive dissonance because an individual is exposed to messages that are inconsistent with existing beliefs, an uncomfortable psychological state” (Rogers, 2013, p. 306).

Homophily: Concept that identifies groups of people who have a “preference for maintaining ties with persons who are similar” (Sion, 2016, p. 2490); persons connected based on shared interests or behaviors and who communicate similarly do so because of common attributes, such as education, beliefs, social groups, socioeconomic status, even military services and/or grades (Rogers, 2003; Sion, 2016); “can act as an invisible barrier to the flow of innovations within a system... homophilous diffusion patterns cause new ideas to spread horizontally, rather than vertically, within a system” (Rogers, 2003, p. 306-307).

Intelligence analysis: “Seeks to illuminate the unknown... [and] deals with highly ambiguous situations” (Heuer, 1999, p. 14); “the process of providing objective and effective support to help U.S. policymakers, by means of information and assessments on events overseas, to carry out their mission of formulating and implementing national security policy” (Davis, 1995, p. 25).

Intellectual curiosity: “An intense, intrinsically motivated appetite for information” (Loewenstein, 1994, p. 77); “constantly alert and exploring [and] seeking material for thought, ... the only sure guarantee of acquisition of primary facts” (Dewey, 1910, p. 31); “in a few

people, ... so insatiable that nothing will discourage it, but in most its edge is easily dulled and blunted” (Dewey, 1910, p. 33).

Intelligence analytic tradecraft standards: The foundation of intelligence analysts' products (e.g. papers and briefings) are formed by “carefully weighed evidence and rigorously structured argumentation, not their opinions or those of policy officials” (Davis, 1995, p. 25); “should indicate both the level of confidence in analytic judgments and explain the basis for ascribing it,” including objectivity, independent of political considerations, timeliness, based on all available sources of intelligence, properly describes quality and reliability of underlying sources, and identifies information gaps and significant contrary reporting (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2007).

Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC): “An interdependent, operational intelligence organization at the Department of Defense, combatant command, or joint task force (if established) level that is integrated with national intelligence centers, and capable of accessing all sources of intelligence impacting military operations planning, execution, and assessment” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013, p. GL-9).

Leader-member exchange (LMX) theory: Maintains that leaders form individual and distinctive relationships with each of their followers; LMX, the core concept of LMX theory, is the relationship-based approach that defines leader-follower interaction (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995; Uhl-Bien, 2006).

Leadership: “A process whereby an individual influences a group of individuals to achieve a common goal... it is not a trait or characteristic... but rather a transactional event that occurs between the leader and the followers” (Northouse, 2019, p. 5); comprised of four basics dimensions: support, interaction facilitation, goal emphasis, and work facilitation;

“organizationally useful behavior by one member of an organizational family toward another [member] of that same organizational family... large aggregation of separate behaviors, which may be grouped or classified in a great variety of ways” (Bowers & Seashore, 1966).

Leadership, complex theory of: See “Complexity leadership theory (CLT).”

Leadership behaviors: “What leaders do and how they act... composed of two general kinds of behaviors: *task behaviors* (facilitate goal accomplishment) and *relationship behaviors* (help followers feel comfortable with themselves)... leaders combine these two types of behaviors to influence followers in their efforts to reach a goal” (Northouse, 2019, p. 73); in many situations both approaches are needed (Casimir & Ng, 2010); (see definitions for *leadership task behaviors* and *leadership relationship behaviors*).

Leadership characteristics (of behaviors): “Who leaders are (i.e., their innate characteristics)” (Northouse, 2019, p. 44); key attributes include (a) influencing followers positively; (b) having a positive relationship with organizational members; (c) providing direction and guidance; (d) listening carefully to followers; (e) being approachable and open to new ideas; (f) relinquishing some control to let followers lead; (g) allowing employees to participate in problem solving; (h) giving voice to low-status or out-group employees; (i) interest in organizational members (people); (j) interest in production; (k) acting to change aspects under the leaders’ authority; and (l) being consistent in word and actions (Bakker et al., 2006; Gardner, 2021; Leroy et al., 2012; Northouse, 2019).

Leadership in a bureaucracy: Historically, vertical leadership up and down a public organization that has power in a chain of command; 20th century public bureaucracies include cross-sectoral leadership with horizontal, shared power (Callahan, 2017); understanding an organization, specifically both internally and externally. internally, dynamics of structure, human

resources, political negotiations, and organizational culture (including informal networks); externally, developing a strategy aligned to the organization's internal mission(s) that have external impact or outcomes, designing systems or procedures to measure results, driving innovation externally to support internal missions, and building the skill set necessary to work with networks (Callahan, 2017, p. 6). See *leadership in a bureaucracy, cross-sectoral* for more.

Leadership in a bureaucracy, cross-sectoral: Horizontal with shared power; skill sets include "building and overseeing effective service delivery networks, working with community-based organizations, developing processes, such as Task Forces or community meetings to effectively identify community needs, as well as risk identification, risk management, and risk mitigation for contract management" (Callahan, 2017, p. 6).

Leadership relationship behaviors: Builds camaraderie, respect, trust, and friendliness between leadership and followers (Northouse, 2019); offers meaningful participation in decision-making, and allows employees to express professional opinions, to be part of solutions, and to have some authority over decisions in their specialized area (Bakker et al., 2006; Bass, 1985; Burns, 1978; Kahn, 1990; Van Dam et al., 2008); takes an interest in workers as human beings, values individuality, gives special attention to personal needs (Bowers & Seashore, 1966; Maslach et al., 2001); "gives the minority a chance to be heard, ... increases interdependence among members" (Bowers & Seashore, 1966, p. 244); negative emotions are responsible for eroding trust and increasing withdrawal (Kiefer, 2005).

Leadership skills: "What leaders can accomplish... the ability to use one's knowledge and competencies to accomplish a set of goals or objectives" (Northouse, 2019, p. 44).

Leadership task behaviors: Defines roles and responsibilities, facilitates action toward goal accomplishment, gives structure with a procedural plan, schedules work activities; workers

may be viewed as a means to an end (Bakker et al., 2006; Bowers & Seashore, 1966; Northouse, 2019); delivers information (Bass, 1985; Burns, 1978; Van Dam et al., 2008); facilitates or directs evaluation of the work quality (Bowers & Seashore, 1966).

Major, complex organizational change: Organizational change that is made through changing a number of variables that determine an organizational system's behaviors and primary and significant levers – for example structure, management practices, interconnectedness, and systems (policies and procedures) – while simultaneously attempting to continue functioning at full strength, which includes a high degree of intricacy, of coherence or consistency, and of keeping interconnectedness with internal and external groups (Burke & Litwin, 1992; Svyantek & Brown, 2000).

Major organizational change: Change is made to a number of variables that determine an organizational system's behaviors and primary and significant levers, including structure, management practices, interconnectedness, and systems (policies and procedures) (Burke & Litwin, 1992; Svyantek & Brown, 2000); “major change require[s] addressing issues of values and beliefs of organization members” (Tichy, 1983, p. 45); for example, “a federal agency where the mission had been modified, the structure and leadership changed significantly, yet the culture remained in the 1960s – obviously a culture change effort” (Burke & Litwin, 1992, p. 534).

Matrixed organization: A framework of professional units or project management groups with specific functions (e.g., marketing, engineering, intelligence collections, and analytic tradecraft and methodologies), including technical, political, and cultural tasks that focus on strategy, structure, and human resources (Burke, 2018; DoD IG, 2018; Tichy, 1983; U.S. DoD, 2008); members report project progress to people outside their chain of command.

Mid-level leaders: Organizational members under the top level of leadership who “lead through influence, not position, power, or leverage... they take the time and effort to earn influence with their followers just as they do with those over whom they have no authority” (Maxwell, 2011, p. 211); seen as more accessible or approachable; a champion for vision; they understand processes and “are closer to people in the trenches than they are to leaders at the top” (p. 281); they understand what work people are doing and the challenges they face; they have greater influence over people at the lower levels than top leaders have; they translate top level guidance and vision down chain to achieve success, using their influence to achieve the organization’s goals and vision (Maxwell, 2011).

Mixed Members: Culturally diverse, hybrid workforce comprised of members from two or more classes of employment status, including military servicemembers from two or more services, federal civil servants (or civilians), and contract employees (Callahan, 2017; Earley & Mosakowski, 2000; Jeszenszky, 1992).

Organizational change: Change “occurs when [an] innovation is [invented or] re-invented so as to accommodate the organization’s needs and structure more closely, and when the organization’s structure is modified to fit with the innovation” (Rogers, 2003, p. 424).

Organizational climate: “In the foreground of organizational members' [awareness]... perceptions that individuals have of how their local work unit is managed and how effectively they and their day-to-day colleagues work together on the job” (Burke & Litwin, 1992, p. 526).

Organizational culture: “The way we do things around here” (Deal & Kennedy, 1982, p. 4); “a pattern of shared tacit assumptions [in the background of an organization]... learned by a group as it solve[s] its problems of external adaptation and internal integration,... taught to new

members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems” (Schein, 2009, p. 27).

Organizational structure: A living network that includes the composition of size, personnel, physical locations and components, reporting and decision-making systems, policies, rules, procedures, and hierarchy (tall, flat, or matrixed) (Anderson & Brown, 2010; Burke, 2018; Carzo & Yanouzas, 1969; Marasi et al., 2018).

Rank (civilian): While civilians have paygrades that determine salary levels, they do not hold a rank like military service members; as federal institutions are hierarchical, military service members and civilians must recognize the equivalent paygrade/rank system to understand an organization’s equivalent seniority structure (Federal Pay, 2020).

Rank (military): Provides a system of leadership and indicates the level of expertise and responsibility for equipment, personnel, and mission which grow with each advancement (U.S. Department of Defense, 2020, para. 1); the level of authority a member has includes organizing, directing, and leading or commanding assigned personnel (soldiers, sailors, airmen, spacemen, and marines) to accomplish the mission (Army Study Guide, 2020).

Resistance to change: The threat of “losing something of value” (Burke, 2018, pp. 268); when change could result in the identity or image of an organization is not sustainable (Fox-Wolfgramm et al., 1998); having no choice or having change imposed from above or an external source, being forced to adopt new ways of acting or working, resistance can come from a place of beliefs, either implicit, political, or ideological (Rogers, 2003).

Self-awareness: “The extent leaders appear to understand their strengths, motives, and weaknesses and how others view their leadership” (Walumbwa et al., 2011, p. 6).

Silo mentality: An unconscious phenomenon that negatively enables groupthink and influences a team's willingness and ability to engage in intragroup cohesion and organizational culture as individuals split organizational artifacts and relationships, which negatively impacts relationships between individuals and teams (Cilliers & Greyvenstein, 2012).

Tradecraft: see “*Intelligence analysis tradecraft standards*.”

U.S. Intelligence Community: “A coalition of 18 agencies and organizations, including the ODNI, within the Executive Branch that work both independently and collaboratively to gather and analyze the intelligence necessary to conduct foreign relations and national security activities” (ODNI, 2020, 2021); “composed of the best and brightest professionals who have committed their careers and their lives to protecting our national security... a 24/7/365 organization, scanning the globe and delivering the most distinctive, timely insights with clarity, objectivity, and independence to advance our national security, economic strength, and technological superiority” (ODNI, 2019).

Methodology Overview

The purpose of this phenomenological study was to examine which leadership behaviors employed to engage civilian employees while executing a major, complex organizational change in three of the DoD CCMD JIOCs. The ultimate goal of this research study was to create best practices for leaders to prepare for change. This study uses interpretive phenomenological analysis (IPA), also known as hermeneutic phenomenology, to examine civilian employees' lived experiences at DoD JIOCs during a major change event (Kafle, 2011). The goal was to better understand the individual perspectives of civilian employees by examining their experiences of re-organizations in the context of the change phenomenon (Moustakas, 1994).

The key reason for using IPA was that it allows the evaluation of data from an inductive or “bottom-up” approach to understand the connection between interview data, individual participants, the environment, and my own reflection process (Reid et al., 2005). Interviews with DoD civilian employees were the primary sources of information. Interviews were sixty minutes, conducted via Zoom with semi-structured, open-ended questions about their experiences and feelings of the organizational change event (Smith et al., 2009). After receiving consent from the participants, each Zoom interview was recorded and transcribed, by a professional transcription service, which enabled me to write limited notes and instead focus on the conversation and nonverbal responses (Mertens, 2015; Ricoeur, 1981). Participants’ words were cloaked in pseudonyms and the data was coded into categories and themes (Wiles et al., 2008).

Delimitations, Limitations, and Personal Biases

Delimitations of this interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) study include the participants were limited to civilian employees who are intelligence analysts in JIOCs that reorganized since 2018. The design of this study allowed data to be gathered from DIA civilian employees who most recently experienced leadership during a reorganization. This study did not account for civilian employees in every division of the JIOCs due to the time that would be needed to complete such a vast study.

I identified at least four limitations associated with this research study. First, the roles and responsibilities of each civilian employee varied and were influenced by the culture, climate, and the position they occupy. Second, there was not one succinct definition for “major, complex organizational change” from available literature, so I developed one from a few scholarly sources. Third, the participant sample was limited to the JIOCs that agreed to participate in this

study. Fourth, data collection was limited to a single-session focused on the participants' personal reflections about their leadership experience during JIOC re-organizations.

While I have a personal bias from decades of experience working in JIOCs where the study was conducted, I asked semi-structured, open-ended questions about the leadership behaviors and characteristics participants observed during the reorganization to remove my own bias from the interview as much as possible. I began the study intending to bracket my own experience so that I did not taint any of the participants, but unbracketed during the third fresh round of coding due to the need to characterize language used by participants in the context of working in a JIOC (Husserl, 1931; Saunders et al., 2017). Interviews were held until the point of saturation occurs and no new experiences or themes emerged (Saunders et al., 2017).

Reflections of the Scholar-Practitioner

Reflection was often used throughout the entire research process to help create resilience in the spirit of the experience (Moustakas, 1994). As with any new task or project, I took stock of the ways in which I may add value and then assessed the situation with the study, plan my approach, and ensured my personal goals aligned. Additionally, I identified my personal biases and assumptions so that I could put them aside to the best of my ability during the work (Dickel, 2011). Finally, in this case where no precedent or policies guiding this project existed, I aimed to guard against my own biases and assumptions to ensure no predetermined conclusions and so the participants' voices were shaping the results and findings. With this foundation, I used these techniques in conducting this study to avoid clouding the participants' experiences with my own experience, but my goal was to avoid advertently mischaracterizing the participants' experiences (Moustakas, 1994).

With the above in mind, my decades of experience working in JIOCs did ultimately allow me to fully comprehend the meaning behind the words of study participants (Moustakas, 1994). I consciously analyzed participants' responses to make connections with the underlying dynamics behind the words, and ultimately unbrackets to use own experiences to connect disparate language for the same or similar experiences or concepts. This allowed me to tell the story of DIA civilians' experiences in JIOC re-organizations without losing the voice of the participants by adding participants' quotes to explanations of discrete events and the change phenomenon overall.

Summary

With the unpredictable, frequent policy changes that affect DoD organizations, JIOC leadership need to be able plan for adjusting tasking, manning levels, and overall organization structure. It is necessary for JIOC leadership to manage change with an approach that focuses on employees and fosters employee engagement in the organization. Given the organizational cultural influence that DoD civilian employees hold in JIOCs, these employees are vital in contributing to a positive work environment. Chapter two will consider the scholarly research on leadership in the frame of leader-member exchange (LMX) theory, complexity leadership theory (CLT), enabling leadership, complex adaptive systems, adaptive leadership, organizational structure and culture, leadership attributes, leadership behaviors, resistance to change, silo mentality, and employee engagement.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

This literature review is focused on four distinct themes related to the experience of civilian employees in Department of Defense (DoD) Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOCs) during major, complex organizational change. After presenting the research question, the first section provides an explanation of a bureaucracy. The second section focuses on the hierarchical structure of military organizations and the complexities that accompany matrixed organizations. The third section covers a number of features of organizational change, including change models and organizational culture. The fourth section presents an overview of U.S. government and intelligence institutions, congressional oversight, and where JIOCs are situated in the federal government structure. The fifth section, leadership behaviors, opens with a brief discussion about leadership theories, including complexity leadership theory (CLT) and leader-member exchange (LMX) theory, and complex adaptive systems (CAS), followed by leadership attributes, employee engagement, adaptive leadership, and leadership in bureaucracy.

Bureaucracy

The concept of “*bureaucracy*” stems from German social scientist Max Weber’s work during the German industrialization period in the mid-20th century when mass production began and steadily increased the size of organizations (Gajduschek, 2003). As a result of this growth, employees were organized into large groups, which presented new challenges including favoritism, as certain groups of people had greater influence over the organization (Gajduschek, 2003). Both public and private organizations can adopt a bureaucratic model, although private organizations do not have the same utility for society (Gajduschek, 2003).

Gajduschek (2003) argued that when examining public administration, the bureaucratic organizational model has two main benefits: the provision of democratic governance and benefit

society. As public administrations are dedicated toward greater social good, public administrative organizations may not always be the most efficient, certain, or cost effective, but still contribute value to society overall (Andrews et al., 2017; Gajduscek, 2003).

Andrews et al. (2017) found that complex bureaucratic organizations can benefit from being part of a larger bureaucracy. Meaning, organizations with above-average performance may view intense bureaucratic overhead as a burden, whereas an organization with average or lower performance could net big benefits from being part of a large, complex bureaucratic organization (Andrews et al., 2017).

Government Institutions

As public establishments, United States' Government institutions are inherently bureaucratic with steep, layered hierarchies governed by laws, rules, regulations, and policies set forth by Congress (Park, 2018; Robbins & Judge, 2018). Government institutions do not have a board of directors to provide aspects such as a vision, mission, purpose; financial oversight; sufficient resources that are managed responsibly; or legal requirements and compliance (Eisenstein, 2019). Furthermore, government institutions do not have shareholders, the American public have a vested interest in the organization's results, and governments do not earn profits to satisfy shareholders. The administrators of the federal government institutions must comply with Congressional guidelines to work in the interest of the American people – the public stakeholders watching for efficient use of taxpayer money (Robbins & Judge, 2018).

As part of government institutions, military organizations (including both military service members and civilian employees) are also bureaucratic, with numerous hierarchical layers each having a narrow span of control (Andersson & Zbirenko, 2018; Robbins & Judge, 2018). Andersson and Zbirenko (2018) defined narrow span of control as a supervisor or manager

having five or six subordinates; in a military organization with hundreds of people, this means the chain of command will be quite extensive or steep. Davoren (2019) noted that advantages of this structure include people who can specialize or focus on work areas in special units, employees who are motivated by a defined role and clear career path, and leadership who can quickly adapt as emerging requirements develop. Disadvantages of this structure consist of a rigid protocol that restricts communications, problematic coordination between units, and employee motivation that is often displayed with infighting or favoritism between work units (Davoren, 2019).

Intelligence Institutions

As U.S. Government intelligence institutions are governed by policymakers and reflect policy priorities, intelligence organizations are also hierarchical (Lowenthal, 2020; ODNI, 2013). While 18 U.S. intelligence agencies are governed by the same laws, policies, regulations, and directives, each is structured differently. Among the respective structures, employees are grouped into work units, such as collections, operations, counterintelligence, analysis, planning, targeting, and security (Lowenthal, 2020; ODNI, 2013). Each focused group also has matrixed tasks—not only within the unit internally, but also across similar units, the 18 intelligence agencies, numerous government departments with intelligence units, and ultimately the Director of National Intelligence (Lowenthal, 2020; ODNI, 2013). Consequently, U.S. military intelligence units are highly complex, both internally, with hierarchical structures and matrixed tasks, and externally.

Complex Organizational Structures

Recent management trends include flattening organizations to decrease costs, increase communication flow, and increase productivity and job satisfaction (Garbulo & Lin, 2018).

United States military organizations start with a hierarchical (or tall) structure to ensure rank and file order and discipline. Cilliers and Greyvenstein (2012) found that organizations typically have layers of positions, starting at the top with the most power and influence, and as the layers decrease, employees have increasingly less power and influence at the bottom of the organization. Furthermore, a few of studies found that organizational structure has a substantial effect on communication and performance (e.g., profits) (Andersson & Zbirenko, 2018; Carzo & Yanouzas, 1969; Dalton, 1980; Slade Shantz et al., 2020). Ultimately, employees want to understand their lanes in the road, who they report to—which is particularly important in a military chain of command structure—and how they can fulfill the requirements of their jobs in order to be successful (Cooke, 2016).

Carzo and Yanouzas (1969) examined tall and flat organizational structures in relation to group performance, including decision periods and quality of output (i.e., profits and rate of return on sales). Based on their study, the authors found organizational structure had a significant effect on performance, as flat organizations took considerably more time to make decisions and the rate of return was lower than the tall organizations. Carzo and Yanouzas (1969) noted that while the taller organizations had more levels, they performed better because (a) group members were able to weigh decisions more frequently, (b) middle managers could aggregate data and resolve conflicts, and (c) the narrow span of supervision led to a more orderly decision process. Overall, the authors concluded that leaders in tall organizations required more time to make decisions, while flatter organization experienced longer periods of unresolved conflict and greater coordination efforts (Carzo & Yanouzas, 1969). Additionally, in their study of public organizations, Jung and Kim (2014) found that span of control (or span of supervision) needs to

be balanced with the managers ability to oversee a set number of tasks and should be reconsidered based on the needs of the organization and the individual manager.

Tall (Hierarchical) Structures

U.S. military organizations are known for their rigid chains of command, which typically feature tall or hierarchical structures. Andersson and Zbirenko (2018) found that these structures work well in allowing supervisors to have a narrow span of control to maintain oversight of tasks and ensure subordinates have the resources they need to succeed. Narrow span of control is defined by Andersson and Zbirenko (2018) as a manager having no more than six subordinates, which in a military organization with over 400 personnel means that the chain of command can be quite large or substantial. Narrow spans of supervision have been found to result in more orderly communication and decision processes, as supervisors are able to understand subordinates' problems and have greater opportunity to engage with employees regarding their work (Andersson & Zbirenko, 2018; Carzo & Yanouzas, 1969).

Anderson and Brown (2010) found that steeper hierarchies may support group success, but generally only when working on routine, simple tasks that do not require input in a collaborative network or from a wide range of members. Which supports Carzo and Yanouzas' (1969) findings that while tall organizations may appear complex, these structures have been found to perform better, allowing group members (especially supervisors) to weigh decisions more frequently, particularly when an orderly decision process is needed. Additionally, Jung and Kim (2014) found that narrow span of control can increase employee performance.

Cilliers and Greyvenstein (2012) found that in organizations with tall structures, employees understand the echelons of authority and responsibility, allowing them to specialize in specific areas of expertise and align identity and loyalty within the team. However, tall structures

may also be detrimental to groups when working on more ambiguous, complex tasks, such as intelligence work which is complex (Anderson & Brown, 2010).


In Torrance's (1955) study involving team problem-solving, the Air Force team, which was comprised of service members of different ranks who knew each other, performed worse on solving a math problem compared to a team comprised of strangers who held no military rank. When rank was part of the chain of command, or the chain of authority and decision-making, it complicated the problem-solving equation. Junior Air Force service members had a difficult time convincing senior ranking members that they had the correct answer (Torrance, 1955). When examining attitudes in an organization, a number of studies have also noted "steeper hierarchies predict worse attitudes" (Anderson & Brown, 2010, p. 62).

Marasi et al. (2018) found that both tall and flat structures can create confusion about employees' roles in an organization. However, decentralization of tasking and authorities can increase communication in informal networks, which promotes employees' willingness to actively participate in the organization (Marasi et al., 2018; Zhu & Akhtar, 2014). Advantages of tall structures include having supervisors at levels where they can aggregate information and resolve issues with clarity and depth of information (Carzo & Yanouzas, 1969). In particular, supervisors may be better able to perform analysis of information on critical issues that need to flow higher in the organization and were able to standardize decisions and output of their group over time (Carzo & Yanouzas, 1969; Jung & Kim, 2014). Conversely, disadvantages of tall structures include departmental rivalries where interests are aligned within the team rather than the entire organization, the likelihood of a swollen bureaucracy, and increased salary costs with additional management layers (Andersson & Zbirenko, 2018; Burke, 2018; Carzo & Yanouzas,

1969; Tichy, 1983; see Figure 1 below for a comparison of the overall structure of tall and flat organizations).

Figure 1

Tall vs. Flat Organizational Hierarchy



Note. Graphic is an original creation of the author. Roles adapted from “Effects of Flat and Tall Organization Structure,” by R. Carzo, Jr., and J. N. Yanouzas, 1969, *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 14(2), pp. 178–191 (<https://doi.org/10.2307/2391096>). Copyright 1969 by SAGE Publications, Inc.

Matrixed Tasks

Over the past century, American organizations have been shifting from bureaucratic to matrixed or networked structures to incorporate organizational tasks and culture (Deal & Kennedy, 1982; Satell, 2015). Tichy (1983) found that matrixed organizations are necessary

when working on issues that overlap in terms of (a) technical expertise, (b) a political system, or (c) a cultural system. More specifically, first, the technical expertise includes work that encompasses hard data or skills that are necessary for understanding. Second, a political system is the sense that an organization has an underlying circulation of power dynamics. Lastly, a cultural system comprises the psychological and people aspect of an organization; while intangible, it is the essence of an organized group of people who share values or norms (Burke, 2018; Tichy, 1983).

While matrixed organizational structures may sound logical, Goold and Campbell (2003) discovered that managers found matrixed organizations to be ambiguous, and many have been challenged by defining the roles, responsibilities, and reporting relationships that are necessary to make the structure work. Matrixed tasks are not always simple to put onto an organizational chart and matrixed structures are not necessarily easy to manage (Tichy, 1983). People who work in matrixed organizations focus on projects or tasks that cross the typical organizational structure and are sometimes based on pre-existing relationships (Tichy, 1983). While tasks are temporary and projects are enduring, decision-making can be slow due to a higher number of supervisors involved, which makes management oversight a complicated process (Burke, 2018).

Tichy (1983) found that matrixed organizations have several hurdles to address, including the political aspect of how power is allocated and centralized, the horizontal power balance across the organization, and the cultural issue of different managerial styles. Managers who cannot adjust their styles to fit a matrixed structure will likely be the least effective. In military organizations that include matrixed tasks (on which already feature a tall hierarchical structure), the approach of managers and employees become even more prominent, which often further

complicate achieving success (Andersson & Zbirenko, 2018; Burke, 2018; Carzo & Yanouzas, 1969; Tichy, 1983).

Lei et al. (1999) found that while learning new skills, building competence, taking initiative, and being innovative are all continuous processes, the “‘unlearning’ of previous organizational practices” is equally if not more important (p. 30). Over-layering the unlearning process on top of a complex, matrixed organizational structure further complicates initiative and innovation, and is further complicated by divisional and middle managers who are averse to adopting new procedures and behaviors (Lei et al., 1999). Lei et al. (1999) found that the organizational structure itself does not matter as much as whether managers can infuse the structure and its occupants with new knowledge, which should be welcomed regardless of who introduces it.

To have a successful matrixed organization, Goold and Campbell (2003) found that several types of roles and relationships need to be defined. These unit roles include: (a) broad responsibilities; (b) reporting relationships up the management chain; (c) horizontal or lateral relationships, including principal decision-makers, resource owners, service providers, and team relationships; (d) main accountabilities; (e) specifying design intentions. Furthermore, the authors found eight unit types to be useful in matrixed organizations, including: (a) business units; (b) business functions; (c) overlay units; (d) sub-businesses; (e) core resource units; (f) shared service units; (g) project units; and (h) parent units (Goold & Campbell, 2003).

JIOCs as Complex Organizations

Each JIOC is led by a military officer and is comprised of military service members, federal civilian employees, and contractors. The JIOCs are complex, hierarchical organizational structures that are uniquely designed by the leaders at the respective CCMDs. While artifacts,

such as organizational charts, would be able to explain the structures, at this time, it is unclear the degree of coordination which occurs across the DIE when designing each JIOC structure. Each JIOC Commander and other senior JIOC leaders discuss ideas for change with other JIOC leaders – at least on an informal level for insight into best practices.

Civilian employees, who work in a matrixed, dual hierarchy JIOCs, witness the positive and negative effects of hierarchical and matrixed structures (Burke, 2018; Cilliers & Greyvenstein, 2012). While both flat and tall structures can result in misperceptions and confusion about employees' roles and responsibilities in an organization, organizations that decentralize communications has been found to increase communication in informal networks with a silo mentality, which increases citizenship behaviors (i.e., the desire to apply effort in helping others) (Cilliers & Greyvenstein, 2012; Janis, 1972; Marasi et al., 2018; Zhu & Akhtar, 2014). Janis (1972) was specifically studying groupthink in foreign policy decision-making in national security failures, which ties groupthink to this current study. Groupthink could be caused by shared backgrounds or educational paths, such as being in the same military service, or being in the same socioeconomic group, or having the same religious or political beliefs (Rogers, 2003; Sion, 2016).

JIOCs are also affected by less tangible aspects of organizational structures, including centralization (participation in decision-making [PDM] and hierarchy of authority) and formalization (written rules and procedures are enforced) (Marasi et al., 2018). Both aspects influence the organizational culture if not implemented fairly and overtly and must be balanced to ensure workplace participation in all organizations (Marasi et al., 2018).

Organizational Change

The 21st century has changed the way organizations evolve, the speed of changing technologies means that leaders can no longer casually contemplate change for years before acting (Berger, 2020; Garamone, 2017; Stephenson, 2011; Williamson et al., 2019). With technological advancements, national economies tied to global trade, and continuous social and political change, leaders and employees must act deliberately and plan for strategic, major, complex organizational change in shorter periods of time to achieve desired outcomes (Garamone, 2018; U.S. Department of Defense, 2018; Williamson et al., 2019). As the speed of change has increased, government organizations are at risk of not adapting innovations quickly to meet the changing needs of the national security and of disappointing the public and increasing risk in threats to national security if they do not adapt to new laws, regulations, policies, and executive orders (Zember & Khooshabeh, 2020).

Revolutionary vs. Evolutionary Change

With the mindset that change must be embraced by leaders and managers before their organizations become obsolete, organizational change can be addressed using a few different models. Here, I will focus on one model that focuses two types of change: revolutionary (i.e., transformational) and evolutionary (i.e., continuous or transactional) (Burke, 2018; Gersick, 1991).

Revolutionary change in any organization can be unsettling and intimidating, but when change is accompanied by innovations, leaders can affect revolutionary and evolutionary change simultaneously in complex organizations (Gersick, 1991). Revolutionary change involves major alterations to an organization and may include changes in structure, manning and personnel, funding and resources, internal and external processes, how a service or product is delivered, and

how quality or success is measured (Anderson & Anderson, 2010; Burke, 2018). It may also include changing organizational culture which requires significant leadership efforts to be persistent and deliberate about shifting dynamics (Anderson & Anderson, 2010; Burke, 2018; Schein, 1990).

Evolutionary change includes gradual change often in a specific area of the organization, and can be deliberate (Burke, 2018). Moreover, evolutionary change requires only certain parts of an organization to change, including individuals or teams, and change can be phased to all members over a period of time (Burke, 2018).

Burke-Litwin Model of Change

Burke-Litwin's model of change focuses on the view that large-scale change requires both short- and long-term attention; therefore, the authors suggested that overall organizational performance depends on transformational and transactional change dynamics (Burke & Litwin, 1992). Burke and Litwin's (1992) view of transformational change includes leadership, culture, mission, and strategy. When employees are asked to learn and demonstrate new behaviors, leaders must understand that transformational change includes cultural change. In contrast, Burke and Litwin's (1992) view of transactional change includes psychological and organizational variables, such as employees' motivation to perform, the group's climate that affects performance, management practices, structure, individual skills and abilities, and formalized policies and procedures. Burke-Litwin's model focuses on organizational structure and strategic alignment that define an organization's overall personality, mission, and aim or direction, all of which support its long-term success.

U.S. Joint Military Planning Model

United States joint military planning includes “the process of identifying military ways and means (with associated risk) the President can integrate with other instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, and economic) to implement strategic guidance” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2020, p. i). Additionally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff identify intelligence planning as identifying gaps, prioritizing requirements, developing production plans, and assessing capabilities to identify shortfalls and outline mitigation strategies (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013). This model demonstrates equal importance in organizational planning. Starting with strategic guidance and senior level objectives, then identifying tasks to meet those requirements and associated shortfalls to execute those tasks, followed by prioritizing the gaps and identifying resources to fill the gaps. Finally, the model purposefully compares courses of action (e.g. different task-oriented organizations) to best accomplish mission objectives per established criteria. As this model is well-known by DIA civilians, it could be a useful model for organizational change.


Steps in a Change Model

While there are many ways in which to implement organizational change, I will address Kotter’s (2012) eight-step plan for change, with Burke-Litwin’s (1992) change model, and elements of Department of Defense planning model (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013), which includes transformational change factors for leaders to consider when implementing revolutionary change. A plan for re-structuring an organization would be as follows: (a) Identify strategic guidance and vision; (b) identify requirements; (c) establish a sense of urgency, (d) create a guiding coalition. The guiding coalition then (e) identifies gaps in meeting requirements; (f) use a transparent methodology in courses of action development and recommendation; (g) outlines

two or three courses of action to meet requirements; (h) socializes with a wider peer or colleagues to allow for scrutiny of the courses of action. After receiving feedback, the guiding coalition (i) identifies shortfalls to the plan and mitigation strategies; (j) edits the courses of action; (k) presents options to senior leadership. Following a decision by senior leadership, (l) the senior leadership communicates the change vision to the workforce, (m) empowers employees for broad-based action, (n) generate short-term wins to celebrate the hard work of the members. In the final stages, with the assistance of the guiding coalition and other organizational leaders, senior leadership: (o) consolidates gains, encourages more change or minor adjustments in the organization as necessary, and (p) anchor new approaches in the culture (see Figure 2).

Figure 2

Organizational change planning model (by category of catalyst for change)



Note. Graphic is an original creation of the author illustrating an organizational change process arranged by the change catalysts that would take action.

Leaders who enter a defense intelligence organization may want to lean on the above planning model as they may not realize the historic biases and assumptions that long-term civilians hold (Lipponen & Leskinen, 2006). The intra-unit rivalries and turf protection as well as mid- and senior civilian resistance to cultural changes will not be immediately apparent but must be acknowledged to successfully implement revolutionary or transformational change (Andersson & Zbirenko, 2018; Burke, 2018; Carzo & Yanouzas, 1969; Tichy, 1983). Burke (2018) suggested that extant organizational dynamics need to be considered when choosing to change an organization, as it could mean success or failure. These dynamics include (a) culture; (b) extant systems that loosely tie the organization together; (c) resistance to change, internally or externally; (d) selection of the right leader and their development, including motivation to improve, emotional intelligence, integrity, high energy, and technical skills; (e) learning agility, including risk-taking, flexibility, speed to adopt new tasks, and collaborating; and (f) trust which is particularly vital for change (Burke, 2018; Kiefer, 2005). Leaders may also want to be able to address planned and unplanned change (Uhl-Bien & Marion, 2009).

Organizational Culture

Each intelligence organization has a unique workplace culture, which consists of the explicit and implicit rules that embody the organization (Burke, 2018; Meyer, 2013; Schein, 1990; Starr, 1982). An organizational culture is defined by its history, the people who work there, how groups behave and interact, how rules are followed, whether members hold information back from leaders, and the social identities that comprise the organizational groups (Burke, 2018; Haslam et al., 2011). The JIOCs have a history of being manned primarily by one military service, each of which has its own sub-culture (Meyer, 2013; Starr, 1982). For example, U.S. Strategic Command has been manned with a majority of Air Force service members and

civilians because historically the Air Force had provided the civilian employees and the majority of the military service members. For the same historical reasons, U.S. European Command has been manned with a majority of Army service members and civilians, and U.S. Pacific Command has been manned with a majority of Navy service members and civilians.

As a military-centric organization, the culture in the JIOCs is often shaped by the military service (e.g., Army, Navy, Air Force) that assigns the most people to that organization and by the length of tenure or “on-station” time (i.e., short or long durations; Meredith et al., 2017). The culture will be greatly affected by in-group or homophilous relationships or friendships (Currarini & Mengel, 2016). Haslam et al. (2011, p. 247) describe in-group as being “perceived to be self-defining in a particular context (i.e., a social self-category).” Currarini and Mengel (2016) found that an added layer of social connectivity is evident in groups of like or similar people who then treat each other more favorably; and while individuals tend to interact with other similar individuals, the authors found these connections to be strongly lined with strong biases within the homophilous group.

In some organizations, homophily and in-group bias may be difficult to overcome, and it is particularly challenging to break for members viewed as neophytes (Haslam et al., 2011). Gleibs and Haslam (2016) concluded that people with in-group relations (positive and negative) had a direct relationship to the leader’s behavior as well as how the rest of the followers reacted. When out-group relations begin to affect a top leader’s view of the organization, the leader and other in-group members may feel their positions are threatened or they do not possess sufficient courage to address major issues raised by out-group members, which impedes innovation and progress. Moreover, taking most of their advice from the in-group can cause further stagnation and disgruntlement among the segment of the workforce that is not in this group (Gleibs &

Haslam, 2016; Rogers, 2003). Ultimately, the organizational culture that surrounds a JIOC depends on several factors, including the history and composition of the organization, group behaviors, and whether members hold information back (Burke, 2018).

United States Intelligence Institutions

United States intelligence organizations are governed by the U.S. constitution through Congress, which has (a) the power to create agencies and departments; (b) the power of budget; and (c) the power to enact laws, policies, and regulations (Lowenthal, 2020; ODNI, 2013). The Constitution also outlines the role of commander-in-chief in defending U.S. interests and the judicial branch's legal oversight of the statutory nature of laws and orders (Lowenthal, 2020).

Numerous laws govern the U.S. intelligence community; the most notable law in the past century is the National Security Act of 1947. This law was passed when the Soviet-U.S. Cold War was just beginning. It provided the legal basis for the U.S. intelligence community and created the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) as well as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) under the Director (Lowenthal, 2020). This was done to ensure oversight of national intelligence estimates; however, government departments and agencies also had their own intelligence which often contradicted CIA analysis yet had little platform with policymakers (Lowenthal, 2020). Of note, the CIA could have been run by a military officer, could not command military troops, and did not have any domestic role or powers. Furthermore, the act did not include any reference to activities associated with the CIA, such as espionage, covert action, or intelligence analysis (Lowenthal, 2020). Instead, the act merely stated that the CIA would coordinate intelligence from various agencies (Lowenthal, 2020; War and National Security Act, 1947). The National Security Act of 1947 created a structure which included the Secretary of

Defense and the National Security Council (NSC); this structure remained in place until 2004 when the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) was created (Lowenthal, 2020; ODNI, 2013).

The intelligence community has been blamed for politicizing intelligence; however, this has often been attributed to agency directors or department secretaries who have altered intelligence to save their budgets or increase their overall power (Lowenthal, 2020). An early example of this was in the late 1950s when President John F. Kennedy entered the White House, as there was no solid consensus over the number of Soviet missiles that could threaten American interests (Lowenthal, 2020). Kennedy's new Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, was highly suspicious of what he saw as Republican-serving intelligence analysis, leading him to create the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to install military intelligence analysts who worked for his own department. Where disagreements existed, DIA could also counter what he saw as CIA's politicized analysis (Lowenthal, 2020).

Of note, the National Security Act of 1947 did not permit the CIA to spy on American citizens. Yet, during the Vietnam War (1964-1975), the CIA was investigated by both houses of Congress (1975-1976), which discovered a series of violations of spying on U.S. citizens (Lowenthal, 2020). This fact not only placed public trust in the CIA in question, but it also put Congress on report for not maintaining oversight of the intelligence community. This instance forced the House and Senate to create permanent intelligence oversight committees, which since have developed more rigorous oversight of intelligence as well as task intelligence organizations (Lowenthal, 2020).

Initially sanctioned in 1981 by President Reagan, Executive Order 12,333 explicitly laid out the roles and responsibilities of U.S intelligence organizations by agency and the rules for conducting intelligence activities with a mind toward protecting American civil liberties (EO

12333 was amended in 2004 and 2008; Lowenthal, 2020). More recent legal reform was taken after the terrorist attacks on American soil in September 2001 and in 2004 following the invasion into Iraq to find non-existent weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (Lowenthal, 2020). Because the 9/11 terror attacks had not been anticipated by the intelligence community, Congress began an investigation into its performance (Lowenthal, 2020; ODNI, 2013).

To improve coordination between the intelligence community and domestic law enforcement, Congress passed the USA Patriot Act of 2001—the first major legislative action following the 9/11 attacks. The act expanded authority for some agencies to collect intelligence and conduct law enforcement activities, which were enacted to reform the structure of the intelligence community (Lowenthal, 2020). In 2004, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004, which reorganized the intelligence community by replacing the DCI with the DNI, which was purposely outside of any agency or department, but was tasked with overseeing and coordinating intelligence (Lowenthal, 2020; see Appendix C for ODNI governing policies).

Congressional approval of the IRTPA provided Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) with budgetary authority over the National Intelligence Program (NIP) which funded the CIA and managed the ODNI (DeVine, 2020; Nemfakos et al., 2013; Sherman, 2005). In 1994, Congress created a new category of the budget for defense-wide intelligence programs called Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) (DeVine, 2020). In 2005, the Secretary of Defense merged the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) and the JMIP to create the Military Intelligence Program (MIP), which assigned direct responsibility to USD(I) for military policies and responsibilities (DeVine, 2020). USD(I) directed the military service component directors to manage the MIP budget, which meant that DIA controlled the

budget for defense military intelligence and took over charge of the military and civilian workforce in the CCMD JIOCs (DeVine, 2019, 2020; Erwin & Belasco, 2013; Nemfakos et al., 2013; Sherman, 2005).

The Defense Intelligence Agency and the Defense Department

Organizationally, DIA is under Secretary of Defense and has been overseen by the Under-Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) since its creation by Congress in 2002, when then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld wanted to decrease the number of people reporting to him about defense intelligence (Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General [DoD IG], 2018; Lowenthal, 2020; U.S. DoD, 2008). In 2014, USD(I)'s portfolio was expanded to include security issues, such as “cybersecurity, insider threats, unauthorized disclosures of classified information, and biometrics,” and was also renamed to the Under-Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S)) (Lowenthal, 2020, p. 55; U.S. DoD, 2008). Therefore, the acronym USD(I&S) will be used to reference the Under-Secretary of Defense that oversees defense intelligence.

Defense intelligence from multiple agencies funnel through USD(I&S), which oversees the policies, budgets, and requirements for the defense intelligence agencies, including DIA, the National Geo-Spatial Intelligence Agency (NGA), and the National Security Agency (NSA) (Lowenthal, 2020). However, both NGA and NSA also fall under the DNI as well, which presents governance challenges. Lowenthal (2020) stated that “neither the DNI nor USD(I&S) can issue orders or directives to NSA or NGA without taking into account the sensibilities of the other office” (p. 55), meaning Congressional oversight restricts the extent of DNI and USD(I&S) authorities (DeVine, 2020).

While the USD(I&S) directly oversees defense intelligence activities and is directly under the DNI, this role does not have legal status and could be eliminated by either the Secretary of Defense or the DNI (DeVine, 2019; Lowenthal, 2020). USD(I&S) and DIA are the two conduits for defense intelligence issues to reach both chambers of Congress. However, USD(I&S) has more power than DIA with Congress, particularly in terms of intelligence requirements and over the defense agencies that produce intelligence, including DIA, NSA and NGA, and collection platforms, such as RC-135 aircraft (also known as “air breathers” because there is a human onboard operating the platform; Lowenthal, 2020). USD(I&S) has direct contact with the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and has the authority of the Secretary of Defense to oversee defense intelligence. Furthermore, USD(I&S) is scrutinized by the DNI, and because of this, they enforce the DNI’s ICDs for defense intelligence analytic production (see Appendix C for ODNI governing policies; Lowenthal, 2020; ODNI, 2007).


Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOCs)

Another complicating factor in defense intelligence relationships is that of the Combatant Commands (CCMDs). The CCMDs are aligned both regionally and functionally; each of the 11 CCMDs and U.S. Forces Korea have a JIOC (Gilmore, 2006; U.S. DoD, 2008). Moreover, each CCMD has an Intelligence Directorate (the joint code for intelligence is “J2”) and each J2 is led by a 1-star or 2-star general or admiral. The J2 directorate is either also designated as a JIOC or the JIOC is a division underneath it (there is no community standard as of the date of this study; Lowenthal, 2020). The JIOCs are comprised of between 400 and 1,000 personnel, depending on the unique missions tasked to the center (Gilmore, 2006; U.S. DoD, 2008).

JIOCs are tasked with intelligence missions, including collections, operations, counterintelligence, analysis, planning, targeting, and security (Lowenthal, 2020; DoD IG,

2018). While the JIOCs include the military hierarchical structure, the analysis mission adds an extra hierarchical structure on top in order to direct analysis, ensure DNI intelligence analytic tradecraft is properly applied, and coordinate and collaborate is throughout the editing chain (Lowenthal, 2020; ODNI, 2007). Additionally, numerous tasks are matrixed throughout the JIOC, including specific missions such as planning, collections, and analysis as well as ad hoc tasks that come directly from DIA, USD(I&S), or the Joint Staff (see Figure 3 below; Lowenthal, 2020).

Figure 3
JIOC and DIA Chains of Command



Graphic by K. G. Picard, 2022

Note. Graphic is an original creation of the author illustrating the chain of command, from the Executive Branch through the Department of Defense (DoD), the Combatant Command, and to the J2/JIOC. It also illustrates the USD(I&S) position under DoD and its linkages to Congress and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

Leadership Behaviors

Leadership is defined by Northouse (2019) as “a process whereby an individual influences a group of individuals to achieve a common goal” (p. 5). According to Olson and Simerson (2015), leadership is comprised of four components: the transactional process, the transformational influence, group dynamics, and common goals. First, I will outline complexity leadership theory which explains the quality of relationships between leaders and followers. Next, I will address the first two components, as leadership itself is vital in improving business outcomes in the public and private sector (Bottomley et al., 2016; Hur et al., 2011).

Leadership Theories

Northouse (2019) found that leadership is not only a set of skills and actions in managerial work, but also a process. When thinking of JIOC leadership, leaders must be concerned about four primary things, including people (Carzo & Yanouzas, 1969; Haslam et al., 2011), tasks (Tichy, 1983), the environment (Harter et al., 2002; Jo & Shim, 2005; Maslach & Leiter (1997 Maslach et al., 2001), and supporting decision-making and policymakers in safeguarding national security (Garamone, 2018; U.S. Department of Defense, 2018; Williamson et al., 2019; Zember & Khooshabeh, 2020).

As a concept and as an action or behavior, leadership is a complex, dynamic process that exists between people and viewpoints or ideas (Lichtenstein et al., 2006). Leadership must transcend people, tasks, environment, and supporting national security, but it is also a product of inter-personal exchanges (Lichtenstein et al., 2006). In the terms of social systems, which are

non-linear and exist between chaos and stability, leaders must be ready and willing to adapt their leadership style and the organizational inter-workings or components, in addition to allowing bottom-up creativity (Marlon & McGee, 2006). This is particularly important for leaders who work in organizations that involve ambiguous, unprecedented problems in rapidly changing environments (Northouse, 2019; Tichy, 1983; U.S. Department of Defense, 2018).

Both complexity leadership theory (CLT) and leader-member exchange (LMX) theory support the necessary components of leadership that may be observed and needed in JIOCs during major, complex organizational change. To paint a full picture of the theoretical framework that surround the phenomenon of JIOC leadership challenges, I will also review complex adaptive systems (CAS), as it is a foundational element of CLT and important to examining JIOCs as complex, matrixed organizations.

Complexity Leadership Theory (CLT)

According to Marion and Uhl-Bien (2007), CLT is entangled in any massive bureaucratic structure that includes planning, organizing, and missions, which comprises every JIOC organization in the U.S. Department of Defense. According to Marion and Uhl-Bien (2001), effective leadership should be focused on learning to get the most out of members' interactions in the organization in order to cultivate conditions in which members can innovate to enable positive outcomes. The founders of CLT, Uhl-Bien and colleagues (2007), explain leadership as a process of managing less with bureaucratic processes and more with skills that manage uncertainty in constantly changing environments so that they foster new ideas and enable a culture of growth mindsets. Marlon and McGee (2006) concluded that followers are the core strength of a complex organizational system, and that it is the followers who have control of their leaders.

According to Uhl-Bien et al. (2007), CLT is necessary for “the knowledge era” which is characterized by the need for faster learning, faster innovation, increased speed, flexibility, and adaptability to meet any organizations’ goals. The concept is underpinned by the social systems that comprises the organization (Marlon & McGee, 2006). Finally, McKelvey and Boisot (2003) found that for any organization to function effectively, the system that governs the organization must be equally as complex as that of the environment. Meaning, in an organization that is part of a rapidly changing environment with matrixed tasks, multiple overlapping networks of individuals and groups, and external influences, the organization must be governed by an equally complex system that enables members to search for solutions. Simplifying an organization with rigid boundaries, compartmentalized organizational responses, and simple communications will only add more complexity to meeting organizational goals.

Complexity Theory. As background, theorists of complexity theory underscore that organizational structures and cultural behaviors emerge out of unseen influences and non-intuitive or learned reasons or behaviors (Marion & Uhl-Bien, 2001). Meaning, that each member of a system has a role to play in the larger system of behaviors and the way in which the system functions, and while members may not easily recognize their part in learning cultural behaviors and may not formally influence others’ behaviors or the structure of how a system works, each member plays a role in the larger system. Simply put, micro-behaviors affect macro-behaviors (Marion, 1999).

Because of this, a number of complexity theorists argue that in order to use a bottom-up principle of innovation and efficiency, leaders will want “creativity, productivity, and innovation [to come] out of people who are provided opportunities to innovate and network” (Marion & Uhl-Bien, 2001, p. 401). Furthermore, the best results in complex organizations were found

when bottom-up innovation and productivity were allowed and encouraged, versus using top-down directives (Marion & Uhl-Bien, 2001). Complexity theory combined with CLT is particularly important for JIOCs as they have policies routinely changed with new presidential administrations, and they encounter ambiguous or unprecedented tasks or processes on a daily basis. Further, while networking from a bottom-up approach is valuable, complexity theorists found that the aggregate of multiple, complicated, interlinked mutually dependent networks is more valuable than independent networks (Marion, 1999; McKelvey, 1999; Regine & Lewin, 2000).

Leadership in Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS)

Complex systems include formal and informal dynamics and include dynamics of the relationships between bureaucratic and administrative functions (Uhl-Bien et al., 2007). As leadership is more than a position or authority and needs to be adaptive, Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) are comprised of “emergent, interactive dynamic[s]” (Uhl-Bien et al., 2007, p. 299). CAS emphasizes that leaders experience a complex relationship from which a collective motivation for action and change arises, particularly when diverse individuals or groups interact in networks in productive ways that generate new patterns of behavior or new modes of functioning (Uhl-Bien et al., 2007). CAS is a basic unit of analysis in complexity science, and regarding leadership it is important to understand CAS as including multiple overlapping hierarchies (like comprise JIOCs), the individual members of the organization, and the network that links these components together (Uhl-Bien et al., 2007).

Complex systems are subjected to *unpredictability*, and because of the unpredictability that is fundamental to a complex system, JIOC leaders cannot easily define, validate, or control the ultimate future efficiency of that organization (Marion & Uhl-Bien, 2001). Considering

complexity theory in relation to leadership, practically speaking, leaders will benefit from being mindful of the three facets. First, *interactions* within and between groups should be considered as independent actions and leaders will benefit from understanding group behaviors in the context of interactions within that group and with other groups (Marion & Uhl-Bien, 2001). Second, the *correlation* of understanding *how* groups interact informs leaders of the degree to which the groups are stable and able to tackle the matrixed assignments they receive (Marion & Uhl-Bien, 2001). Finally, *unpredictability* in complex tasks and organizations are best tackled by leaders who have purposefully developed the skills necessary to confront surprise situations (Marion & Uhl-Bien, 2001), to allow followers to collaborate for a joint solution from the bottom-up (Marlon & McGee, 2006).

Leader-Member Exchange (LMX) Theory

Leader-Member Exchange (LMX) theory is included in this research proposal because it bolsters the explanation of leadership as a process and as relationships are important to building trust that is vital to supporting national security, relationships are vital particularly for matrixed organizations where two people may communicate regularly with one employee or group (Andersson & Zbirenko, 2018). The leader-member relationship is characterized by “the quality of exchange between leaders and each of their followers” (Zhou & Schriesheim, 2009, p. 920). Leaders develop close relationships with some members or subordinates and only a distant relationship with other members (Kessler, 2013).

LMX theory suggests that leader-member relations are comprised of “the degree of confidence, trust, and respect members [or subordinates] have in their leader” (Robbins & Judge, 2018, p. 190). Overall, the quality of the leader-member relationship has great influence on employees’ attitudes and behaviors (Kessler, 2013). The basis of LMX is that organizational

roles are negotiated between new members and the leader; depending on the personalities involved, the quality of the relationships vary between the leader and each member, which affects social exchanges (trust, obligation, and interpersonal connection) and economic exchanges (explicit, distinct, and tangible transactions; Kessler, 2013; Northouse, 2019).

Kiefer (2005) found that when workers already trust organizational leadership, negative emotions are partially mediated. “Trust in the organization is an indicator for the belief about how the organization will behave towards employees in the future” (p. 891). Likewise, the lack of trust will lead to employees’ intentions to withdraw and withdrawal behaviors, which will negatively impact the organization’s climate (Kiefer, 2005).

Leadership can become complicated when two people either share responsibility for one member’s work or two or more leaders supervise one employee (Andersson & Zbirenko, 2018). LMX includes mention of this phenomenon by outlining that multiple leaders over one team or individual means numerous dyads or two-way relationships, which can lead to increased conflict between the leaders and decreased team efficiency (Andersson & Zbirenko, 2018). When leaders communicate and work together to resolve issues, they can collectively lead subordinates to the same goal (Andersson & Zbirenko, 2018).

Leaders’ Attributes

To identify leaders’ attributes in this study, I define *leader attributes* as including, but not limited to, the following: (a) influencing followers positively, (b) having a positive relationship, (c) providing direction and guidance, (d) listening carefully to followers, (e) being open to new ideas, (f) relinquishing some control, (g) allowing employees to participant in problem solving, (h) giving voice to low-status or out-group employees, and (i) acting to change things under leaders’ authority (Bakker et al., 2006; Northouse, 2019). Kotter (1990) argued that management

is aimed at creating order and stability; whereas leadership is aimed at seeking inspiring followers to reach organizational goals through adaptive and constructive change. Kotter (1990) argued that organizations need both management and leadership; an organization with solid management but without leadership will be highly bureaucratic. Conversely, Kotter (1990) also argued that an organization with strong leadership but without good management will be listless or without direction as leaders may be able to direct change, but not all can manage good outcomes. I will briefly explore the following two types of leadership: transactional and transformational (Burns, 1978).

Transformational Leadership

Burns (1978) first introduced the notion of *transforming leadership* to describe political leadership, and now with the additional work from Bass (1985), the term has been updated to *transformational leadership* and is used to describe organizational leadership psychology. Transformational leaders are those who inspire followers to see past their own self-interests and are capable of motivating followers to perform above expectations in the interest of the organization (Bass, 1985; Burns, 1978). They provide vision and instill a sense of mission and pride in each follower, both of which help gain respect and trust. These leaders are good communicators who convey high expectations and infuse purpose for each follower in their messages (Bass, 1985; Burns, 1978). Transformational leaders promote personal and professional advancement, rational thinking, and innovative problem solving. In addition, they encourage creativity and are eager to decentralize responsibility. Lastly, transformational leaders take more risks with a long-term view of success for the organization and make followers feel as though they have more control over their work (Bass, 1985; Burns, 1978). Bass (1990) argued that the 21st century will require leadership that empowers, envisions, and enables the workforce.

Northouse (2019) added that it is important to understand that leaders are not better or more important than followers.

Transactional Leadership

Burns (1978) also introduced the term *transactional leadership*, used to describe leadership through making contact to exchange something that is values, and who direct or motivate followers toward documented organizational goals by focusing on clear roles and task requirements. Bass (1985) also added to this concept by arguing that transactional leaders “mostly consider how to marginally improve and maintain the quantity and quality of performance, how to substitute one goal for another, how to reduce resistance to particular actions, and how to implement decisions” (p. 27). Laissez-faire leadership is the most passive and least effectual form of transactional leadership (Bass, 1990). Transactional leadership also includes management by exception which means leaders do not proactively address problems and therefore are ineffective (Bass, 1990). Finally, transactional leaders may be able to lead followers with the promise of rewards and punishments (Bass, 1990).

Group Dynamics

Leadership encompasses “the leader influencing a group, organization, or community; others, the group, must be involved in the transaction in order for leadership to occur” (Olson & Simerson, 2015, p. 23). Group dynamics are commensurate with intergroup relations which are influenced by the social identities that exist in any organization (Lippon & Leskinen, 2006). Intergroup relations or group dynamics may be comprised of supervisor communications and interactions, social interactions between colleagues, employee performance, (Abd-El-Salam et al., 2013), team diversity, (Earley & Mosakowski, 2000), the organizational climate, (Jo & Shim, 2005), diversity, function, and tenure (Christian et al., 2006).

Common Goals

Leadership encompasses a leader focusing energy on individuals who are trying to achieve a common goal; simply by having influence, a leader effects those who are being led (Northouse, 2019). Followers and leaders must work together to successfully accomplish common goals, and leaders and followers must share the moral commitment toward common goals which affects an organization's values (Northouse, 2019). Leadership includes a focus on common goals, a mutual purpose, something the group achieves together (Northouse, 2019).

Employee Engagement

According to Maslach and Leiter (1997), "engagement is characterized by energy, involvement, and efficacy" (p. 34), and in a workplace setting, it begins with leadership interactions with employees to enable participation in meaningful exchanges (Jo & Shim, 2005; Maslach et al., 2001). Harter et al. (2002) added that *employee engagement* refers to the individual employee's interest, contribution, and satisfaction at work. Meredith (2017) included that employee engagement with both formal and informal leaders or stakeholders is important.

From the angle of leadership, Van Dam et al. (2008) found that leaders who deliver information, build trust, and offer meaningful participation in decision-making will have the best chance at realizing highly engaged employees in the workplace. Through meaningful engagement, Maslach et al. (2001) found that employees who are engaged with leadership are more likely to enjoy their work because they feel appreciated by their superiors and therefore are happy to remain part of the organization. Employees who actively participate in the workplace also derive purpose and meaning from their work, including being able to express their professional opinions, being part of solutions, and having some authority over decisions in their specialized area (Kahn, 1990).

Organizations that offer time to members to think through problems more slowly can not only enforce disciplined communications and procedures, but they can make better decisions (Kahneman, 2011). Additionally, a useful quality for members to possess is intellectual curiosity, which is used by some people to generate new, original ideas (Chamorro-Premuzic, 2014). People with intellectual curiosity often appear to be non-conformists, but this quality is valuable for managing complexity where there is persistent ambiguity and where individual members are constantly seeking more knowledge (Chamorro-Premuzic, 2014; Von Stumm, Hell, & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2011). In bureaucratic organizations, such as JIOCs, where there is a relentlessly changing knowledge environment, leaders' goal is to communicate ambiguous information (and tasking), and where risks need to be managed, DoD intelligence analysts need to be able to use their critical thinking skills (for which they were hired) to navigate the organization.

Harter et al. (2002) found that while organizational culture influences employee engagement and satisfaction, individual employee traits had less of an effect on organizational culture. To evaluate engagement, the authors found that to better understand employee engagement, leaders may want to inquire as to whether employees are receiving proper resources, access to new skills development, and the right type of training. Moreover, leaders can ascertain whether employees know their purpose at work and if they feel their work is important and valued (Maslach et al., 2001). Managers must engage employees on a personal level as participants in the organization to establish trust and reinforce employees' purpose, as interpersonal communications also includes nonverbal communication (Harter et al., 2002; Jo & Shim, 2005; Meredith, 2017).

Adaptive Leadership

Today's U.S. Armed Forces are faced with complex challenges that require leadership who are skilled at tackling and solving complex problems with timely, collaborative, effective, and novel solutions (Garamone, 2018; U.S. Department of Defense, 2018; Williamson et al., 2019). JIOCs need to be staffed with leaders who can navigate changing national security threats and fiscal and policy environments and who can meet the challenges of preparing military service members, civilians, and contractors to analyze the threat environment in a timely manner (Zember & Khooshabeh, 2020). The DIE cannot afford for unproductive workplace culture to get in the way of the DoD's vital job of safeguarding national security (Burke, 2018; Gersick, 1991; Schein, 1990).

The challenges that intelligence professionals face each day span the spectrum of threats, from adversaries' military sea, air, and land weapons, weapons of mass destruction, cyber and space weapons, violent extremists, natural disasters, and pandemic health threats (Lowenthal, 2020; U.S. Department of Defense, 2018). Because of this variety of challenges, JIOC leadership need to possess characteristics that span the spectrum of leadership theories and approaches. Adaptive leadership is one framework that can assist individuals and organizations to adapt to changing environments and effectively respond to recurring problems, including changing environments (e.g., adversary threats, requirements, budgets), addressing recurring process problems, and responding to external change itself (Northouse, 2019; Uhl-Bien et al., 2007).

In 1978, Burns highlighted the implied power that leaders possess in the leader-follower relationships, but it was Heifetz (1994) who first published the seminal book about *adaptive leadership*, which has occupied a unique place in leadership literature. Heifetz's work (1994) has been effective at explaining how leaders can engage in activities that motivate and organize

people and tasks, and how leaders need to be willing to adjust behaviors and practices when necessary to focus the attention of followers.

Heifetz and his colleagues (2009) suggested that “adaptive leadership is the practice of mobilizing people to tackle tough challenges and thrive” (p. 14), and that leaders must know what is valuable and must be preserved, as well as what needs to change for overall improvement. Uhl-Bien et al. (2007) reinforced Lichtenstein et al.’s (2006) notion, that leadership is a complex, dynamic process, with the view that organizational leadership is embedded in a complex system that is comprised of formal managers but is also informed by history and informal dynamics. Day (2000) further distinguished management and leadership with the management applying solutions to known problems and leadership helping groups learn adaptive thinking against unpredictable problems.

Uhl-Bien et al. (2007) found that leadership is an interactive process that adapts influence based on various situations to produce desired outcomes. Northouse (2019) asserted that adaptive leadership is more about followers than leaders as it focuses on how leaders assist others in doing their work and involves adapting to challenges they all face. Adaptive leadership is less about power, more about teamwork as leadership can only occur when there is influence over one or more people, but always in groups aiming to thrive (Northouse, 2019).

Adaptive leadership is aimed at encouraging change in people, processes, and organizations (Northouse, 2019). Heifetz (1994) found that leaders have influence over followers to mobilize collective efforts to overcome challenges and that leaders can use their ability to diagnose problems, appeal to individuals’ values to support changes. While leaders use their formal authority when necessary to re-frame issues, they also mediate conflicts, advocate for reallocation of resources, and assign specific responsibilities to specific individuals or groups.

Finally, Heifetz (1994) underscored the need for leaders to build a coalition for shared leadership as a single leader cannot resolve all issues and a coalition of leaders will bring the necessary innovative thinking and behaviors to create change that will last (Heifetz, 1994; Heifetz & Laurie, 2001).

According to Heifetz (1994), leadership must adapt behaviors to encourage others to address and resolve change. Uhl-Bien et al. (2007) offered a framework of three leadership functions. First, *adaptive leadership* is the adaptive, learning, innovative actions that are born out of collaborative engagement; it is an “informal emergent dynamic that occurs among interactive agents [who are part of the complex adaptive system] and is not an act of authority” (Uhl-Bien et al., 2007, p. 305). Second, *administrative leadership* refers to the “actions of individuals and groups in formal managerial roles who plan and coordinate activities to accomplish organizationally-prescribed outcomes in an efficient and effective manner” (Uhl-Bien et al., 2007, p. 305); this includes structuring tasks, engaging in planning, creating vision, allocating resources to reach goals, and to manage crises, including managing conflicts and organizational strategy (Uhl-Bien et al., 2007; Yukl, 2005). Lastly, *enabling leadership* refers to setting the conditions in an organization in which adaptive leadership can thrive, managing those conditions where innovation and adaptability are needed, and facilitating the flow of knowledge and creativity (Uhl-Bien et al., 2007).

Northouse (2019) advocates for an adaptive leadership model that includes three types of situational challenges, including technical challenges, challenges with both technical and adaptive components, and adaptive challenges. *Technical challenges* are clearly defined problems or issues in the workplace with a process, procedure, or other technical issue, and can only be solved by having someone with a specific expertise (Northouse, 2019). For example, a

JIOC's leader may have the authority to make fiscal decision solve the problem of a lack of software or lack of contract support to update current software, and they may be able to cause the work to be done to write the contract work.

Technical and adaptive challenges involve clearly defined problems or issues but do not have a clear solution in the organization or the system of organizations (Northouse, 2019). Resolving the problem is shared by the leader and the followers, the leader may be a resource for followers, but the followers have to do the work and need to learn to adapt to the change or challenge (Northouse, 2019). For example, a JIOC may want to streamline how tasks come into the organization so it is easier for external clients to know which team works on a specific geographic area, such as Russia or China issues. The JIOC leader may move a few people from one team to another, and the division and branch leaders would need to adapt how they communicate with employees to accomplish the tasks.

Adaptive challenges are not clearly defined and have no clear owner to resolve the challenges; they cannot be solved by a leader or expert and cannot be achieved with the current ways of doing things in the organization (Northouse, 2019). Resolving problems requires leaders to encourage followers to define the challenges and identify solutions; these are not always easy, they are frequently resisted, and usually require people to change their values and beliefs (Northouse, 2019). For example, a JIOC leader may have a new mission that requires the leadership team to brainstorm solutions, which may lead the team to provide the leader (decision-maker) courses of action that include moving a substantial number of people and resources to a new division. This division's processes did not previously exist, so the leadership and new division team adapts current processes to meet the new mission. In tackling the adaptive challenges, the JIOC creates new values and beliefs surrounding the new mission area.

Leadership in Bureaucracy

While JIOCs are part of the U.S. government and are comprised of bureaucratic chains and processes (Gajduschek, 2003; Robbins & Judge, 2018), the added cross-sectional nature of JIOCs' work inside the U.S. Intelligence Community adds an extra layer of bureaucracy, in addition to DIA civilian and the joint military services that comprise the workforce population (Callahan, 2017). JIOC leaders need to understand the complex nature of the organization they lead and the complexities that collide within their organization to be successful at their missions in the U.S. national security arena.

JIOC leaders often change their organization to accomplish a change in higher headquarters' missions and functions, or a new initiative that their CCMD leadership wants, such as more analysis on a specific threat country or group. Fernandez and Pitt (2007) found that managers of public organizations often change their organizations because of the desires of their superiors. Fernandez and Pitts (2007) research on public managers as change agents because JIOC leaders are routinely in contact with transient CCMD senior leaders who have new visions and goals. They are also in frequent contact with leaders across the DoD and Intelligence Community who desire to see improvements the analytic support from the JIOCs.

While the traditional military chain of command sits at the core of a JIOC, the secondary layer of analytic review must be acknowledged and codified to enable future military leaders and members of JIOCs to understand how to accomplish work or production in the local JIOC culture. Leadership in a bureaucracy includes cross-sectoral leadership or shared leadership with people across the organization. This shared leadership is vital to empowering JIOC members to accomplish work for the mission (Callahan, 2017).

JIOC leaders must master the local culture before making any changes to the JIOC organization. Without that knowledge, the JIOC leadership will disrupt the internal dynamics, the members' ability to negotiate with each other, and may inadvertently disrupt or misalign internal missions with external outcomes. JIOC leaders may inadvertently disrupt culture and innovation – particularly when internal re-organization chaos disrupts members' ability to get daily work done (Deal & Kennedy, 1982). Fernandez and Pitt (2007) found that public managers who buffer subordinates from external influences to decrease uncertainty (Thompson, 1967) are more often able to innovate at the micro-level; those successful micro-level pilots are often channeled upward and adopted by the organization overall. Finally, disruptions to the organization can decrease members' ability to measure the JIOCs' results or to build new networks (Anderson & Anderson, 2010; Burke, 2018; Callahan, 2017; Uhl-Bien et al., 2007).

Cross-sectoral leadership is necessary in bureaucratic organizations. JIOC leaders will want to acknowledge the shared power that is necessary to get work done by mid-level leaders who do the bulk of the work (Callahan, 2017). To be successful, JIOC leaders could hone leadership skills aimed at building relationships with members, taking interest in people, championing members' ability to build knowledge, building networks, empowering mid-level members to lead from the positions they hold, developing processes, identifying organizational needs and members' needs, and managing risk throughout (Callahan, 2017; Uhl-Bien et al., 2007).

Working in complex organizations requires JIOC leaders to embrace adaptive leadership behaviors thereby evolving to create relationships with JIOC civilian members to evoke the best work possible out of them (Heifetz et al., 2009; Uhl-Bien et al., 2007). These interactions will

reinforce civilians' desire to serve the public in national security and will build the collective relationship to accomplish the JIOC mission (Kahn, 1990).

Summary

Due to the complex nature of the JIOCs, including overlapping chains of reporting and matrixed task organization, military and civilian leaders in JIOCs need to develop a solid plan for major, complex organizational change and receive buy-in from civilian employees in order to avoid resistance when ordering change. Accordingly, when engaging with civilian employees, leadership may want to develop leadership skills that are adaptable to rapidly changing situations, welcoming bottom-up innovation, and should attempt to gain an understanding of the culture underpinning the organization and the circles of trust that civilians can influence. Both military service members and civilian employees need positive leadership and would benefit from leadership engagement, including communications and guidance when JIOC leaders aim to design and tackle a major, complex organizational change with the support of civilian employees. The next chapter is an overview of the methodology of the study.

CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this phenomenological study was to develop an understanding of the leadership characteristics displayed throughout a major, complex organizational change event and the relationship between leadership characteristics and how leaders engaged DoD civilian employees during the reorganization. This chapter includes information about the research design, study participant and recruitment, data collection (tools and procedures), data analysis process, and the ethical considerations. The ultimate goal of this research study was to create best practices for leaders to prepare for change. The research design included details of the phenomenological approach that was employed.

Research Question

The following research questions were used to guide this qualitative study:

How do DoD civilian employees' experience leadership during major, complex organizational change?

In support of the main research question, one sub-question supported the main question:

Which leadership characteristics appeared to exert the greatest impact over civilian employees during the change event?

Method

This section provides an overview of the research design followed by an outline of participants selection, including DoD approval for DIA civilian participation. Also, a summary is provided about the details of methods for data collection, including procedures and tools, and data analysis, including methodological integrity. Finally, ethical considerations for this study are presented, including professional relationships, institutional review board (IRB) approval, and confidentiality and anonymity.

Research Design Overview

While considering and selecting the subject of study, I specifically searched for a method that would best answer the research question and identified IPA since it allows for the inclusion of separate instances of phenomena (Moustakas, 1994)—including leadership behaviors and employee engagement—to be easily compared. To make the research manageable, interviews were conducted with individual members who were willing to participate from the three JIOCs that were known to have had recent re-organizations. I focused on individuals willing to participate and I used the snowball technique to garner additional participant with a breadth of experiences, both positive and negative, various mid-level paygrade, and male and female participants. This provided an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon, which is the goal of this and any similar phenomenological study (Creswell & Poth, 2018).

The method employed in this research study was interpretive phenomenological analysis (IPA), which is known as hermeneutic phenomenology (Moustakas, 1994). The goal of IPA is to examine people's lived experiences at the individual level to develop a deep understanding in the context of a phenomenon—in this case, the experiences of employees and supervisors during organizational change (Kafle, 2011). Heidegger's take on hermeneutic phenomenology is that the researcher cannot be completely objective and suspend their personal opinions in the research, but the researcher's aim should be to interpret the lived experiences through a narrative, allowing anyone to understand the individuals' experiences (Kafle, 2011). The aim of IPA is to identify detailed perceptions, feelings, and understandings of a particular group of people who share an experience (Smith et al., 2009).

A key reason for using IPA was that it allowed for an inductive or “bottom-up” approach in order to understand the connection between the interview data, the individual participants, the

environment, and my own reflection process (Reid et al., 2005). This means I entered the participants' environment through their descriptions of feelings and reflections of their lived experiences. Participants' words were then used to code the data into categories and themes (Saldaña, 2009).

Acknowledging my own biases and assumptions through my work as an intelligence analyst (Creswell & Poth, 2018), I began this study by bracketing my experience and knowledge to not taint the interview participants' comments (Husserl, 1931; Saunders et al., 2017). Interviews were held until the point of saturation occurred and no new experiences or themes emerge (Saunders et al., 2017). Later, as I analyzed the interview data, I used my knowledge of JIOCs to interpret the meaning of the experiences and to articulate associated conditions that participant expressed (Kafle, 2011; Moustakas, 1994).

Participants

Phenomenological studies require participants have direct knowledge and experience of the phenomena being studied (Creswell & Poth, 2018). After obtaining IRB approval, I submitted a request for DoD approval of this study. Due to office restructuring in the DoD, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) ultimately granted approval for me to proceed with this study of DIA civilian employees. After DIA approval was granted (see Appendix I), DIA civilians were identified at the three JIOCs for participation in the study. DIA civilians (federal civil servants) were identified who served as front-line employees and supervisors in three JIOCs in different geographic locations (see Figure 4 below).

At the time of the study, each JIOC was comprised of between 400 and 1,200 members. Initially, interview participants were selected based on my professional relationships with people in the JIOCs. I contacted at least one participant in each JIOC via email and used the snowball

technique with each participant during the interview to request names of other potential participants (Babbie, 2017). Every attempt was made to obtain participation from multiple layers of the organization at each JIOC to ensure data was not solely based on junior or senior employees.

The study required that all participants have experienced a recent organizational change event and were in the organization for at least four months following the event. I obtained demographic information and verified the experience of each participant. The study included limited demographic information, such as age, gender, position title, and years in DIA and CCMDs.

To create a well-balanced overview of the change event in this study, my goal was to obtain at least three employees from each of the three JIOCs. Pseudonyms were used to ensure identities are kept confidential; additionally, the specific identities of the three JIOCs were also kept confidential and not tied to the participants or the study's findings.

Figure 4*Map of Three JIOC Locations in This Study*

Note. This graphic is an original creation of the author illustrating the geographic locations of the three JIOCs that are the focus of this study.

Data Collection

The primary data source for this study was from interviews of DoD civilian employees who experienced an organizational change event in their JIOC. In addition to interview data, a short survey was conducted to gather demographic details. No supporting data was collected due to the classified nature of the intelligence work conducted in JIOCs.

Data Collection Procedures

While Creighton University has an institutional review board (IRB) process, the JIOC organizations are organizationally situated under the Department of Defense (DoD) and the

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) (see Figure 3). I gained DoD approval through DIA's Office of Oversight and Compliance to interview DIA employees (see Appendix I).

After obtaining final IRB (see Appendix H), and DIA approval (see Appendix I), invitation letters and my plan of study were sent to initial potential participants (see Appendix D). A general timeline of the study was shared, as well as the link to scheduling an interview via Calendly (2021). During the first few interviews, participants were asked for other potential participants (Babbie, 2017).

In-depth, semi-structures, open-ended interview questions were used, along with memoing (Smith et al., 2009). No other artifacts, such as organizational charts or other documents presented during the reorganizations were used due to the classification of those charts. In-depth interviews were used to explore the views and experiences of individual participants (Creswell & Poth, 2018). Semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions allowed me the greatest flexibility to guide participants through the interview and to use the participant's words to explore their experiences (Babbie, 2017; Creswell & Poth, 2018). I used memoing to note participants' emotions, but also my ideas, insights, and words to explore in data analysis (Smith et al., 2009).

Data Collection Tools

Two data collection tools were used for this qualitative IPA research study, including semi-structured interviews and memo writing (Smith et al., 2009). I employed member checking for the themes and sub-themes by asking one participant at each JIOC to check the themes.

Interviews with DoD civilian employees were the primary sources of information. Initially, interviews were conducted via Zoom with semi-structured, open-ended questions about their experiences of the organizational change event (Smith et al., 2009). Since face-to-face

interviews were not ideal when addressing geographically dispersed participants, after receiving consent from the participants, interviews were conducted and audio was recorded over Zoom (2021) to conserve time and money. Audio recordings were transcribed by a professional transcription service UpWork.com (2021) to save time (Bampton & Cowton, 2002; Opdenakker, 2006).

I had intended to conduct at least three interviews per JIOC and up to 15 total interviews. At 14 interviews, I saw the data was at point of saturation, when no new experiences or themes emerged (Saunders et al., 2017).

While memo writing is not a core feature of IPA research, it was used to capture nonverbal communications during interviews to capture participants' reactions and feelings about the change event (Smith et al., 2009). While evaluating the data, I noted nonverbal reactions from interview notes as well as identified areas for follow-up interview questions to connect any missing data (Ricoeur, 1981; Tan et al., 2009). As part of the data collection process, Creswell and Creswell (2018) stated that archival materials can be collected to expand the analysis of lived experiences. The research did not include organizational charts, strategic planning notes, or presentations.

Since the organizational change events were from three different geographic locations and occurred in the past, I did not conduct any participant observations during the interviews or study. I employed member checking by sharing the major themes from the study with some participants to ensure saturation and accuracy (Creswell & Creswell, 2018; Birt et al., 2016).

The data storage plan for this study involved saving transcriptions and audio recording on a personal password-protected iPad and computer via the cloud to easily transfer files and avoid the use of USB drives. The information and participant information were stored with a secure

password only known to me, the researcher. The recordings will be destroyed after the dissertation defense is completed, which will protect against unintended voice recognition of the participants.

Data Analysis

The IPA (or hermeneutic) research methods require the researcher to not only understand the words study participants use, but also to understand intentions and meaning behind the words (Moustakas, 1994). The researcher must delve into the conscious description and the underlying dynamics behind the words. As such, as the researcher, I examined the distinct language participants used to describe their unique experiences in JIOC re-organizations. People's perceptions of reality are critical to the IPA method as it is committed to the lived experience of individuals (Kafle, 2011; Moustakas, 1994). This view of the participants' words was used to categorize similarities and differences in the collected data, which enabled meaningful patterns to emerge from the experienced phenomena (Creswell & Poth, 2018).

After each interview was conducted, I sent out the audio files to be transcribed by a third party hired through UpWork.com (2021). Full transcripts were available for initial analysis roughly one week after each interview was conducted from a member of UpWork.com (2021). After first reviewing all 14 transcripts individually to highlight major themes on paper, a multi-cycle coding process to include by-hand, open, axial, and in vivo coding was used to elucidate themes from the raw interview data. I tackled my first round of coding with my experiences in JIOCs bracketed.

After uploading the transcripts into the MAXQDA (2020) qualitative data analysis software program, my first round of coding started by examining the interview data with hand coding in the margins of the interview transcripts. In MAXQDA, I used the hand coded notes to

start examining the data with the in vivo coding technique. These in vivo codes were derived from the words or phrases that participants used in their interviews. This generated a high number of codes, so I then used open coding to break up the discrete parts of the in vivo codes. This process aided me in identifying the essence of the participants experiences of the re-organizations. I then utilized axial coding which enabled me to combine or group more specific data or codes into a smaller number of general data categories. The initial codes were largely comprised of negative feelings and views of leadership behaviors during re-organization events and codes that focused too much on specific individual re-organizations, not phenomena that tied issues in all events.

Because of a personal time-delay which interrupted data analysis, when I reexamined the codes, I discovered that I had dozens of interrelated in vivo codes which made it difficult to combine the codes into individual phenomena, so I repeated the entire coding process from scratch. For this second round, first, again, I employed in vivo coding to re-examine and code the words and phrases used by interview participants (Creswell & Creswell, 2018; Saldaña, 2009). Second, I utilized the open coding technique to break up the in vivo codes into individual phenomena of interest. Third, I employed axial coding to combine the phenomena into larger overarching categories. Finally, after the second time examining the data with in vivo, open, and axial coding techniques. At the end of the second round of coding, the codes were again largely negative with less than half of the participants having positive statements about leadership behaviors.

As this topic is enveloped in complexity, the categories emerged into several themes that had overlapping sub-themes. Because of this, after another time-delay interruption, I realized that it was vital to unbracket my own experience working in JIOCs for the final, third round of

coding. By unbracketing my experience, I was able carefully examine the nuanced language used by the DIA analysts. This switch in my own mindset enabled me to visualize the big picture. Again, first, I employed in vivo coding to re-examine and code the words and phrases used by interview participants (Creswell & Creswell, 2018; Saldaña, 2009). Second, I utilized the open coding technique to break up the in vivo codes into individual phenomena of interest. In this round of open coding, I did more focused MAXQDA lexical searches, which allows several different words to be pulled into a spreadsheet at once. This practice enabled me to use the participants various terminology for the same issue, such as the complexity of the organization was discussed in both broad and detailed terms, but the word “complexity” was not used. Open coding certainly worked with the lexical searched, but with such a complex topic, the overlapping themes and sub-themes were difficult to pinpoint, so honing these skills necessitated unbracketing and using my own intelligence analyst critical thinking skills. In a final review of the codes and phenomena in MAXQDA, I realized that a few sub-themes were missing from the final categories, so I added them at this stage, under specific phenomena. Third, I employed a final stage of axial coding to combine the phenomena into larger overarching categories that fit the JIOC analysts’ experiences. Finally, after this third iteration of examining the interview data with in vivo, open, and axial coding techniques, the larger categories emerged.

My own unbracketed experience enabled me to not only filter participants’ words but implement axial coding to the best of my own analytic ability. My understanding of JIOCs as complex, matrix, bureaucratic organizations enabled me to deeply examine and contemplate the interview data, which emboldened me to generate umbrella themes that are relevant to real-world situations, not only focused on the negative views of leadership behaviors that participants experienced. Moreover, as someone who has worked at the GG-13, GG-14, and GG-15 level as a

DIA civilian in two CCMD JIOCs, I brought subject matter expertise, and subjective but practical filters to the umbrella or axial coding effort. Key findings emerged as a result of my use of an interpretive framework that included textural elements (e.g., personal experiences) and structural elements (e.g., conditions, situations, and/or context that frame personal experiences) (Creswell & Poth, 2016; Moustakas, 1994; Saldaña, 2009).

Methodological Integrity

My lens for reviewing the data was filtered by my understanding of the research related to complex, bureaucratic organizations, adaptive and complex leadership theories, and leadership in bureaucracies. Additionally, as someone who has been in JIOCs during re-organizations at each of the paygrades of the study participants, my analysis of the interview data was filtered by my own knowledge. Interviews were held until the point of saturation occurs and no new experiences or themes emerged (Saunders et al., 2017).

As I am mindful of my own experiences, I aimed to bracket my experience and to use in vivo coding. However, while I was executing data analysis with an objective, brackets mindset, since the codes overlapped extensively, I decided to unbracket and apply my subjective experiential. My unbracketed filters were useful in the coding work to create umbrella categories, which enabled me to create sub-themes under the two umbrella themes, which was especially useful regarding organizational structure and employee engagement (Husserl, 1931; Saunders et al., 2017).

Throughout the data coding process, I employed triangulation in order to validate information from several sources (Creswell & Poth, 2018). Throughout coding and data analysis, I archived thoughts and observations in memoing, which provided an audit trail and involved

diagramming themes to illustrate connections for use in the final study results (Ricoeur, 1981; Tan et al., 2009).

To ensure methodological integrity, I asked several participants to review the themes and sub-themes that emerged from the coding. A few participants offered ideas for refinement, which I considered and accepted. The absence of observations of the participants did not harm this study as the practice is not necessarily reliable, according to Babbie (2017).

In order to ensure validity, I employed member checking a second time to confirm my proposed solutions. This was aimed at ensuring the proposed solutions were feasible with military leaders and military or DIA training networks.

Every effort was made to ensure analytic processes were consistently applied throughout the study; moreover, any inconsistencies which arose were explained and contextual information and was provided to reinforce the findings (APA, 2020). Finally, data was displayed in figures and tables to ensure study results are clear to readers (APA, 2020; Ricoeur, 1981; Tan et al., 2009).

Ethical Considerations

As human subjects were involved in this study, Creighton University's Institutional Review Board (IRB) process was utilized to guarantee the drafted interview questions and the research design were ethically sound. Initially, training through Creighton University's Collaboration Institutional Training Initiative (CITI) for Research Ethics and Compliance training was completed in October 2020. As part of the IRB process, I provided an overview of the benefits and risks for participants in this study; I also provided the participants with the Bill of Rights for Research Participants (see Appendix E).

Professional Relationships

My decision to conduct interviews over Zoom ensured the participants were not sitting in their workplace and that no one of power could influence participants' interview answers as the participants were either in their homes or in other private areas of their choice (Creswell & Poth, 2018; Opdenakker, 2006). Additionally, participants identities were cloaked in pseudonyms to ensure that individual participants were not identifiable (Creswell & Poth, 2018). The pseudonyms used for participants were either chosen by them or assigned alphabetically by me, which further ensured anonymity and confidentiality. Also, I took great care to ensure confidentiality and anonymity including ensuring all saved recordings, transcripts, and data were stored on password protected devices, to which I only had access. I also refrained from describing participants in any detail that would allow others to identify them. This rigor was also applied to the direct quotes that I pulled from transcripts, ensuring key words and phrases would not identify individual participants.

Institutional Review Board Approval

In addition to obtaining Department of Defense approval through the Defense Intelligence Agency, which I addressed in the Data Collection Procedures section, I needed to obtain IRB approval from Creighton University. I completed the required IRB training October 14, 2020, through the Creighton University approved Collaborative Institutional Training Initiative (CITI). All required documents were submitted to the IRB for approval. The final versions of the required forms were submitted to Creighton University's IRB following the completion of the proposal defense and were included in the final report of this study.

Confidentiality and Anonymity

Ethical considerations for this study included participant anonymity and confidentiality in order to safe-guard sensitive information that participants willingly shared. Participants were treated with the utmost respect and confidentiality throughout the study (Wiles et al., 2008). The informed consent letter also detailed that participants could withdraw from the study at any time.

The utmost care was taken to mask the identities of participants. Pseudonyms were used to anonymize the names of participants apart from the data. Individual participant's data was not shared with anyone else, and the data was presented in a way to ensure the participants' identifications were not disclosed (Wiles et al., 2008). Pseudonyms were purposefully not connected to JIOC locations to add an extra level of identity protection. Finally, audio recording and participants pseudonyms were kept in a password-protected file in my personal computer, also password protected.

Summary

This chapter outlined the methodology and the research design that were employed to conduct this interpretive phenomenological study on leadership behaviors experienced during major, complex organizational change at three geographically distinct JIOCs. The use of interviews enabled DIA civilian employees at JIOCs to share their experiences of leadership behaviors during the organizational change events. The study included audio recorded interviews, data analysis using thematic coding, some member checking of themes. Participants were briefed on the research process, provided the Study Participant Information Letter (see Appendix D) and a Bill of Rights (see Appendix E). Finally, the confidentiality of participants was protected throughout the study with pseudonyms. The next chapter presents the results and findings of this study.

CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS AND FINDINGS

The following chapter presents a description of the research results and findings from interviews of 14 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) employees. As summarized in Chapter One, the purpose of this phenomenological study is to understand the lived experiences of DIA civilian employees and JIOC leaders during a change effort. This chapter presents the results that answer the primary research question: How do DoD civilian employees experience leadership behaviors during major, complex organizational change? Additionally, one sub-question supports the primary research question: Which leadership characteristics appeared to exert the greatest impact over civilian employees during the change event?

Exploring how the personal experiences of DIA civilians in the context of the phenomenon of a re-structuring event in a JIOC provided personal stories and experiences of the participants. This phenomenological study used an inductive strategy where patterns emerged from raw interview data to formulate a set of themes (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). The themes were extracted from the descriptions of participants' lived experiences that illustrate experiences, knowledge, and perceptions related to the social phenomenon of organizational change that was the focus of this study.

As detailed in Chapter Two, the context of this study is the bureaucratic nature of JIOCs, the hierarchical structure and complexities of matrixed organizations, and the leadership behaviors experienced in JIOCs during change events. Specifically, this study explored the lived experiences of DIA civilian employees at the individual level to develop a deep understanding in the context of the phenomenon— in this case, the experiences of employees and supervisors who were intelligence analysts during organizational change. This chapter contains the results of the

study, summary information about participants, an overview of the data analysis process, detail regarding the findings that emerged from the study, a discussion, and a summary section.

Results

By using an interpretive phenomenological analysis (IPA) methodology, the meaning of the study participants' lived experiences was revealed through the telling of their personal life stories (Kafle, 2011). As discussed in Chapter Three, a bottom-up approach (Reid et al., 2005) was used to gather quotes from the interview transcripts that formed the open and emergent coding into categories and themes (Creswell & Poth, 2016; Saldaña, 2009) that comprise the results of this study. The IPA approach used to inform these results was chosen to convey a deeper understanding (Kafle, 2011) of the phenomenon that the study participants experienced (Smith et al., 2009). This IPA framework facilitated the discovery of textural and structural descriptions of participants' experiences. Participants' experiences during JIOC re-organization phenomena drew detailed descriptions of the complex nature of the JIOCs where they lived their experiences (Creswell & Poth, 2016; Moustakas, 1994).

A phenomenological qualitative study was conducted and obtained data from 14 participants. To participate in the research study, individuals had to meet the following criteria: (a) be a current DIA employee; (b) have experienced the organizational change event; (c) be in the organization for at least four months following the re-organization event; and (d) currently work at a U.S. CCMD at the time of the interview. Prior to their initial interview, the interviewer verified each participant was a current employee of DIA and was working at a Combatant Command that had recently experienced a re-organization. Following the interviews, participants completed a brief demographic information survey (Appendix G). The participants' pseudonyms as well as demographic information are described in Table 1.

Participants

Participants of this study were predominantly over the age of 35 (86%) with at least six years of employment with DIA and three years of experience at a CCMD. Seven of the 14 participants identified as male (50%) and seven identified as female (50%). Five of seven male participants were over the age of 45 (36%); two males were between the ages of 35 and 44 (14%); one female was over 45 years of age (7%); two females were under the age of 34 (14%); and two females were between the ages of 35 and 44 (14%). No questions were asked about race or ethnic identity.

Half of the participants (seven) were GG-14 paygrade (50%), three were GG-13 paygrade (21%), and four were GG-15 paygrade (29%). Years of experience at DIA ranged from six to 20 years with an average of 12.6 years. Position titles ranged from Team Senior Analyst (14%), Branch Senior Analyst (14%), Senior Intelligence Analyst (29%), Senior Intelligence Officer (29%), and Division Chief (or equivalent) (14%). Experience at a CCMD ranged from three to 18 years with an average of 10.2 years. All participants in the study were current DIA employees at the time of their participation.

Participants were asked a total of nine questions during their sixty-minute interviews over Zoom. Participants' interview responses were analyzed and coded for themes, for which I employed member checking by sharing the major themes from the study with some participants to ensure saturation and accuracy (Creswell & Creswell, 2018; Birt et al., 2016). Coding practices were described in Chapter Three, and themes and sub-themes are presented in the following section.

Table 1

*Participant Demographic Information and Pseudonyms
(assigned alphabetically by participants' choice or in order of interview)*

Pseudonym	Gender	Age	Paygrade	Years with DIA	Years at a CCMD
Aden	Male	45+	GG-14	13	13
Baxter	Male	45+	GG-14	17	14
Charlie	Male	45+	GG-14	8	11
Darby	Female	35-44	GG-13	12	12
Eban	Male	35-44	GG-15	17	15
Felix	Male	35-44	GG-15	17	3
Gina	Female	35-44	GG-14	12	12
Haley	Female	25-34	GG-13	6	3
Imogen	Female	35-44	GG-14	11	11
Jaxen	Unknown	25-34	GG-13	10	5
Kelly	Male	45+	GG-15	11	11
Leslie	Female	35-44	GG-15	15	4
Maddox	Male	45+	GG-14	8	12
Nadia	Female	45+	GG-14	20	18

Note. Data was gathered from a survey design by K. G. Picard implemented on the Qualtrics website. Qualtrics and all other Qualtrics product or service names are registered trademarks or trademarks of Qualtrics. Copyright © 2022 Qualtrics.

Data Analysis

As described in the Data Analysis section of Chapter Three, after receiving the 14 transcripts from UpWork.com, all 14 transcripts were reviewed individually to highlight major themes on paper and by-hand coding was conducted in the margins of the transcripts. Then all 14 transcripts were uploaded into the MAXQDA qualitative data analysis software program (2021).

In MAXQDA, open, axial, and in vivo coding was used to elucidate themes from the raw interview data.

While I attempted bracketed coding in the first round of coding, which I realized later was not as useful. Having been a member of two JIOCs in a supervisor analyst role (GG-13, GG-14, and GG-15) and a non-supervisory analyst role (GG-13 and GG-14), I brought subjective experiential filters to coding, which enabled the coding work.

My own experience flavored my review of the data, which enabled me to filter participants' words based on my understanding of the research related to complex, bureaucratic, matrixed organizational change, leadership behaviors, employee engagement, communications, and organizational culture. Moreover, as someone who has worked at the GG-13, GG-14, and GG-15 level as a DIA civilian in two CCMD JIOCs, I brought subject matter expertise and subjective but practical filters to the coding effort. Conscious of my experiences, I attempted the use of in vivo language for the coding as it was noted as a best practice (Creswell & Creswell, 2018; Saldaña, 2009). However, participants' experiences and language were so diverse that in vivo coding did not always enable useful themes. Key findings emerged as a result of my use of an interpretive framework that included textural elements (e.g., personal experiences) and structural elements (e.g., conditions, situations, and/or context that frame personal experiences) (Creswell & Poth, 2016; Moustakas, 1994; Saldaña, 2009).

After reaching saturation with the 14 interviews and reviewing both the transcripts and audio recordings several times, I shared the major themes and sub-themes with a few of participants to ensure saturation and accuracy (Creswell & Creswell, 2018).

Findings

Ultimately, two major themes emerged as umbrella codes with 13 sub-themes from axial coding. The major themes that emerged included culture, which encompassed seven sub-themes, and planning, which encompassed six sub-themes (see Figure 5).

Figure 5

Summary of Study's Two Major Themes and 13 Sub-Themes

Theme 1: Culture – JIOC culture must form the basis of leaders' behaviors	Theme 2: Planning – Military model planning methods should be employed for successful re-organizations
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1a. Mid-level members are vital to mission success in major, complex organizations 1b. Complexity increases during a re-organization, particularly for mid-level, process users 1c. Intelligence analysts have unique intellectual skills that are key to mission success 1d. Overseas locations are restrictive for members during re-organizations 1e. Members who rotate into the organization often complicate mid-level members' work 1f. Dual analytic and administrative chains of command complicate mid-level members' work 1g. Re-organization during a global pandemic or geo-political crisis further impedes member satisfaction 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2a. Leadership engagement creates trust, members' buy-in, and generates communications 2b. Leadership communications must be unambiguous and transparent 2c. Townhalls and all-hands' meetings are good venues to communicate 2d. Champions of change (or members with buy-in) are key to success 2e. Forming a diverse planning team is vital for success, particularly in organizations with a diverse, mixed workforce 2f. Leaders' goals, vision, and requirements need to be well understood for expedient, practical re-organization execution

Graphic by K. G. Picard, 2022

Note. This graphic is an original creation of the author illustrating the geographic locations of the three JIOCs that are the focus of this study.

Theme 1: Culture – JIOC culture must form the basis of leaders' behaviors

Cultural issues were a resounding theme mentioned by all 14 participants. The theme of culture of complexity includes six supportive sub-themes. The first sub-theme focused on the mid-level JIOC members who lead from multiple angles. The second sub-theme was focused on the complex nature of the JIOCs as organizations. The third sub-theme encompassed the two

chains of command that DIA civilians worked through in JIOCs. The fourth sub-theme identified the unique skills and intellectual curiosity that JIOC intelligence analysts possess. The fifth sub-theme focused on the increased complexity that occurs due to members rotating every two or four years. The final sub-theme focused on the issue of JIOC members who are stationed overseas and cannot quickly or easily leave a job in the middle of a re-organization.

When discussing the complex culture, Gina stated that “There’s very much an “us or them” culture. This is the worst “us or them” culture I’ve seen in my time working for DIA, which is now 11 or 12 years, partially because of this.” Gina also underscored the expertise that civilians bring to the intelligence analysis mission when she said:

Air Force [personnel are] only here for two years, ... they have to do a year on the watch. Then, [by] the time I [train] them to the point where they can do [intelligence analysis], they're gone. [In] surveys, the military [members] complain that they don't get to do any actual intelligence. I'm like, “Well, I have a quick-turn tasker from the four-star [Commander]. Who am I going to ask to do it? The airman who just came off the watch or [a seasoned civilian expert] who has been doing this job for 40 years?”

Darby added detail about the complexities of the computer networks needed to do intelligence work and the various browsers necessary to access webpages, when she stated:

We have anywhere from three to four [computer] networks that we work on across the day, and we are expected to look at all three networks, because if you want to know where you're supposed to go and who you're supposed to meet, you better be checking the [unclassified] network, but if you want to actually get your work done as an IC professional, you better be on [the top secret computer system] or at a minimum the [secret computer system]. That alone is complex.

Even with agencies' [web] pages, everyone is using a different internet browser. You must know that if you want to use this website, you cannot use Mozilla. It must be X, Y, or Z. This one will not open in Internet Explorer, or ... Chrome. It's [very] frustrating. Not only do you have to know all the disparate sources to get all of your intel, but now you must also remember of the four different internet browsers, which one will actually work. It can definitely make our day, but it's definitely a different definition of complexity.

Aden added that "giving analysts a good starting point, but not all products are reviewed the same.... if you have something as basic as a J2 [Request for Information (RFI)] that comes in during the brief, that is much more minimal review process." Additionally, regarding the entire analytic review process, Aden stated the following:

...The review process for products that cross division [lines] is still very unclear, at least to some of us at the division level when they dissolved the [final review office]. They leaned almost entirely on the divisions, which is fine when you have a product that is contained within just one adversary but it didn't seem like JIOC leadership communicated very clearly what that review chain were to look for a division.

Kelly described how the transient military leadership sometimes do not look out for civilian employees when he stated the following:

For leaders, what they have to understand, anytime you move into reorganization is, "what is the culture of the organization you're in?" We're in a military organization. [Military members] move in every few years in general. Sometimes, [military leaders] come in and go, "Well, I say, you do. It doesn't matter what you're used to doing. It doesn't matter the culture." They're going to drive it, and then what do you hear the

civilian say? “Well, how long can you hold your breath because I can hold my breath forever? I'm going to wait three years until that J2 transitions out or that general officer goes off to their next job, and then we'll just start again with a new person.”

Kelly went on to say that “when the Commander says jump, we jump. If you're constantly jumping, who's looking out for you? Who's got your interest? ... Unfortunately, with that churn of military leadership, that doesn't always happen.”

The JIOCs' complex organizational cultures are informed by the way things or work is done, the tacit assumptions that groups make to solve problems, the group's way of thinking or perceiving problems (Deal & Kennedy, 1982; Schein, 2009). Also, the JIOC cultures are comprised of complex hierarchical structures (Andersson & Zbirenko, 2018), military chains of command (Vargas, 2016), matrixed tasks (Lowenthal, 2020; ODNI, 2013), and strict reporting criteria (Goold & Campbell, 2003). The more layers of complexity that are added to a member's or group's work environment, the more leadership should behave in transparent and unambiguous ways. Anderson and Brown (2010) found that tall structures may also be detrimental to groups when working on more ambiguous, complex tasks, such as intelligence work which is complex in itself (Heuer, 1999).

Other cultural issues that arose are outlined in the six sub-themes below. While each JIOC has a unique culture, the following sub-themes were found in each of the three JIOCs, which are comprised of civilians, military, and contract members.

Sub-Theme 1a: Mid-level members are vital to success of major, complex re-organizations

This was a resounding theme from all 14 participants. Mid-level members or employees are key leaders in organizations such as JIOCs, where mid-level members are supervisory or non-supervisory civilian analysts and deputies (GG-13 and GG-14) and military officers (O-4

and O-5). People who work at the JIOC's middle level know the complex culture of the organization and are vital to working through processes, completing tasks and projects, communicating up, down, and across the organization, and in accomplishing the mission through research, writing, briefing, and teaching others. The DIA civilian expertise also endures through changes in U.S. Presidential Administrations as they possess the knowledge of the strategic guidance and how to work with Congress that enables their work in intelligence analysis to be successful.

While DIA civilians can rotate in and out of JIOCs like the military servicemembers who rotate every two to four years, DIA civilians have longer tenure and time-on-station. Even with shorter overseas' assignments, the DIA civilian employees possess the long-term expertise that underscores organizational continuity throughout perpetual military turn-over. In fact, Maddox stated that the people who knew how to get the work done were "not the [GG-]15s because they're entrenched. [GG-]14s stood out farther, but the [GG-]14s and [GG-]13s who are still one foot in the 'salt mine' and one in senior leadership." He went on to say that "the [GG-]14s are still one step away from all the discussions and all the rationale for how decisions are made. ...The workforce underneath the [GG-]14s and below are the guys who carry out the actions."

Haley stated that mid-level leaders (GG-13 and GG-14) often serve as "conduit[s] between analyst level issues, problems and concerns, and communicating that to higher branch leadership and at times, division leadership. Production planning, but also admin, leave, questions, and travel." She went on to say that as a mid-level lead analyst in an Acting SIA role, she was "not a supervisor ... just [an] informal team lead. [It's] the lowest level of fake responsibility. I am able to accomplish my job by my team buying into me having responsibility but there's no formal responsibility associated with it."

According to Goold and Campbell (2003) organizational members or employees can have several roles and responsibilities that are often sophisticated and multifaceted. Individual roles can transcend the layers of bureaucracy, areas of accountability, and the multiple objectives and missions or goals of the organization itself. The organizations that were studied are complex and have complex mission sets, which can only be accomplished with members or employees who can think critically about how to get those missions accomplished.

Sub-Theme 1b: Complexity increases during a re-organization, particularly for mid-level process users

All 14 participants described working in a complex organization where their main functions and missions were accomplished through multifaceted research, critical thinking, writing about multidimensional analytic topics, networking, coordinating, receiving tasks or requirements from multiple people or offices, and working through complex processes to publish analytic assessments. The fourteen participants described working in an organization where they have several sources of leadership telling them what to do, have many identities, have many types of tasking, and many paths to accomplishing those tasks.

Imogen stated, “one division was being made into two. Then another division was being dissolved and those [functions] were being integrated into two different divisions. [The planning support] of that division was being moved directly under [the front office].” This statement alone, illustrates the additional complexity of administrative and analytic issues during the re-organization. Not only moving civilian employees, military servicemembers, and contractors, but also desk seating arrangements, and administrative re-alignments in the multiple electronic programs that are required for performance appraisals, position descriptions, and re-assignment to new supervisors.

Within JIOCs, members talked about having many bosses, many complex tasks and processes, and require many lenses through which to view their roles but also by which they need to portray different views of the organizations they comprise (JIOC, CCMD, DIA, and IC). Exactly 50% of the participants (seven) described hard and soft skills that enable them to meet the organization's mission successfully, and included their views that these soft skills may be over-looked as valuable leadership traits by more senior leaders. Finally, mid-leaders emphasized their perspectives that included the transient military members which complicate the hierarchical nature of the organizational leadership's recognition of the mid-level employees' roles as leaders.

Leslie stated: "Our organization has more layers of complexity than it needs by far. I am theoretically the lead for something. I've been a GG-15 for nearly a decade, yet I [must] ask ... seven people before I can complete a task." Jaxen highlighted that their role was complicated from the aspect of networking with offices where similar work was being done. They stated:

Responsibilities are making sure the team is producing analysis on appropriate topics, encouraging the people on the team to talk to their counterparts with their levels, fostering relationships between organizations ... with [DIA headquarters] and [our JIOC, and] foreign partners. ...Making sure that people are talking to [others] or picking up the phone, cold calling, and saying, "Hey, we're both working on the same thing. We should be talking to each other. Who on your team is working this?" It's that kind of networking aspect.

Imogen expanded on this notion that GG-14 analysts play a complex role in a JIOC when she made the following comment:

The interesting thing ... with the work complexity is that you have so many sources of leadership, but you don't necessarily have a boss if that makes sense. A lot of times, I feel like loyalties are very divided between your identity because your identities are so different. Am I representing my branch? ... my division? ... the [JIIOC]? [The higher headquarters Command] or the J2 [Directorate]? It all depends on who your audience is. [Also] because it's not just the domestic environment, the internal dynamic of [the Command], ... but it's also what you represent in the complexity of dealing with the rest of the IC, the DIA, or the components.

Leslie added that post-reorg in a COVID environment added further complications with external offices that could not get in touch with the right people when she stated the following:

[Other CCMDs were] on minimum manning. They don't know who to contact in our teams because [they] all changed. Suddenly, our interoperability with the IC was disrupted because now we have new [email] distros.

Jaxen provided a good description that was shared by others when they explained the two chains of command at the Branch or Team level in the following statement:

It's meant to be a [GG-]13 paired with an OIC, an Officer In Charge, who is generally an O-3... The division of labor in [the O-3] was meant to be the Team Lead. The civilian [Senior Analyst] was meant to be the *analytic lead*. It'd take point on handling the teams' analytic lines in conjunction, obviously, with up the chain to the SIA and SIO. The OIC is meant to be more of the *administrative lead*, signing leave forms and keeping everyone in the team in line, although, depending on the team, the OIC understands the analytic lines.

Eban expounded on the re-organization in a positive light, but added that their division remained relentlessly complex:

The JIOC is probably less complex post-reorg I feel. It's probably less complex than a lot of other commands. I think that in [my division in the JIOC], that's slightly less true and more complicated only because we literally have two entire chains where we fall under, both the J2 and work for the J2 and we're part of the JIOC, but we also are directly federated and support the [another office in the Command]. We have two different one-star [Directors]. One owns us [administratively], but the other one has the full tasking authority and is our boss for a production customer perspective.

Furthermore, Eban explained how DIA governs the analytic production that is done at the CCMD JIOCs. In the case of that JIOC, Eban explained about Defense Intelligence Analysis Program (DIAP) lanes and the Board of Governors that directs the lanes or topics to each DIA Center, military Service Intelligence Centers, and CCMD JIOCs.

... we are co-owners of the threats to [the mission] DIAP lanes. We're both co-producers, co-owners, but they have made the decision in the contract that [the DIA center] is going away ... then we are going to become the sole responsibility ... of that mission.

There's whole DIA Board of Governors [with a] charter so that means other agencies who were part of the charter have the say. JIOC lanes have to be redrawn, that's once-a-year process where those changes. There are other things that play into it, but from an internal productions perspective, we could very easily just rip the band aid off and [the DIA center] could be like, "[CCMD JIOC], you got it. You guys are the official review board. We'll forward anything to you. If you need help, ask us.

Marion and Uhl-Bien's (2001) research connects cultural behaviors to each member's role and micro-behaviors in the organizational structure as learned behaviors inside the organization. Meaning that each member of the organization has a role to play in solving problems, accomplishing goals and objectives, and achieving work outcomes – including middle members (Marion, 1999). Marion and Uhl-Bien (2001) found that organizations performed best when members were encouraged and allowed to innovate and drive productivity from the bottom-up. In matrixed organizations, the added benefit of members' networks can increase innovation with a bottom-up approach. Without the middle members or employees, the work and mission would not succeed (Marion, 1999; McKelvey, 2007; Regine & Lewin, 2000). "Enabling leadership is most often vested in formal (often middle management) positions because of their access to resources and authority, but it may also be performed by informal agents as well" (Uhl-Bien et al., 2011, pg. 119).

Sub-Theme 1c: Intelligence analysts have unique intellectual skills that are key to mission success

Thirteen participants spoke about intelligence analysts' roles as critical thinkers in JIOCs, two participants were particularly full of passion and confirmed much of what other people talked about. In the Intelligence Community, analysts are hired and trained to be intellectually curious and to investigate, examine, break down, process, assimilate, and scrutinize people's actions and words. The typical target of an American intelligence analyst is the words of leaders in foreign states and the actions of those militaries. As part of the complex JIOC culture, it is important to keep in mind that these intangible skills, or soft skills, are also used throughout the course of daily interactions in the workplace.

Jaxen spoke passionately about their experience with the re-organization when they detailed:

I felt confused, perplexed, and then investigative if you can say that. [I had] conversation with [the JIOC Commander where] I said, “The problem when you're a leader of analysts, we're either going to find the cookie crumbs that you leave behind or we're going to come up with our best assessment of what fits in the blanks. You can't just keep information from us because we'll dig or we'll say A and B, and we're going to surmise or assume that C and D are there.”

Gina emphasized the point in a slightly different way by stating:

Then the leadership was very upset like, “Well, why aren't you trusting what I'm saying?” I'm like, “You have people whose sole job is to dissect the meaning of words and understand argumentation, and you're confused on why when things don't add up, they keep questioning you.”

According to Lowenthal (2020), analysts in JIOCs think critically, carefully weigh information, long-term knowledge of a specific problem, are good communicators, always problem-solving, and they will naturally apply these skills to any problem – against a state government acting out, a terrorist organization, a world leader, or their own organizational leadership. Lowenthal (2020) provided the following metaphor that “intelligence analysts are either butchers or bakers. Butchers tend to cut up and dissect intelligence to determine what is happening. Bakers tend to blend analysis together to get the bigger picture” (p. 172).

Adaptive leadership is all about teamwork in helping groups to succeed (Northouse, 2019). In re-organizations, leaders must understand that followers will mobilize behind the leader to achieve collective efforts or goals, and in order to accomplish that, leaders must

understand that success will likely only come when followers can help create the change, which may manifest in followers asking questions for understanding (Heifetz, 1994; Heifetz & Laurie, 2001). Leadership must be able and willing to listen to their followers and must manage their own behaviors to lead followers through innovative problem solving and to facilitate the flow of knowledge and creativity (Uhl-Bien et al., 2007).

According to Kahneman (2011), organizations are better at making decisions than individuals. Organizations avoid errors more often because they inherently think more slowly and can enforce disciplined communications and procedures. Von Stumm et al. (2011) found evidence that intellectual curiosity or a curiosity quotient is a very useful quality possessed and used by some people to generate original ideas. This use of intellectual curiosity often makes people appear to be non-conformists (Chamorro-Premuzic, 2014), but it is very useful for managing complexity where there is persistent ambiguity and where the individual is constantly seeking more knowledge (Von Stumm et al., 2011). In bureaucratic organizations where there is a continuously changing knowledge environment and the goal is to communicate ambiguous information and situations, and where risks need to be managed, intelligence analysts need to be able to ask questions and use the critical thinking skills for which they were hired.

Sub-Theme 1d: Re-organization during a global pandemic or geo-political crisis further impedes member satisfaction

Twelve participants talked about the added complexity of carrying out a re-organization during the COVID pandemic and/or during a geo-political crisis. The lack of full offices during the pandemic and the added work and hours that some personnel were already working during a geo-political crisis added stress and more hours for many members.

Aden stated, “Especially with the impact of COVID, there are a lot of people carrying a heavier load because most of the division was stuck teleworking.” Aden also stated “We were still sorting out the transition period when COVID forced us to draw things down... It got really bad and then we went down to only a handful of people in [the office].”

Baxter stated, “To complicate the [re-organization], we did it in the middle of COVID where they just executed it without any guidance or input from leadership.” Baxter went on to state that “We didn't have enough desk space for everybody to have a place to squat. There was no direction or guidance on how do we transition the one section of the division over into the other division.” Charlie went on to state that they were told “We are going to build this thing while it's in flight, ... there was so much miscommunication and confusion about what the impact that COVID was going to have on the workforce.”

According to Darby, JIOC leadership made the decision to re-organize and then did not offer support to the workforce when they stated, “COVID just threw this massive wrench into [the re-organization]... there were so many challenges... leadership specifically, essentially, everybody in a leadership position,... quickly became just fatigued. I feel like they even ran out of compassion.”

Imogen highlighted that at the GG-14 level in the organization, the workforce was not receiving a great deal of information about a re-organization. She stated:

We also got met with... a little bit of hostility in being questioned, which obviously doesn't go well when you have a very concerned workforce. ...there were a number of us at the branch level [saying], “You're not communicating well. There's a lot of rumors.

We are trying to tow the line and support leadership up, but this is a time of COVID. We

don't know what's going on. We're in shift work. ... We're getting this secondhand... You have to over communicate right now. You have to be more transparent.”

Gina also indicated added stress because of COVID pandemic and a simultaneous military crisis when she stated:

The [military crisis] was happening, and because we did the reorg, [1 division had] lead for up Intel [slides, but] ... They didn't have any train[ing] because we plopped right into a crisis. Guess who actually did the slides. It was us even though it was supposed to be them.

Haley reinforced Gina's experiences of added stress while re-organizing during the COVID-19 pandemic by stating:

...in March and April [2021]. When a large part of your workforce works on topics that are very busy during that specific time and having to turn into a crisis cell part of that time while you're also trying to execute a reorg at the same time. [This put] a lot of undue burden on your analysts who are already really burnt out, are already really busy, and [are] already feeling a lot of pressure, [because of] COVID ...shift work.

Leaders of complex, matrixed organizations that face ambiguous or fast changing environments must be able to navigate these challenges and must be able and willing to adapt their leadership styles quickly. Leaders of these organizations must not only be capable in shifting priorities, responding to recurring problems, but also changing policies and budget constraints, addressing process issues, and responding to external change while simultaneously responding to internal changing dynamics as well (Northouse, 2019; Uhl-Bien et al., 2007).

During a re-organization of a complex, matrixed organization, leaders must be engaged in motivating and organizing people and tasks. Leaders must be willing to adjust their behaviors and

practices when necessary so that followers' attention can be focused. When direct engagement is absent or leaders do not listen to followers, it is very easy for followers to become unmotivated and lose sight of their roles in the organization's goals (Heifetz, 1994). In the government, followers often possess high public service motivation, which helps to keep them focused on the ultimate goal, in this case – national security. However, when motivation is low or members do not necessarily share a common motivation, leaders must work deliberately to connect members' motivation to a change event (Burns, 1978; Heifetz, 1994). Leadership is more about teamwork and less about power, particularly when leaders require followers to change – followers require encouragement and collective mobilization to overcome challenges (Heifetz, 1994; Northouse, 2019).

Sub-Theme 1e: Members who rotate through the organization complicate mid-level members' work

Eleven participants described the transient nature of the military servicemembers in their organizations and that the transient nature of this segment of the member population further complicates who is trusted in the organization and how communications occur. Imogen commented on the transient nature of military members and the perception that military officers conduct re-organizations to demonstrate leadership and earn comments in their annual evaluations. She stated “the O-5s [are] here for short term and they're not really JIOC lifers like some of us who have been through reorgs before.”

During one re-organization event, Kelly drew attention to members' shocking reactions to major, complex re-organization, when he stated, “[JIOC offices] were organizations that have been basically untouched, some of them for years. ... Here comes this new [leader] that we don't

know. There were even acts of vandalism that occurred because of this reorganization. There were people who were very upset.”

Haley stated “my branch chief [is] no longer with the organization. [They] PCSd down to [another CCMD] already.” Gina stated that “[the JIOC] commander said that the military can only be in their position for a year before they have to rotate.” While Jaxen stated that “the [JIOC’s top military officer] is a transient military body who may or may not have analytic expertise.”

Felix elaborated on the rotational military leaders not understanding the analytic work during their experience:

...nearly all of our branch chiefs are military officers on rotation. Some of them bring previous expertise to the accounts and do not write. It's fairly easy to get a branch chief running a branch in a mission area that has never worked on a topic before, so they tend not to engage very much on the analytic reviews side. ...It's maybe one out of four or one out of five [military members that] may have actually engaged on substantive analytic issues. ... because it's in an area that they have had previous experience....

This is where the dynamic shifted because, in the reorganization, the same cadre of military officers that I just talked about, that doesn't get as involved in analysis, dominated the reorg process. ...Ultimately created a disconnect because ... [the re-org was] dominated by a group of people who didn't quite understand exactly what most of the workforce does. ...They certainly understood what their own analysts were doing, but to change an organizational structure, you have to have a vision that exceeds your span of control, I think. ...Maybe collectively, through some organizational magic, you can get everyone to pull together.

Several sources indicate that hierarchical structures have been found to create a silo mentality (or group-think) with invisible barriers that fragment organizations (Cilliers & Greyvenstein, 2012; DoD IG, 2018; Janis, 1972). Coupled with the military culture and the fact that they are not subject matter experts, the silo mentality impacts the communications that military leaders undertake with a mixed military-civilian workforce. The sub-cultures that develop enable both military and civilians to surround themselves with like-individuals who reinforce their compatible confidants' perspectives of how things should be done in the organization (Vanderslice, 1988).

Marion and Uhl-Bien (2001) found that leaders working in complex adaptive systems would benefit from understanding that while interactions within and between groups of members are independent actions, leaders should have an appreciation and understanding of these as part of the organization's culture. Additionally, leaders should understand the correlation between these groups and how they interact to produce the tasks that depend on a matrixed structure. Finally, the authors found it vital that leaders understand that working under the auspices of unpredictability in complex tasks and organizations. Leaders must develop skills purposefully to confront unforeseen situations, including how a re-organization of a complex system would affect formal and informal relationships that disrupt members ability to accomplish complex tasks. When members move in and out of organizations often, the members who remain stable are more often confronted by disruption and unpredictability, which further disrupts members' ability to get work done.

Sub-Theme 1f: Analytic and administrative chains of command complicate mid-level members' work

Ten participants described having two chains of reporting, including administrative and supervisory chain which is the traditional hierarchical chain of command, and an analytic chain of receiving tasks and getting those assessments reviewed by an analytic chain. When asked if the JIOC's organizational chart shows two chains of command, Gina stated, "It's just an organizational chart. ... It basically just shows, here's the topics or the branches now that are underneath each construct."

When talking about whether participants had analytic or administrative roles and responsibilities, Maddox stated that they had roles in both analysis and administrative when he said, "I was responsible, along with my senior analyst, for all the production, all the performance, evaluations, all the administrative overhead that comes with having a team of contractors, military, government, civilian that work with you." Nadia expressed similar dual roles when she stated:

My role is supposed to be primarily administrative, where I take care of people meaning evaluations, awards, objectives, training, and anything else that they may need, as well as anything that comes into the branch that has administrative in nature, as far as taskings are concerned. Because we're short staffed as most JIOCs are, I also have an analytic role.

Nine participants described specifically how the analytic chain worked or influenced the work they were responsible for daily. While several participants mentioned that a re-organization in their JIOC might help to iron out some inefficiencies, Aden remarked that while they were "excited at the prospect of creating a [country-specific] division... the reorg fell short a little bit in [their] opinion." He went on to say the following:

There still is this nebulous Branch that is outside of our Division, but it still looks at the same adversary. I get the idea behind [the Branch,] but how it has played out in practice

is [that] Branch has become the go-to entity for the [four-star] Commander and the J2. I know that [the Commander wants] the deepest knowledge base,... but it's at the exclusion of [our] broader division. Those efforts are not necessarily in sync. We've found at several occasions that task management also has been very confusing as they'll go straight to [that] Branch for things that maybe we should, if not have been involved in, at least been aware of because it has created duplicative work where we've ended up producing things that were not needed or just completely wrong. If we had the [that branch's] focus within the division... that would have helped.

Both military and civilian members are challenged to navigate the matrixed, dual hierarchy (military and analytic chains) in the organization (Jeszenszky, 1992). Members have an added complexity of collaborating and coordinating internally and externally and keeping both chains apprised of progress throughout their work (Burke, 2018; Cilliers & Greyvenstein, 2012; Costa, 2006; DeVine, 2020; Gilmore, 2006; Lowenthal, 2020; U.S. DoD, 2008). The sub-cultures of communications methods and traits must be learned when entering into a mixed member organization so that trust and respect is earned and success can be met (Meredith et al., 2017; Vanderslice, 1988).

According to Uhl-Bien et al. (2007) formal and informal dynamics of complex systems create relationships that link administrative and bureaucratic functions. These relationships and dynamics need to take into account the challenges that arise from having a mixed member workforce as well. When organizational change occurs members must re-create patterns of behavior or new modes of functioning to complete tasks and functions successfully (Uhl-Bien et al., 2007). This is particularly vital in organizations that have dual hierarchical structures where individual members must work in matrixed networks (Uhl-Bien et al., 2007).

Sub-Theme 1g: Overseas locations are restrictive for members during re-organizations

Eight participants mentioned they were “frustrated” by the re-organization efforts. One participant provided substantial detail about how civilians working overseas felt stuck when the re-organization occurred because they could not easily find new jobs or move back to the United States. They highlighted that being stationed overseas and unable to quickly leave a job or move back to the United States added further stress.

Imogen stated:

... this is a mixed [civilian and military] organization. Especially abroad and especially during COVID where your options are so limited, you can't just direct people to completely change their lives and their schedules without getting their emotional buy-in, ... [Being stationed abroad] people can't move. It's not like we can leave if we're not happy. ...with reorgs where people just vote with their feet and they just leave, but you're tied here [abroad] for three years. ... You're stuck and you've uprooted your family, your entire life, and everything else. You're dealing with all of the uncertainties of the pandemic. Just not taking any of that into consideration, maybe the lack of communication, which is normal for reorg, made it even worse.

Some participants were quite emotional during the interviews while talking about their feelings during JIOC re-organizations. Kiefer’s (2005) study on the “antecedents and consequences of negative emotions in ongoing change” found that negative emotional reactions to change indicates the “everyday emotional issues experienced in organizational change immediately affect the level of trust” (p. 890). He found that “change initiatives can lead to employee withdrawal when certain work events are evaluated as potentially harmful or threatening” (p. 890). This well-researched study underscores the emotions that arose out of my

study's interviews with all participants having emotional responses, both nonverbal and verbal. Kiefer (2005) concluded that workers' high frequency of negative emotions is responsible for eroding trust and increased withdrawal. When workers already trust organizational leadership, negative emotions are partially mediated, and trust in the organization indicates how its leadership will behave in the future (Kiefer, 2005). Similarly, the lack of trust will lead employees to withdraw from good organizational behaviors, which can impact the organization's climate negatively (Kiefer, 2005).

Theme 2: Planning – Military model planning methods should be employed for successful re-organizations

Planning for the re-organization was a resounding theme mentioned by all 14 study participants. This theme also includes six sub-themes. The first sub-theme focused on how engagement creates trust, member buy-in, and communications. The second sub-theme was that leadership communications must be unambiguous and transparent. The third sub-theme focused on the best venues to communicate. The fourth sub-theme identified champions of change as key to success. The fifth sub-theme focused on the need to form a diverse planning team. The sixth sub-theme highlighted the need for leaders to clearly outline the goals, requirements, and vision for the re-organization.

When discussing planning for the JIOC re-organizations, Gina stated:

My biggest thing with the reorg was nobody asked what are the requirements we're trying to meet. They just reorged. They said, "Okay, the staff wants more [analysis on a specific topic] so we're going to reorg." The first question I asked when I was informed about the reorg [was], "Well, what are the new requirements because that should shape how we're organized?" It's the first step in any planning or military decision-making processes....

We reorged and it's just been excruciatingly painful since because nobody asked the question.

Baxter felt “professionally let down, unsupported” that his JIOC “had no transition plan.”

Darby added to this by saying:

There was a good amount of information being passed to the JIOC at large to include who would be Division Chiefs, Branch Chiefs, the analysts, and the different team structures. Then, there was a last-minute switcheroo with a number of division leadership personnel across the entire JIOC. I, for one, was not happy with the outcome for my division.... It was very unclear and it wasn't at all transparent.

Eban added that the COVID did not help the re-organization when he stated that it “felt like [leadership] made a decision, then [they] sat for months, and... at four o'clock on a Friday, and they're like, ‘Hey, effective Monday, you guys are in a new structure.’ Everyone's like, ‘Whoa, where this coming from?’” Leslie added that the re-organization:

All had to happen during the COVID lockdown... some people didn't come back in [to the office] and we couldn't touch their stuff. They moved some teams but not others. ... That whole execution was even more bungled because you couldn't move some desks. It's like someone who was high risk, they didn't want you touching their stuff. You can't touch anyone's cubicle, so entire teams have moved around them, but that one cubicle would stay there or somebody would stay over here.

After the decision was made to re-organize, when talking about lower-level planning, Imogen stated:

The first thing that my branch chief did was he shared everything and sat down with me and my co-SIA. We brought our Team Leads in to discuss what we thought was going

on, how this would affect us, how it would affect our people and our mission. We game planned with him how we could mitigate the effects on our mission. Having that unsanctioned side discussion, where we could plan it, look for different eventualities, and talk through that, that helped a lot [as we could] help our people through it after that. Once we did that, we did have branch level discussions about, “This is what we know. This is what we don't know. Here's our plan going forward.”

As the JIOCs are situated under the Department of Defense, the joint military planning process would aid re-organizations in the process of identifying “ways and means (with associated risk)... to implement strategic guidance” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2020, p. i). Military planning includes prioritizing requirements, identifying resources, developing courses of action for various planning options, and assessing capabilities to identify shortfalls and outline mitigation strategies (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013). This model is as relevant for planning military operations as it is for organizational planning, and as the model is well-known by DIA civilians, it is a useful model for organizational change. A good place to start is the organizational change planning model that I created from the Joint Chiefs of Staff model combined with Kotter’s (1996) eight-step plan for change and Burke-Litwin’s change model (see Figure 2).

Working in complex organizations requires JIOC leaders to embrace adaptive leadership behaviors to tackle evolving issues, including relationships between mixed members of their organizations and organizational change (Heifetz et al., 2009; Uhl-Bien et al., 2007). JIOC leadership must be adaptive leaders who can simultaneously address specific technical challenges, ambiguous adaptive challenges, and challenges that include both technical and ambiguous adaptive components (Northouse, 2019). Most relevant may be adaptive challenges which are not clearly defined and have no clear owner to resolve the challenges. JIOC leaders are

in a position to make goals, policy, resource, and organizational changes where needed to accomplish the defense mission.

Sub-theme 2a: Leadership engagement creates trust, members' buy-in, and generates communications

This was a resounding theme mentioned by all 14 participants in the study. Participants mentioned that leadership engagement would create trust during a significant time such as leading up to and during a re-organization. Engagement ensures lines of communication are open, members can ask questions, and members are not afraid about the impact about the impact the organizational changes will affect their work.

Darby held the view that “prior to COVID, there was a lot of repeated leadership engagement, interaction, and just soliciting opinions from the workforce. I appreciated that level of consideration for the people who would most be affected by the reorg in practice.”

Felix commented that the O-5s and few GG-15s were doing the planning; “[the group] stalled and didn't do anything for months, and then [we had] something dictated to us very quickly. That left no window to get workforce buy-in, or engagement, or even the appearance of that.” Felix went on to say that:

Paradoxically, I don't think there was enough engagement. When I talk about leadership, I'm talking above the division level, because I think that would have solved, potentially, all the problems that occurred in the first phase of this where a bunch of peers couldn't really get an upper hand against each other because it was a group of O-5s representing a group of divisions without their boss being there or someone in that chain. What that meant was they basically just went back and forth amongst themselves.

Imogen stated that her top-level leadership did not engage at all and the most engagement was “during [virtual] town halls.” She went on to say that those forums were not good for GG-14s since “they had been told to toe the line and promote the party line,” but the town halls were “a good outlet for some [GG-]13s and below to express their frustrations, but they got no real information back.” Furthermore, the JIOC Commander tasked the O-5 Division Chiefs to communicate, but they “did not provide much else” and did not include GG-14s until late in the process as Imogen’s Division Chief “expected [the O-4 Branch Chiefs] to communicate [the re-organization plan].” In Imogen’s view, “there was a lot of stratification of the information there. It also cut off any ability to question.”

Imogen went on to say:

There was a little bit in [some of] the early morning meetings [when leadership would say], ‘This is where we are in the process,’ but it honestly felt like they were lying to us about where we were in the process because... then all of a sudden, we have PowerPoint [org charts] with names. When [leadership] sent out an email that had the new division structure... and [it] had some pros and cons listed. Then [they said,] “We will have a division-level huddle and we can all ask questions.” By that point though, people were so angry and frustrated that they just didn't really engage on it. They're like, “Whatever, it's a fait accompli. We'll just do what we need to do.”

Charlie reiterated, “there wasn't leadership engagement really about the reorg.” Jaxen stated that there was “just a vast difference between branch level leadership and their transparency and communication with the branch versus the division which barely communicate anything, and then the [JIOC] Commander overall, which I felt communicated non-transparently and in bad faith.”

Imogen also spoke about a previous JIOC re-organization that she experienced which she viewed as a much better experience. She stated that there was “much more formal... engagement, through meetings, emails, and [a job preference] spreadsheet to fill out. This is where we currently are in the process. Let's have a meeting with the branches [or] division leadership.”

Imogen also stated that they had a few informal discussions. “My O-4 had a few informal discussions with the head of the mission analysis... Then there was much more formal engagement, both with the branches, but also I think with the J2 leadership.”

Imogen concluded by stating that:

The [O-6] Colonel [JIOC] Commander at the time, ... [made it] okay to be angry and to voice it. We were not expected to just jump on board [with the re-organization]. [The O-6] knew it was going to be controversial, [and] created an atmosphere where that was okay, and it's okay to voice it at every level.... [The O-6] recognized that you have a right to have those emotions. It won't stop the reorg, but you've been heard. If somebody would make a valid point, [they] would try to follow up with them. [The O-6] would basically say, “I will listen to your concerns but don't just come to me with problems, come to me with solutions. I can't think of everything. You're more in the trenches so if you have a solution, [supply] it.”... I think [the] Colonel ended up protecting some of the teams in particular that were going to be really negatively affected by [the reorg].

All 14 participants mentioned that getting buy-in from the organization's members made members feel valued and ensured communications across the JIOC.

Eban stated, “half of the organization ended up getting new jobs...Actually, getting that workforce buy-in of ‘what do you want to do with your career,’ I think helped.” He went on to say, that leadership needs to:

...over communicate, communicate early, communicate often because workforce buy-in is critical in any reorg. If it's just done at the top and then forced on people, that's not a recipe for success, at least in trying to work hard to minimize any disruption, to get as much team buy-in, and maintain as much continuity as possible.

Felix emphasized that not only was workforce buy-in important but informing the workforce early on in the planning process is important when he said:

We stalled and didn't do anything for months, and then have something dictated to us very quickly. That left no window to get workforce buy-in, or engagement, or even the appearance of that. None of those actually really happened. When the reorg effectively was shown to everyone, for many, it was the first time they had seen any real details about it, especially to [GG-]13 and below.

Gina’s perspective was that leaders who communicate upfront to the workforce offers them time to provide input and respect from “getting workforce buy-in from the very beginning, instead of presenting to them as a fait accompli or done deal.”

Robbins and Judge (2018) and Kessler (2013) found that the ways in which leaders interact with their followers has a tremendous influence on the employees’ attitudes and behaviors, and those interactions and exchange of information is the way in which trust and respect are built. The exchanges between leaders and members are critical to building the relationships in complex, matrixed organizations where communication is vital to success (Andersson & Zbirenko, 2018; Kessler, 2013; Zhou & Schriesheim, 2009). These professional

relationships are comprised of social and economic exchanges including those involving building or maintaining trust and unambiguous transactions involving communications.

Communications between leaders and members is how subordinates collectively understand the leader's goals and those of the organization (Andersson & Zbirenko, 2018). Trust and employee buy-in to the leader's authority and decisions is eroded by several factors, including when a leader does not listen carefully to followers or influence positively; when the leader is not open to new ideas; and when leaders do not allow members or employees to participate in problem solving (Bakker et al., 2006; Northouse, 2019). Kotter (1990) argued that leaders much aim to create stability and order, to inspire followers to reach organizational goals. Further, Kotter (1990) argued that highly bureaucratic or hierarchical organizations must have both leaders and managers who provide direction through change, which involves being a transformational and a transactional leader, according to Burns (1978). Meredith (2017) found that leading through change also must include employee or member engagement with both formal and informal stakeholders, as employee's interests, contribution, and work satisfaction will be enhanced when leadership interacts and listens to employees' contributions (Jo & Shim, 2005; Maslach & Leither, 1997; Maslach et al., 2001).

Kahn (1990) found that without inclusive engagement, if organizational leaders did not invite certain members into discussions, members felt treated as though they and their roles were unimportant. When organizational members were included in meaningful interactions during engagements, Kahn (1990) found that the members felt valued and that these interactions promoted dignity, self-appreciation, and a sense of worthwhileness. Van Dam (2008) concluded that employee engagement ensures leaders can deliver information, manage expectations,

suggest opportunities for involvement, and to build trust overall, particularly when undergoing change in the organization.

Sub-theme 2b: Communications must be unambiguous and transparent during any major, complex re-organization

All 14 participants mentioned unambiguous communications as a key factor that is necessary during a re-organization of their JIOCs. When talking about the senior leaders' communication of the re-organizations, numerous participants commented negatively. Leslie stated: "I'm just shocked with the lack of communication from the civilian leadership to the workforce. That didn't help them. I think it was the mid-level leaders that did the most to help the workforce embrace the change." While Jaxen added that "I think [the JIOC Commander], from my experience, does not know how to lead civilians. ... nothing [they] did helped us feel warm and fuzzy or embrace the changes."

Jaxen's view was that "it was handled from the beginning so poorly. There probably wasn't anything anyone could do to help us embrace the change. I think it more was like, 'Okay, we're resigned to this. How do we make it work?'" Kelly stated, "It wasn't communicated very well. It was the rumor mill started filling in the blank."

Leslie stated that "...it was not very well communicated to the workforce. I was a [GG-]15 ...it was probably about as messy as it could be with very little communication from leadership as to why." They went on to emphasize that:

I think most of the decisions were communicated one-on-one. I don't recall entire emails to the JIOC... There wasn't ...an all hands. It was like, "We're doing this," so there was a lot of questions unanswered by the employees. There was a lot of questions at the leadership level. That trickled down to the employees [who] knew even less than we did

because they were not privy to the advanced discussions like we were at the leadership level.

Aden added that “I didn’t feel that feedback was very welcome in the recommendations or restructure because we saw people shut down with their suggestions. They inhibited or hindered people feeling comfortable in sharing those overtime.”

Eban’s view was that “[the JIOC leadership] did a good due diligence of reaching out to the division leadership that had equities in the reorg and getting their opinions rather than just unilaterally making a decision and executing.”

Direct communication and interaction with followers or members of every level in an organization will help to empower members to innovate and create change at their level, which in turn will create champions of change at all levels (Howell & Boies, 2004). Complex organizations require complex structures and leaders who can communicate unambiguously in many venues and at all levels of the organization (McKelvey & Boisot, 2003; Uhl-Bien et al., 2007). Simple communications are not enough in organizations with rigid boundaries; simple communications are often compartmentalized. By empowering members or followers, particularly mid-level leaders, the organization will learn through the development of processes in every position, members’ needs will be met, and risk can be managed for success (Callahan, 2017; Uhl-Bien et al., 2007).

When communications are ambiguous, intelligent employees will start piecing together an assessment between the words leaders use and the behaviors they see from leaders. One thing to keep in mind about valuing continuity in long-term civilian employees is that there may be pockets of civilian employees who have a silo mentality (or group-think), which can create real barriers to change (Cilliers & Greyvenstein, 2012; Janis, 1972). Members with group-think can

fragment the workforce to resist leaders' intentions and plans to change. Civilian employees may create invisible barriers that show-up as lacking a vision for the organization, which could materialize as an unconscious denial of any need for improvements. It could also cause a split in the workforce, where long-term employees fear that their professional skills are not valued and their networks will change for the worse. They may also isolate newer employees who may be eager for improvements (Cilliers & Greyvenstein, 2012; Janis, 1972).

Marlon and McGee (2006) found that leaders must be ready and willing to adapt their leadership style and the ways in which they engage with the workforce in order to understand organizational challenges about the inter-workings or components. Leaders will also want to understand who wants to participate and allow bottom-up creativity (Marlon & McGee, 2006). Adaptive leadership is particularly important in JIOCs because of working on ambiguous, unprecedented problems in rapidly changing environments (Northouse, 2019; Tichy, 1983; U.S. Department of Defense, 2018).

Sub-Theme 2c: Town halls and all-hands meetings are good venues for leaders to communicate to the workforce

Twelve participants mentioned town halls or all-hands meetings as communication events where the workforce learned about the re-organization or where members could ask questions of the top leader(s).

Eban emphasized that town halls or all-hands were a good way for the top leader to outline the entire though process for a re-organization. He stated:

It was very clear [a re-organization] was going to happen. It was communicated through the town halls and emails. [The Intelligence Director] sent out emails as well that the reorg [was] going to occur. Then as the options were laid out, those were also

communicated to the workforce usually by email, but also, in general terms, in the town halls.

Nadia emphasized that “having an all hands is a good thing... a best practice... to communicate intentions. Then at the [division] level and branch level... Pushing down whatever information [they] knew at the time, [they] would let us know.”

Haley talked about how leaders need to be genuine in their willingness to answer questions about the upcoming or recent re-organization when she stated:

...having town halls and communicating things by email could be a best practice. I just think how they were actually used in our reorg were disingenuous and too late in the game. If they had started with clear communication saying [a re-org] was coming, “you’re going to hear more about this,” and that had been true that it hadn’t already started at that point, that would have been helpful.

In military organizations with a tall hierarchical structure and matrixed tasks, the inclusion of managers and employees will enable success (Andersson & Zbirenko, 2018; Burke, 2018; Carzo & Yanouzas, 1969; Tichy, 1983). In fact, Lei et al. (1999) found that the structure of an organization does not really matter, but the importance for improvements and change is the infusion of new knowledge, regardless of who introduces it. Carzo and Yanouzas (1969) found that allowing group members to weigh decisions was important and that avoiding inter-departmental rivalries would benefit the entire organization.

Sub-Theme 2d: Champions of change (or members with buy-in) are key to success, ensuring are all levels of the organization to foster change and meet goals and vision

Eleven participants answered positively to the question about whether they saw anyone who stood out as champions for the JIOC members. Two of the remaining participants

answered negatively to that question, but in other questions they talked about how they themselves behaved as emerging leaders supporting the re-organization, regardless of how they felt about it. The remaining one participant simply had a negative reply but did mention how the people at their same paygrade or position to form a guiding coalition to support the changes.

Aden provided a clear summary of one of the military officers who the JIOC members saw as a champion when he stated:

[The military officer (O-5)] was a champion and merited trust from a lot of us because we felt like he took the time to... do genuine mission analysis and to put up a stiff arm where things didn't make sense or were clearly the wrong [intelligence] questions for our organization to be answering. [The O-5] would engage with other directorates to redirect where needed, but also create relationships of trust between the J2 Director, JIOC leadership, and in ourselves at the division level because of that mission analysis. We knew that [the O-5] would be frank with us. He didn't sugarcoat things, but he earned that trust because he was personable, related with us, spent time with us, and was an effective communicator. He relayed clear guidance. He followed up... checked in with folks to make sure that things were clear and understood in the right way so we weren't doing a lot of back and forth.

Charlie stated that

I think that there was a core group of leadership folks that were ... just making themselves available if they were needed. ...I think one of the best things that I've seen in a leadership in the reorg and in a lot of the confusion, was that they were making themselves available. They were thoughtful in how they approached people.

While Gina did not see any clear champions, she stated that “the other SIAs [and I], we’ve really gotten tight on just figuring out how to make things work.” While Baxter replied similarly in saying “We tried to come together as a team and support as best we could. I don’t think any of one of the division chiefs, SIOs, SIAs, or deputy division chiefs abandon their people.”

Champions are vital especially during re-organizations that create confusion, make members feel they are not valued, and where members are highly skilled at examining pieces of seemingly disparate information. As Jaxen stated, “You can’t just keep information from us.” Champions are pivotal to successful re-organizations (Howell & Boies, 2004). Champions are people who will risk their reputations on an innovative idea or change that they believe in. They will use their informal networks to build a coalition of supporters for the change. Champions are not afraid to raise other members’ concerns and questions to top leaders, simultaneously keeping top leaders informed of how the workforce is doing in adopting the change (Callahan, 2017; Howell & Boies, 2004; Maxwell, 2011; Uhl-Bien et al., 2007).

Sub-Theme 2e: A diverse planning team is vital for success, particularly in JIOC organizations comprised of a diverse, mixed workforce

Eleven participants said that the re-organization of their JIOC was dictated by the leaders above or that the order came down from the top. Two of the three JIOCs appeared to have near-homogenous groups as the planners for re-organization. Imogen stated, “The [JIOC] Commander ordered that the O-5s, the division chiefs in particular, would get together and make proposals on the reorg.”

Gina stated the following when talking about what a good planning team may look like:

Here's the [Director's] guidance... [and] the requirements. [The Director] solicit[es] for volunteers to have one from different divisions, different grade levels. Then ...form[s] a tiger team, explain the deadlines and the due outs, and then, maybe you appoint an O-5 in charge of each of the tiger teams to help be that officer to manage, then let them work through what it should look like in order to meet those requirements based on the on the guidance from the leadership. Then... it's communicated to the workforce. It's completely transparent to the workforce what we're doing, [and] where we're at.

Aden stated that during the re-organization, above the division level, at:

...the broader JIOC leadership, I felt like that was a little bit more hands off. We probably would have benefited from more regular check-ins from JIOC leadership during the transition period... Not in an effort to standardize everything, but just to see where we were maybe struggling in some areas. Then could have used some rudder [or guidance] where we didn't know to even ask for.”

A few participants mentioned that leaders should have included non-supervisory analysts or member in re-organization discussions from the beginning. Haley talked about the need for non-supervisory analysts to be part of the planning discussions when they stated:

From my perspective, if it were communicated upfront before this starts being this conversation on O-5 level that, “We are exploring the options for doing a reorg. We want to understand what the workforce [is doing]. These are the goals that we're trying to get to. This is how we're currently aligned. This is how we want to be better aligned because of these goals. We want input upfront before we actually do anything.” I think that would have felt less frustrating.

Nadia added that:

I would like it to be a diverse group, including people of different ranks, different job types, male, female, black, Hispanic, including all types of people to get a look at “This is what we do now, how can we improve it?” I can tell them, “This is what I need? What do you need to do to get me what I need?” Use that kind of sensing session and those kind of people to help me put together a plan on how they can help get me to where I need to go. Finally, Imogen added detail about a senior leader’s willingness to listen to dissent from the workforce when she stated:

[The Director] knew [the re-org] was going to be controversial. [They] created an atmosphere where that was okay... to voice it at every level. It wasn't just the branch leadership or division leadership. It was okay for everyone. [The Director] didn't belittle that, which I really appreciated. During [JIOC] town halls when [they were] talking about it, people would get up in front of the entire [JIOC] and expressed their concerns, and part of it is just [the Director’s] leadership style. [They] recognized that you have a right to have those emotions. It won't stop the reorg but you've been heard. If somebody would make a valid point, [the Director] would try to follow up with them. [Their] big thing was, “I will listen to your concerns but don't just come to me with problems, come to me with solutions. I can't think of everything. You're more in the trenches so if you have a solution, force it.”

Bringing a diverse group of willing employees from across the organization to discuss a potential or impending re-organization would benefit the entire organization as people will bring diverse perspectives to address the predominant issues and those seemingly minor issues that senior leaders may not know exist (Andersson & Zbirenko, 2018; Burke, 2018; Carzo & Yanouzas, 1969; Jung & Kim, 2014; Tichy, 1983).

Tichy (1983) found that communication with key personnel, including civilian employees, is vital when facing change, particularly as in the case of organizations with mixed culture (military and civilian employees), long-term employees are more likely to tacitly counter-act new culture or ways of doing things. When leadership engages with members, they offer meaningful participation in decision-making, allow employees to be part of solutions, and allow employees to have some level of authority over the decisions in their specialized area (Bakker et al., 2006; Bass, 1985; Burns, 1978; Kahn, 1990; Van Dam et al., 2008). This builds trust between leaders and members and it reinforces the employees' purpose and networks through interpersonal communications as well (Harter et al., 2002; Jo & Shim, 2005; Meredith, 2017).

Employees who are engaged have more energy and involvement, and overall, more meaningful exchanges in the workplace (Jo & Shim, 2005; Maslach et al., 2001; Maslach & Leiter, 1997). Meredith (2017) found that employees' interest and contributions to work and overall satisfaction at work increased when they were engaged with both informal and formal leaders. Kahn (1990) found that employees who were not actively engaged derived less purpose, trust less, and shed some responsibilities. However, when employees are engaged by leaders, they are more likely to feel psychologically safe and are more likely to bring their whole selves to the workplace. They are more supportive and trusting, more flexible, less fearful of change (Kahn, 1990).

Northouse (2019) concluded that leaders and followers must work together to accomplish goals successfully. They must share the moral commitment to the organization's common goals so that the organization's values can be upheld. Van Dam et al. (2008) found that leaders build trust by delivering information and offering meaningful participation in decision-making. These behaviors create highly engaged members of the workforce.

Sub-Theme 2f: Leaders' goals, vision, and requirements need to be well understood by members for expedient, practical execution

Eight participants expressed concern over the lack of goals or vision for the re-organization efforts from leadership. Nine were adamant that the requirements to re-organize were never outlined in such a way that planning efforts could fully support the end requirement, goals, or vision. Gina talked about how the traditional military planning process was not followed and that the JIOC leadership did not outline the exact problem and requirements to solve the problem and reach the end goal and vision. She stated:

Leadership [needs to explain] the problem... A series of tiger teams that would have different people from different sections of the [organization] involved in making these decisions in providing input.... "Here's [the Director's] guidance. Here are the requirements. I'm soliciting for volunteers to have one from different divisions, different grade levels." Then pick the volunteers, form a tiger team, explain the deadlines and the due outs, and then, maybe you appoint an O-5 in charge of each of the tiger teams to help be that officer to manage, then let them work through what it should look like in order to meet those requirements based on the on the guidance from the leadership.

Leslie agreed with the goal of the JIOC's re-organization because it was aimed at aligning the JIOC better with how DIA works, including emulating offices and titles. Leslie stated:

...the overall reason...was to be more aligned with the [Intelligence] Community so that's a good practice that we weren't just willy-nilly doing it. There was discussions of how we can more mirror other organizations and how we can help. There was discussions about titles of [positions] and how they were important when our analysts are applying

for promotion.... which was good to set our analysts and our leaders up for promotion later so that was good.

Van Dam et al. (2008) found that a leader can alleviate employees' resistance to change when the leader is willing and able to deliver accurate information in a timely manner, provide opportunities for participation in decision-making, and infuse trust of members in the leader's vision for a change event. Employees' confidence in leaders' integrity and trustworthiness affects employees' ability to accept leaders' vision for change efforts and increases chances of success (Van Dam et al., 2008). Northouse (2019) underscores that a leader's goals for change must be a central pillar of the change efforts; when leaders outline goals to members, they can then visualize themselves being part of the end purpose and they want to meet those goals.

Summary

This chapter reviewed the research methodology, introduced the study participants, outlined and discussed data analysis procedures and coding, and provided the cumulative analysis and results of the research study of DIA civilians who experienced a JIOC re-organization. As a result of extensive data analysis and coding of interview transcripts, two major themes and 13 sub-themes were identified. These themes provide insight into how 14 DIA civilians working at CCMD JIOCs experienced leadership behaviors during a re-organization. The next and final chapter will present the proposed solutions, best practices for future JIOC re-organizations, evidence that supports and challenges the proposed solutions, implementation options for the proposed solutions, implications for practice, implications for future research, strengths, and limitations of this study.

CHAPTER FIVE: PROPOSED SOLUTION AND IMPLICATIONS

Through the discussion of existing academic literature and the findings of the study conducted for this research, this chapter presents recommendations intended to fulfill the aim of the study. The participants in this study were DIA civilians who worked in JIOCs during major, complex re-organizations in which structures, functions, and processes were altered.

This chapter provides a brief summary of the study findings, including a review of the themes and sub-themes, concluding with the aim statement. Next, five proposed solutions are outlined, then three categories of evidence are outlined to support the proposed solutions. Finally, the implementation recommendations for the proposed solutions, practical implications for practice, implications for future research, strengths and limitations of the study, and a summary of this dissertation in practice.

Summary of the Study

Fourteen DIA civilian employees who worked at JIOCs during major, complex re-organizations were selected and interviewed for this research study. All participants agreed to partake in one 60-minute Zoom interview with audio recorded. The participants answered open-ended, semi-structured questions focused on their experience of a re-organization and their leaders' behaviors during the change event. Two major themes and 13 sub-themes emerged following multi-cycle coding of the interview data. These themes answered the proposed research question and are supported by academic literature.

The following major themes and sub-themes emerged from this study to answer the primary research question: How do DoD civilian employees experience leadership behaviors during major, complex organizational change? One sub-question supported the primary research question: Which leadership characteristics appeared to exert the greatest impact over civilian

employees during the change event? The themes and sub-themes that comprise the study's major findings can be found in Figure 6.

Figure 6

Summary of Study's Two Major Themes and 13 Sub-Themes

Theme 1: Culture – JIOC culture must form the basis of leaders' behaviors	Theme 2: Planning – Military model planning methods should be employed for successful re-organizations
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1a. Mid-level members are vital to mission success in major, complex organizations 1b. Complexity increases during a re-organization, particularly for mid-level, process users 1c. Intelligence analysts have unique intellectual skills that are key to mission success 1d. Overseas locations are restrictive for members during re-organizations 1e. Members who rotate into the organization often complicate mid-level members' work 1f. Dual analytic and administrative chains of command complicate mid-level members' work 1g. Re-organization during a global pandemic or geo-political crisis further impedes member satisfaction 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2a. Leadership engagement creates trust, members' buy-in, and generates communications 2b. Leadership communications must be unambiguous and transparent 2c. Townhalls and all-hands' meetings are good venues to communicate 2d. Champions of change (or members with buy-in) are key to success 2e. Forming a diverse planning team is vital for success, particularly in organizations with a diverse, mixed workforce 2f. Leaders' goals, vision, and requirements need to be well understood for expedient, practical re-organization execution

Graphic by K. G. Picard, 2022

Note. This graphic is an original creation of the author using participants' language during interviews of this study.

Aim Statement

The aim of this Dissertation in Practice (DIP) was to create a set of evidence-based best practices and behaviors or actions to enhance how JIOC leadership engages with civilian employees throughout a major, complex organizational change event. Positive leadership behaviors during re-organizations greatly benefit organizational members, performance, retention, and mission outcomes (Bakker et al., 2006; Northouse, 2019). Much of the literature recommends leaders build trust with members to enable smooth communications during organizational change (Andersson & Zbirenko, 2018).

Proposed Solution

All 14 study participants agreed that leadership behaviors and engagement with employees are important aspects of any re-organization. Based on the findings of this study and the supporting academic literature, I assert the best way to begin the work necessary to address leadership during major, complex organizational change is for senior leaders to adopt a growth, learning mindset so that focused engagement and clear communication with mixed members from across the JIOC can be accomplished. I also propose JIOC leaders be provided leadership training to prepare, plan for, and to implement a re-organization of a complex, bureaucratic, matrixed organization.

As the complex nature of the themes overlap sufficiently, the findings of themes and sub-themes have been rearranged slightly to consolidate the evidence. Therefore, in analyzing and creating proposed solutions I have combined like-themes and sub-themes into five topics (see Table 2 for evidence from scholarly references that align to the five proposed solution topics). These topics align with the literature presented in Chapter Two. The topics also enable alignment to proposed solutions and implementation so leaders can easily understand and implement improved re-structuring of their organizations. For this, I unbracketed my decades of experience at JIOCs to develop solutions that are realistic and welcomed by DIA employees.

The first three proposed solutions are aimed at senior military JIOC leaders and senior DIA civilian leaders (GG-15 and Senior Executives). Leaders must understand and acknowledge the complex nature of JIOCs as organizations and that any major changes will add further complexity to a workforce that is in the midst of complex national security work. These proposed solutions include multiple parts; scholarly references can be found for each part in Table 2. The proposed solutions are as follows:

1. JIOC leaders must comprehend their organization's culture, including the complexity of two reporting chains and a diverse workforce, some of which possess unique skills, such as intellectual curiosity, critical thinking, and informal leadership roles;
2. leaders must engage with a diverse, heterophilous group of organizational members including mid-level non-supervisors who have unique skills, out-group members, and who understand work processes;
3. develop a plan for change and a communications plan that enables all leaders to implement the plan, explain the reasoning behind the change(s) and how the members can accomplish the vision, and create engagement with members;
 - a. find ways to create buy-in from the workforce, including partnering with leadership and commitment to change – especially as the JIOCs' workforce possesses critical thinking and intellectual curiosity;

The fourth proposed solution is aimed at JIOC leaders who want to improve their leadership abilities:

4. create adaptive, enabling leaders who will create conditions for innovation, adaptability, and facilitate the flow of knowledge.

The final proposed solution is aimed at higher-level leaders that JIOC commanders and directors report to, such as a CCMD Intelligence Directors (J2s) and CCMD Commanders. This proposed solution is that JIOC leaders should have:

5. standardized leadership training specifically directed at how best to plan for and implement change in their organization(s).

This final proposed solution is aimed at ensuring new JIOC leaders arrive to their positions with the requisite characteristics, attitudes, and capabilities to prepare them to lead a

diverse, mixed culture, and if necessary, for the possibility of a re-organization. Such training could be implemented by military services, the military war colleges, and/or DIA training centers to ensure both military and civilian leaders of JIOCs have the same training.

Table 2

References for the five proposed solutions by sub-topic

No.	Leadership Learning Topics	References
1	Understand the culture of your organizations	(Bakker et al., 2006; Burke, 2018; Callahan, 2017; Carzo & Yanouzas, 1969; Casimir & Ng, 2010; Chamorro-Premuzic, 2014; Costa, 2006; Currarini & Mengel, 2016; Hearn, 2019; Garamone, 2018; Gleibs & Haslam, 2016; Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995; Harter et al., 2002; Haslam et al., 2011; Jeszenszky, 1992; Jo & Shim, 2005; Kamara, 2018; Marion, 1999; Marion & Uhl-Bien, 2001; Marlon & McGee, 2006; Maslach & Leiter, 1997; Maslach et al., 2001; McKelvey, 1999; McKelvey & Boisot, 2003; Meredith et al., 2017; Meyer, 2013; Northouse, 2019; Regine & Lewin, 2000; Schein, 1990; Starr, 1982; Tichy, 1983; Uhl-Bien, 2006; Uhl-Bien et al., 2007; U.S. Department of Defense, 2018; Vanderslice, 1988; Vargas, 2016; Williamson et al., 2019; Zember & Khooshabeh, 2020; Zhu & Akhtar, 2014)
	including the complexity of two chains	(Anderson & Brown, 2010; Andersson & Zbirenko, 2018; Burke, 2018; Carzo & Yanouzas, 1969; Cilliers & Greyvenstein, 2012; Jung & Kim, 2014; Marasi et al., 2018; Tichy, 1983; Torrance, 1955; Uhl-Bien & Arena, 2017; Von Stumm et al., 2011; Zhu & Akhtar, 2014)
	and mixed members	(Carzo & Yanouzas, 1969; Costa, 2006; Gardner, 2021; Gleibs & Haslam, 2016; Haslam et al., 2011; Hearn, 2019; Jeszenszky, 1992; Maxwell, 2011; Tilghman, 2015; Vanderslice, 1988)

	some of which possess unique skills, such as intellectual curiosity for which they are continually trained	(Chamorro-Premuzic, 2014; Dewey, 1910; Jeszenszky, 1992; Kahneman, 2011; Tichy, 1983; Vanderslice, 1988; Vargas, 2016; Von Stumm et al., 2011)
2	Engage with a diverse, heterophilous group of organizational members	(Carzo & Yanouzas, 1969; Christian et al., 2006; Cilliers & Greyvenstein, 2012; Currarini & Mengel, 2016; Earley & Mosakowski, 2000; Haslam et al., 2011; Janis, 1972; Kahn, 1990; Van Dam et al., 2008)
	including mid-level non-supervisors who have unique skills,	(Callahan, 2017; Chamorro-Premuzic, 2014; Howell & Boies, 2004; Jeszenszky, 1992; Maxwell, 2011; Tichy, 1983; Uhl-Bien et al., 2007; Vanderslice, 1988; Vargas, 2016; Von Stumm et al., 2011)
	out-group members,	(Currarini & Mengel, 2016; Gleibs & Haslam, 2016; Haslam et al., 2011; Janis, 1972; Rogers, 2003)
	and who understand work processes	(Burke, 2018; Callahan, 2017; Carzo & Yanouzas, 1969; Chamorro-Premuzic, 2014; Cilliers & Greyvenstein, 2012; Currarini & Mengel, 2016; Gajduschek, 2003; Gleibs & Haslam, 2016; Heifetz, 1994; Haslam et al., 2011; Heifetz et al., 2009; Marasi et al., 2018; Meyer, 2013; Robbins & Judge, 2018; Rogers, 2003; Starr, 1982; Uhl-Bien et al., 2007; Zhu & Akhtar, 2014)
3	Develop a coherent plan for change using a planning model suitable for complex organizations	(Burke, 2018; Burke & Litwin, 1992; Gersick, 1991; Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013; Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2020; Kotter, 1996)
	and unambiguously communicate with transparently to enable leaders at all levels to implement the plan,	(Andersson & Zbirenko, 2018; Carzo & Yanouzas, 1969; Currarini & Mengel, 2016; Harter et al., 2002; Gleibs & Haslam, 2016; Haslam et al., 2011; Hearn, 2019; Jeszenszky, 1992; Jo & Shim, 2005; Marasi et al., 2018; Maxwell, 2011; Meredith et al., 2017; Torrance, 1955; Zhu & Akhtar, 2014)
	and accomplish the vision,	(Bass, 1985; Bass, 1990; Burke & Litwin, 1992; Burns, 1978; Callahan, 2017; Carzo & Yanouzas, 1969; Kamara, 2018; Kotter, 1996; Uhl-Bien et al., 2007; Yukl, 2005)


	and create engagement with members.	(Andersson & Zbirenko, 2018; Callahan, 2017; Carzo & Yanouzas, 1969; Cilliers & Greyvenstein, 2012; Currarini & Mengel, 2016; Harter et al., 2002; Jo & Shim, 2005; Janis, 1972; Jones, 1973; Kahn, 1990; Maslach & Leiter, 1997; Marion & Uhl-Bien, 2001; Maslach et al., 2001; Meredith, 2017; Uhl-Bien et al., 2007; Van Dam et al., 2008)
3a	The plan should include ways to create buy-in	(Bakker et al., 2006; Carzo & Yanouzas, 1969; Casimir & Ng, 2010; Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995; Kamara, 2018; Northouse, 2019; Uhl-Bien, 2006)
	and build trust with the workforce – especially if the workforce has a unique set of skills that are vital to the organization’s success, such as JIOCs’ need for members who have intellectual curiosity	(Andersson & Zbirenko, 2018; Bakker et al., 2006; Bass, 1985; Burns, 1978; Burke, 2018; Carzo & Yanouzas, 1969; Chamorro-Premuzic, 2014; Harter et al., 2002; Heifetz, 1994; Jo & Shim, 2005; Kahn, 1990; Kessler, 2013; Kiefer, 2005; Meredith, 2017; Northouse, 2019; Robbins & Judge, 2018; Van Dam et al., 2008)
4	Create <i>adaptive, enabling leaders</i> who will create conditions for innovation, adaptability, and facilitate the flow of knowledge	(Burns, 1978; Day, 2000; Garamone, 2018; Gersick, 1991; Heifetz, 1994; Heifetz et al., 2009; Heifetz & Laurie, 2001; Lichtenstein et al., 2006; Lowenthal, 2020; Northouse, 2019; Schein, 1990; Uhl-Bien et al., 2007; Uhl-Bien & Arena, 2017; U.S. Department of Defense, 2018; Williamson et al., 2019; Yukl, 2005; Zember & Khooshabeh, 2020)
5	Standardized leadership training specifically directed at how best to plan for and implement change in their organization(s)	(Burke, 2018; Day, 2000; Kotter & Cohen, 2012; Smith, 2018; U.S. DoD, 2008; DoD IG, 2018)

Evidence that Supports the Proposed Solutions

In examining the two themes, 13 sub-themes, and the five proposed solutions, the following discusses the three categories that support the proposed solutions to combine all of the themes and sub-themes into a solid set of best practices (see Figure 7). The following section details evidence that supports three categories of proposed solutions and best practices.

Figure 7

Proposed solutions lead into best practices for JIOC leaders' behaviors during re-organizations



Note. The above best practices and proposed solutions graphic was designed by the author and derived from participants' language about their experiences during interviews for this study.

Category One: Culture, Including Complexity, Diversity, and Members' Skills

Culture. All participants described working in a complex organization where their main functions and missions were accomplished through a complex set of processes. Every organization has a different culture, including each of the 11 JIOCs, which start with a foundation of bureaucracy with dual chains of commands (military and analytic), mixed members (civilians, joint military, and contractors), and matrixed tasks with numerous managers. Like all organizations, JIOCs are affected by the types of people (military, civilian, contractors; supervisors, non-supervisors; formal and informal leaders; administrators, analysts, planners, etc) who comprise the organization and the way work is centralized and formalized through a chain or two chains of command; all of this must be balanced to ensure the workforce is participating in the organization for a positive culture.

While increased complexity during re-structuring may be unavoidable, leaders should be aware of the possibility of increased complexity when undertaking planning and during re-structuring. When organizational change includes unlearning old and learning new behaviors or culture, significant leadership efforts must be deliberate and persistent to shift dynamics (Anderson & Anderson, 2010; Burke, 2018; Lei et al., 1999; Schein, 1990). Leaders should demonstrate new behavioral change if the organizational change requires a cultural transformation (Burke & Litwin, 1992).

While JIOCs are part of the U.S. government and are comprised of bureaucratic chains and processes (Gajduschek, 2003; Robbins & Judge, 2018), senior JIOC leaders are most often military officers who will naturally lean toward engaging with homophilous military members as they share backgrounds, or with GG-15 DIA civilians who share responsibility for oversight functions (Currarini & Mengel, 2016; Haslam et al., 2011). Another aspect of leading JIOCs is that not only are managers of matrixed tasks and process owners required to share leadership, but DIA civilians (supervisors and non-supervisors) should also be included in discussions about process changes. The middle level military (O-4) and DIA civilians (GG-13 and GG-14) are the users of processes and they know the culture, which includes knowing “the way [they] do things” (Deal & Kennedy, 1982, p. 4). This inclusion of DIA civilians will help to break old behaviors and anchor them as process users in any new processes needed to create the visionary change, it will also anchor the new approaches in the local culture (Kotter, 1996).

As ascending JIOC leaders learn to use their skills to manage in uncertain, constantly changing environments, it would help military leaders to be less focused on bureaucratic processes and allow their followers to innovate to grow the organization (Uhl-Bien et al., 2007). Leaders who recognize the “knowledge era” will inherently lead differently, meaning they will

see the need to be flexible and adaptable to innovate and solve problems quickly. This aspect of culture can be rewarding for the DIA workforce, as long as the culture is built on trust and feeling valued. DIA civilians will be champions for change if the JIOC culture is one where rules and policies are followed, people are held accountable (at all levels), people behave as positive organizational citizens, members do not withhold information, and the social identities are inclusive (Burke, 2018; Haslam et al., 2011). When new JIOC members are quickly brought into the in-groups, organizational growth and employee satisfaction and performance will be high (Burke, 2018; Gleibs & Haslam, 2016; Rogers, 2003).


All participants described that they have several sources of leadership telling them what to do, many identities depending on their role in any given situation, and many paths to accomplish their tasks (see Figure 8). JIOC leaders will want to understand, appreciate, and acknowledge these various aspects that create the culture of their unique JIOC organization.

Diversity/Heterophily. Eight participants shared the view that the lack of diversity within planning teams for JIOC re-organizations created low feelings of value and hindered GG-13 and GG-14 DIA civilians from being able to add important perspectives in the planning process (see Figure 8 for a list of analytic processes). When leaders engage primarily with like-people, discussions often evolve around groupthink or silo mentality (Cilliers & Greyvenstein, 2012; Janis, 1972) where members inadvertently reinforce missteps through peer influence (Jones, 1973). Some members will also suppress dissent in order to please others and hold back opposing comments in an effort to drive consensus in a like-group. JIOC leaders will want to be conscious of the negative affect of groupthink (or silo mentality) so they can bring heterophilous groups of JIOC members together to tackle tough decisions by engaging in intragroup cohesiveness which will bring out a wide variety of factors to consider for organizational change

(Cilliers & Greyvenstein, 2012). JIOC leaders may believe this will slow the process for change, but in fact it will increase the speed at which change can be implemented and completed when a diverse/heterophilous group of people can carry the leaders' message and vision for the change. As JIOC leaders bring new groups of champions of change together for engagement, the workforce will view this as a new cultural phenomenon and will independently unconsciously start building new networks and viewing each other more favorably in the workplace as well (Cilliers & Greyvenstein, 2012; Currarini & Mengel, 2016; Janis, 1972).

Figure 8

JIOC organizational complexity in terms of processes



Note. The above list of processes was created by the author using participants language used during interviews for this study.

Members' Unique Skills. Intelligence analysts have many roles in JIOCs, including but not limited to, being critical thinkers, which makes them well-trained to examine their leaders' words and actions. When leaders' words and actions do not match, this quickly breaks analysts' trust in their leadership. Knowing how intelligence analysts think (and that this is a unique skill) is a strong reason for JIOC leaders to fully comprehend the value that intelligence analysts provide to the organization, not only to intelligence assessments, papers, and briefings, but as analysts and leaders in the middle of the organization (Callahan, 2017; Howell & Boies, 2004; Maxwell, 2011; Uhl-Bien et al., 2007). Analysts use these skills daily to analyze foreign leaders and to understand what those countries are doing to damage our national security. Additionally, the critical thinking skills intelligence analysts use daily are heightened when they are excluded from discussions about changing the organization (Chamorro-Premuzic, 2014).


Analysts at the GG-13 and GG-14 level are vital to the organization as they understand the processes for accomplishing the work of analysis, and they are often the level of leadership that lower employees trust to ask their tough questions because the junior employees know the GG-13s and GG-14s will either answer their questions or raise questions to more senior leaders. JIOC leaders will want to take time to engage in conversations with the GG-13 and GG-14 level analysts (supervisory and non-supervisory) to learn about how those analysts view their roles and how the JIOC can use them as champions and planners of change. This will enable trust building and give JIOC leaders time to share their vision and goals for organizational changes while engaging with analysts on a more personal level, which will make them feel valued.

Understanding the unique skills of JIOC GG-13 and GG-14 DIA civilians is a vital aspect of JIOC culture (see Figure 9 for a list of roles). JIOC leaders will want to understand intelligence analysts' need for communication and knowledge, as this is a vital demographic

group in the organization. Intelligence analysts have a high level of intellectual curiosity (Von Stumm et al., 2011), and while this is valuable for their work in national security, it can make them appear as non-conformists that do not follow the traditional military chain of command, which is one aspect of JIOC culture. However, intellectual curiosity is a useful attribute for managing complexity where persistent ambiguity exists and where individuals are constantly seeking more knowledge. In most people, intellectual curiosity is easily muted or damped, but “in a few people, intellectual curiosity is so insatiable that nothing will discourage it,” (Dewey, 1910, p. 33). Some intelligence analysts will have this insatiable appetite for information, particularly when they are middle leaders who are constantly engaging across the workforce with subordinates, peers, and superiors. Intelligence analysts at the GG-13 and GG-14 levels in particular may be subject to information insatiability as they have some knowledge of what senior leaders want and also of what junior employees need or want.

Figure 9

JIOC organizational complexity in terms of analysts' roles



Note. The above list of roles was created by the author using participants language used during interviews for this study.

Category Two: Communicate for Workforce Buy-In, Building Trust and Champions

Communicate Unambiguously with Transparency. All participants shared the view that leadership should aim for unambiguous communications and inform the workforce of re-organization planning early in the process. Communications in mixed member organizations, such as JIOCs, are difficult between transient military members and civilian subject matter experts, the mainstay of the long-term workforce. When organizational change is planned in a complex, bureaucratic, matrixed organization and national security is at risk, leaders' clear, transparent communications are vital for success (Meredith et al., 2017). Communication with

key personnel, including civilian expert analysts, is particularly important. While military leaders often want to use the chain of command to communicate, highly skilled, intelligent employees want to know that their concerns are being heard, which was demonstrated in this study to improve loyalty to the organization, prevent conflicts, and reduce tension with and the in-group “us” versus out-group “them.”

While tall (hierarchical) organizations, can benefit from supervisors with narrow spans of control to ensure communications are clearly relayed (Andersson & Zbirenko, 2018; Carzo & Yanouzas, 1969), with the GG-13 and GG-14 DIA civilians in JIOCs, this level of the organization would benefit from added communications to ensure they can answer their teams’ questions. Military rank or civilian paygrade is certainly part of the workplace, junior service members and junior civilians may have a more difficult time communicating (or no clear path to) concerns to senior ranking members (Torrance, 1955), so having the mid-level GG-13 and GG-14s informal leaders knowledgeable of the organization and the changes being planned will help to create transparent communications across the workforce.

Create Buy-In by Building Trust. All study participants mentioned that getting buy-in from the organization’s members was also a best practice. Nine participants stated that bringing people together to discuss the need for a re-organization and how to accomplish the goal(s) was a best practice. There are many ways for leaders to build a culture of trust; one way to do this is to create buy-in. Creating buy-in starts with leaders identifying members of the organization who support change and then partnering with them to work together toward the new mission, vision, and goals (Carzo & Yanouzas, 1969; Kamara, 2018). Leaders can invite a diverse or heterophilous group of members to meet to discuss plans for change and to weigh decisions,

which is important to create bonds among the mixed member workforce and to avoid inter-departmental rivalries.

Gathering with a diverse group of JIOC members will enable JIOC leaders to build relationships across the organization, which will support the leaders' understanding of the culture. These interactions will also provide a venue for the leaders to shape the culture of the JIOC through the relationships. The exchanges that leaders have with members will help members become comfortable raising concerns and questions so they can all reach the same goals. Some level of empowerment by senior leaders will enable members to take an active role as part of the solution where members have some authority over decisions in their specialized areas.

Build Champions for Change. The majority of participants believed that identifying and creating champions for change during JIOC re-organizations is a best practice. Leaders will want to be clear on the purpose and vision of change and to build prestige around the role of champion that supportive members can play in advocating for the change (Callahan, 2017; Uhl-Bien et al., 2007). In doing this, leaders will build trust through dialogue, answering members' questions, and empowering the self-identified and new champions for the change (Howell & Boies, 2004). Leaders will want to empower the champions to work and support each other as a guiding coalition and will want to coach and train them on how to best support the idea for change, the timelines, and how to bring questions back from the workforce (Smith, 2018).

Creating champions of the re-organization and the vision for success would add a number of mid-level leaders (known and/or unseen to top leaders) to being able to answer questions and offer support to members who raise challenges from the workforce (Callahan, 2017). Overall, JIOC leaders' behaviors will drive effective support and performance from DIA civilians. If

leaders are authentic and want to provide stability during change, they will want to walk-the-talk – meaning, leaders must be consistent in their words and actions (Leroy et al., 2012). If they say they want to communicate transparently, then they need to strive to communicate clearly and transparently with the workforce (Andersson & Zbirenko, 2018). Finally, JIOC leaders will want to have an open mind to be teachable, approachable, and be open to new ideas and perspectives of the mixed JIOC members.

Category Three: Use a Planning Model for Enduring Culture

Plan for Change. All participants mentioned that planning was important for a re-organization. The organizational change model offers an example for JIOC leaders to consider when implementing revolutionary change (see Figure 10). JIOC leaders will want strong, coherent planning methodology to ensure members accept organizational changes, which will bolster members' trust in leadership. Leadership behavior that insists on methodical and defensible planning is an admirable attribute.


Leaders must outline the vision and strategic guidance, the identify the requirements for an end state, which would be born out of the senior level guidance from the CCMD headquarters or the JIOC leadership. The vision and strategy must be further developed with inputs through engagements with key leaders, process owners, and the members of the work force to ensure members understand the differences between what they are currently doing and what must change to accomplish the new goals and vision.

Next, leaders must create a sense of urgency in the organization to ensure the vision for change is well understood across the workforce. This can be done in all-hands or town-hall meetings, and should also be addressed in staff meetings, analytic meetings, small groups, and individual engagements.

Simultaneous to the JIOC senior leader outlining the strategic guidance, vision, and the requirements for the change, leaders will want to select members from across the JIOC to form the guiding coalition to start the planning process. The guiding coalition must be comprised of a diverse or heterogenous group of people from across the organization and should include key formal and informal mid-level leaders, process owners, and champions of change. This group should be selected from the middle of the organization as these individuals will be able to carry the visionary message to others, answer questions when criticism is offered during routine interactions in the office, and they will raise questions to higher leadership when needed. This group should have a strong leader, who could be an intelligence planner, who can lead the entire planning effort.

Figure 10

Organizational change planning model (by category of catalyst for change)



Graphic by K. G. Picard, 2022

Note. This graphic is an original creation of the author illustrating an organizational change process arranged by the change catalysts that would take action.

Use a Planning Model for Re-organization. The use of a planning model in a military organization will enable early communications with members who know or could quickly learn the military planning model. Also, as the JIOC workforce includes intelligence planners, a DoD-trained planning expert could lead the planning effort to ensure efficiency and effectiveness of the plan.

In gathering the guiding coalition, intelligence planners will take higher level guidance to develop a strategy by organizing the factors compelling change. The planner(s) will help lead the coalition in identifying the tasks to be accomplished, breaking down the tasks into parts and processes, then requesting recommendations from process owners and other members of the workforce.

The guiding coalition will develop courses of action (COAs) to best solve the problem as outlined by senior leadership and they will ensure the COAs align with the strategic vision. The COAs will address the requirements of the senior leader's vision and will highlight any identified shortfalls in resources or structure and offer mitigation strategies. The COAs will be critically reviewed by the guiding coalition to bring fresh perspectives before being socialized with a large network of JIOC members and leaders to ensure all angles of work processes and administrative oversight are considered and incorporated. Finally, they will present the COAs to JIOC leadership for a decision. Following a decision, it will be vital for the JIOC senior leader to create a communication plan to announce the vision and the plan for implementation.

Following a decision by JIOC or CCMD leadership, the senior leadership will communicate the change vision to the workforce during all-hands or town hall meeting, staff

meetings, small group meetings, individual engagements, and analytic meeting would ensure the vision is communicated at multiple levels, repeatedly. The senior leader will want to empower members from across the organization for broad-based action on a select number of issues or areas that are already under their purview. It is wise for JIOC leaders to direct subordinates to carry the vision down the chain to every member of the JIOC so that no one is surprised by the vision for change or that change is coming.

Enduring Culture. The leadership will want to generate short-term wins to celebrate the hard work of the members, and to recognize champions for carrying positive messages and conversations of change throughout the workforce. Publicly celebrating near-term wins will visibly demonstrate to JIOC members that the leadership recognizes the hard work toward improving the culture and moving toward the vision. Military and DIA impact awards programs are good tools for recognizing members who have championed the change to meet the JIOC leader's intent.

With the assistance of the guiding coalition and mid-level champions, senior leadership will want to consolidate gains and positive changes that support the vision to produce more change internally, which breeds further success. They will also want to encourage minor adjustments in the organization, as necessary to adjust any previously unforeseen issues that arise during the initial change events.

Lastly, leadership must anchor new approaches in the organizational culture. This can be done through all their communications, including small group meetings, sensing sessions, staff meetings, and all-hands meetings. It is also important to establish programs, processes, procedures, and policies to anchor new issues into the culture. Old work habits will need to be unlearned so that new habits can be learned. Creating new policies, programs, procedures, and

processes along with a strong communications plan to ensure every member knows the behaviors that are expected will ensure change will last over the long-term.

Leaders need the help of members to ensure new behaviors are rooted in social norms and shared values. If new behaviors are not rooted in social norms, the in-group members who opposed change from the beginning will work against the change and will pressure future senior leaders to transition back to where the organization was previously.

JIOC leadership will want to be wary of declaring victory too soon, as anchoring or solidifying change takes time but is vital for lasting cultural transformation. As a couple of participants pointed out, if the senior DIA civilians do not fully adopt the JIOC leader's change initiative, as soon as that military leader leaves, the DIA civilians will work to change everything back to the old processes and culture. Also, concurrently with implementing revolutionary or major change, JIOC leaders will also want to be prepared and capable to address unplanned challenges, including (but not limited to) issues regarding fiscal resources, sudden loss of key personnel, or other unforeseen challenges/issues.

Best Practices for JIOC Re-Organizations

All participants talked about how their re-organizations could have gone better and mentioned best practices for future re-organizations. To start, JIOC leaders will want to be willing to embrace chaos, ambiguity, and change before tackling a re-organization. They will also want to listen and communicate regularly with members to understand challenges at various levels of the organization.

As a military organization, JIOCs are hierarchical and have matrixed analytic tasks, which involves two chains of command and several managers who want to be kept informed of progress and challenges. While the structure of the organizations does not matter a great deal, the

improvements made through organizational change will necessitate an infusion of new knowledge, regardless of who introduces it, and change will add further complexity to JIOCs as changes begin to be implemented.

This section outlines the best practices (see Figure 11) found through the language study participants used during interviews. The top six topics for best practices include: (a) member engagement at mid-levels is just as important at senior levels, (b) numerous communications venues are valuable, (c) building trust at all levels creates buy-in, (d) diversity in the planning team is valued, (e) goals and vision must be clear, and (f) champions of change will enable success for culture change.

Member Engagement

JIOC leaders will want to engage with members at all levels, particularly those who complete the most complex tasks in the organizations. This will enable JIOC leaders to understand where they can change quickly for a near-term success, and those issues that will need more time or evolutionary change in terms of policies, programs, and procedures.

Engagement with members will ensure they have more energy and involvement through meaningful exchanges in the workplace. Members will keep high interest and contributions to work and will have more overall job satisfaction through both engagement with both formal and informal leaders. Members who are not actively engaged derive less purpose, are less trusting, and often drop some responsibilities when they are not engaged. However, when employees are engaged by leaders, they are more likely to feel psychologically safe and are more likely to bring their whole selves to the workplace. Through engagement, members are more supportive and trusting, more flexible, less fearful of change.

JIOC leaders will also want to engage with the intelligence planners on staff to help impose a planning model onto any re-organization. Finally, they will want to identify diverse members of the workforce to form the guiding coalition on the planning team to ensure all or most roles in the organization are represented.

Communication Venues

Numerous forms of communication, but the most mentioned by participants was that all-hands or town halls were very useful in communicating to most of the workforce, particularly when the idea of a re-organization is first announced. A follow-up email is also a good idea to ensure members have something to reference if they missed the large meeting or if they have questions afterwards.

The message of change must be carried down through the chain of command by all formal leader in all possible venues to ensure they are echoing the JIOC leader's message the same way to members and are able to answer questions when raised. This will ensure members trust leaders' message and that they can ask questions for clarification. Informal leaders who trust leadership and have buy-in to the re-organization will also echo the leader's message to their followers.

Communication up the chain is equally important as down. Informal leaders in particular want to know that their questions and questions from more junior members will be answer professionally and respectfully. Junior members trust the mid-level leaders (formal and informal), which causes mid-level leaders to most often be the level of the JIOC to raise questions as they have their own questions and those of their followers, including peers and junior members of the workforce.

Clearly Outlined Goals

Leader's goals for change must be a central pillar of the change efforts. When leaders outline goals to members, members can then visualize themselves being part of the end purpose and they want to meet those goals. Identifying the requirements that need to be met for the re-organization is a top need of highly intellectual members of the workforce. Members who use their intellectual prowess to tackle tough defense and national security problems also critically think through organizational challenges and may have experience with military planning. Clearly outlining and communicating vision, goals, and requirements will ensure JIOC members can be ready and agile for implementation of change.

Buy-In by Building Trust

Members' confidence in leaders' integrity and trustworthiness affects members' ability to accept leaders' vision for change efforts and increases chances of success. Buy-in must start by building trust, and leaders build trust by delivering information and offering meaningful participation in decision-making. Leaders and members must work together to build trust across the workforce to accomplish goals successfully. They must share the moral commitment to the organization's common goals so that the organization's values can be upheld. These behaviors create highly engaged members of the workforce. Leaders can alleviate employees' resistance to change when the leader is willing and able to deliver accurate information in a timely manner, provide opportunities for participation in decision-making, and infuse trust of members in the leader's vision for a change event.

Diverse Planning Team

Members from numerous offices and career fields or specialties will need to be brought together to form a diverse planning team. This team will need to be able to discuss a potential or

impending re-organization, which will benefit the entire organization in addressing the predominant issues, including issues that seem minor to senior leaders.


Long-term civilian members (those with 10 or more years of longevity in one JIOC) should also be engaged during the planning process so ensure buy-in to the changes. According to study participants, when long-term members are not engaged, they are more likely to tacitly counteract change which greatly affects the vision of a new culture or the new ways of doing things. Leaders and the planning team will want to include long-term civilians in discussions to ensure they have a feeling of participating in decision-making, to be allowed to be part of the solutions, and to obtain buy-in to the new culture and structure. This will build trust between leaders and members, builds trust with these key members, and it reinforces the members' purpose and networks through inter-personal communications as well. Ultimately, this engagement will ensure the long-term members become champions of the change and can be relied upon to anchor the new approached in the new culture.

Champions of Change

Creating champions of the re-organization and the vision for success will certainly add numerous mid-level and informal leaders to a positive force for change. Members who support the vision and idea for change, can answer questions about timelines, processes, and put others' minds at ease about potential chaos and ambiguity will ensure that every member has someone to answer their questions and reassure them about the future of their roles. Champions of change will magnify success as more people throughout the organization can carry the vision message; any members with high public service motivation will want to be a part of any positive change effort so will eagerly carry the message throughout all their duties.

Figure 11

Best practices for JIOC leaders' behaviors during re-organizations



Note. The above best practices graphic was created by the author and derived from participants' language about their experiences during interviews for this study.

Evidence that Challenges the Solution

While this study does not pinpoint one major piece of evidence that strongly challenges the proposed solutions to advocate for leadership behaviors during organizational change events, as JIOCs are complex bureaucratic organizations, the bureaucracy itself may be the major challenge to the proposed solutions. While 21st century bureaucratic organizations largely remain grounded in the framework from the Industrial Age, defense leaders must use a control system that not only achieves the organization's goals (Callahan, 2017; Uhl-Bien et al., 2007), but

engages with the workforce in a way that fosters innovation (Uhl-Bien & Arena, 2017). Furthermore, leaders in today's tall or hierarchical bureaucratic organizations often lack the vision of moving leadership beyond formal relationships, which contradict today's innovative competitive circumstances (Uhl-Bien et al., 2007).

Some study participants stated that leadership did not engage them, but only engaged homogenous members – either senior military officers or senior civilian leaders. This itself poses a challenge particularly as the mid-level DIA GG-13 and GG-14 leaders are the doers of JIOC organizational tasks and they reside in the middle of the organization. As mid-level members are highly intellectual and they are looked up to by junior members, senior JIOC leaders will want to communicate with them because the GG-13s and GG-14s will need guidance and context for them to champion the change vision. JIOC leadership should desire engagement with mid-level members to understand how best to plan for and implement a change for them as the doers. Success relies on fully engaging the workforce. By engaging in meaningful learning from middle leaders, JIOC leaders will be able to learn more fully about the organization's culture including recognizing the critical thinkers who thirst for information and knowledge, how they communicate transparently with junior members, and how they create buy-in at all levels of leadership to build trust and identify champions for change throughout the JIOC organization.

Many leaders may start a new position with the approach that they do not intend to change the organization. Therefore, it may be difficult to discern whether incoming JIOC leaders are receptive to training in preparation for leading a complex re-organization. However, with the number of re-organizations that JIOCs undergo, it would be wise to prepare all JIOC leaders for the eventual circumstances which require a re-structuring. After all, the global security

environment is constantly changing, and the supported CCMD's mission constantly evolves which directly impacts the work JIOC analysts do for defense issues.

Finally, complex organizations that work in rapidly changing environments with matrixed tasks, multiple overlapping networks of individuals and groups, and external influences must be governed by equally complex systems of leadership and members who search for solutions (McKelvey & Boisot, 2003). JIOC leaders will want to include middle leaders (GG-13s and GG-14s) to find solutions for changing vision and goals, which will help them to adjust to a new mindset of inclusivity after years of military training in taking control and quickly organizing a management solution (Uhl-Bien et al., 2007). Formal and informal leaders who hear the new vision for re-organization first-hand from their JIOC leader will be able to champion the message for change with their followers, peers, and colleagues through an already complex system.

Implementation of the Proposed Solution

By implementing a few proposed solutions, JIOC senior leaders can mitigate the challenges they experience during a reorganization by demonstrating their commitment to serve members of their JIOCs and meeting the objectives for their missions. Consequently, training both senior military and senior civilian JIOC leaders on planning and leading re-organizations can help mitigate the challenges they encounter. As leaders' micro-behaviors affect organizational macro-behaviors (Marion, 1999), each JIOC member has a role to play in the larger system of behaviors and the way in which the system functions. While members may not easily recognize their part in learning cultural behaviors and may not formally influence others' behaviors or the structure of how a system works, each member plays a role in the larger system. JIOC leaders' recognition and appreciation of DIA civilians' skills and perspectives will add to

their understanding of the macro-level of the organization. Additionally, DIA employees can embrace their informal leadership roles as champions and engage wherever they can to support the macro-level as well (Marion & Uhl-Bien, 2001).

Factors and Stakeholders Related to the Implementation of the Solution

For JIOC leadership to re-organize their centers, in some cases they can re-organize without any oversight from more senior military or civilian leaders, but in other cases JIOC leaders need to obtain approval from above them in the chain of command. Because oversight is inconsistent, I propose that leadership training focused on re-organizations be incorporated in CCMD Intelligence Directorate senior leader (military and civilians) formal training so that each JIOC leader receives training on before or when they arrive to new JIOC leadership roles. Alternatively, training focused on problem solving and implementing change could be incorporated into required military (O-5 and O-6) and civilian (GG-15) training for senior paygrades. With training being offered in one of these ways, all military and civilian senior leaders who are selected for key JIOCs leadership positions will receive requisite preparation to lead successful re-organizations.

Organizational stakeholders for the proposed solutions include the DoD Joint Staff, the Office of the Under-Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, the DIA, and CCMD education and training offices, which are situated in various locations at CCMDs. The positional stakeholders include the Senior Intelligence Officer (or Intelligence Director) at each CCMD (typically an O-7 or O-8 military officer), the JIOC leaders themselves, and the members of the workforce who strive for excellence every day and want to be able to work at their highest potential for the mission. Finally, the military service training centers, war colleges, and DIA training centers are potential stakeholders as the locations where training might be developed.

CCMDs may want to create a process for JIOCs to implement re-organizations, which may include (a) requiring certification of new leadership re-organization training, (b) creating a new role in each JIOC for overseeing the process of re-organizing, which could be a Ombuds role from the CCMD headquarters, or (c) requiring the JIOC Commander to get approval in writing from the Intelligence Director or another designated senior leader to implement a re-organization. Realizing the last recommendation may be restrictive and tying the hands of a military JIOC leader, but it would ensure that the JIOC leader has considered all facets of implementing a re-organization, including the aspect of leading a highly skilled civilian force and impact to the CCMD's mission. Another option may be to obtain training through DIA's training center. After all, DIA employs the senior civilians, including the Deputy and Assistant Intelligence Directors in CCMDs and they would be advocates for all JIOC leaders to have additional training before undertaking a re-organization.

Timeline for Implementation of the Solution

The implementation of the proposed solution for training JIOC leaders before re-organization would take place through a series of steps that would likely take months, if not years, to achieve. While many senior leaders are interested in new leadership training, the bureaucracy surrounding the various paths for training may be slow to respond. The first realistic step would be to contact the leaders above the JIOC level to assess their interest in training for leaders who may oversee re-organizations. If one CCMD or JIOC agrees to do a pilot of re-organization leadership training, the results for that could be used to convince the larger bureaucracy that such training would be good for leaders at all the JIOCs.

Implications

Practical Implications for Practice

As JIOC members perform at a high intellectual level, acknowledging this may ease the weight that DIA civilians feel in working in an intensely bureaucratic organization. Leaders who learn the JIOC culture and acknowledge the matrixed nature of receiving work and task management may be able to ease some of the burden of analysts who have multiple managers and partners who want or need to feel in control of those matrixed tasks. JIOC leaders may also be able to open communications substantially across the multiple layers of mid-level leaders which would likely increase and improve performance as well. Ultimately, DIA employees want to understand their lanes in the road, who they report to—which is particularly important in a military chain of command structure—and how they can fulfill the requirements of their jobs in order to be successful. Additionally, in terms of managers' roles, managers want to understand their span of control (or span of supervision) so they can balance the need to oversee the workload of their organization. Adoption of these practices would also improve retention and overall job satisfaction.

Implications for Future Research

The findings from this study fill a gap in current research and about how JIOC military leaders can engage DIA civilian employees while planning for and executing a re-organization. Future research is needed to explore how a formal planning process would aid JIOC leaders in preparing for a re-organization, including involving a diverse or heterogenous group in the planning process and the results of the execution of the re-organization. Additionally, if leadership training for re-organizations is developed, further research should be conducted to

understand how DIA civilians' experiences of JIOC re-organizations changes with JIOC leaders more aware of how to engage and plan.

Based on the interview data, this study developed solid overarching best practices for leadership engagements and behaviors during JIOC re-organizations. Based on the findings from this study, it would be beneficial to conduct a longitudinal study of DIA civilians who experience JIOC re-organizations to better understand the direct and indirect effects of leadership behaviors during change events. It would also be beneficial to study DIA civilians who are not in the analyst career field to understand the perspective from different career fields, such as planning, targeting, human resources, security and mission management. Finally, it may be useful to study how military members and senior leadership experience organizational change.

Implications for Leadership Theory and Practice

The current study reinforced the need for a people-focused approach to leadership within defense intelligence centers. U.S. military officers are expected to lead through the DoD's core values of Duty, Integrity, Ethics, Honor, Courage, and Loyalty, which is a combination of each separate military service's core values (Mattox, 2013). To effectively do so, military officers must be cognizant of their leadership style. Self-awareness is a baseline characteristic of any authentic leader, which guides them in knowing what they can accomplish (Walumbwa et al., 2011).

Self-awareness ensures JIOC leaders have a heightened sense of knowing what they are capable, and they would be better able to use their emotional intelligence to exhibit the values and behaviors they want in their organization by building interpersonal relationships and reducing inequity (Robbins & Judge, 2016; Walumbwa et al., 2011). Through self-awareness, JIOC leaders would be cognizant of their strengths and weaknesses, and through frequent

formalized training, they would better serve the JIOCs' diverse, mixed members' needs to meet the mission. By keeping the members' needs in mind, JIOC leadership will be well prepared to make decisions and to also build a culture of trust and respect consciously across all members' ranks and paygrades.

Strengths

The use of the interpretive phenomenological approach (IPA) using open-ended interview questions led to rich data that aided in determining relevant themes which convey a deep understanding of the participants' lived experiences. By focusing on the lived experience of DIA civilians working in JIOCs, this study provided a view into their experiences of JIOC leadership, which plays an instrumental role in meeting the national security mission for the Department of Defense.

The study findings align with scholarly research suggesting that DoD leaders are not only part of the process of behaving as leaders of their JIOC, but that the relationships inside the JIOCs are equally vital to supporting the mission of defense and national security. The leader-member exchange (LMX) theory underscores that relationships between leaders and members have a great influence on members' attitudes and behaviors and whether members trust the leaders (Andersson & Zbirenko, 2018; Kessler, 2013). Finally, the study findings show that direct communications and engagement between leaders and members play a significant role in building champions of change within this study group (Callahan, 2017; Uhl-Bien et al., 2007).

Ultimately, this research can be applied across the DoD and IC where bureaucratic, matrixed, complex organizations are the norm. It also can be applied to numerous other U.S. and international organizations to assist with successful organizational change events.

Limitations

As detailed in Chapter One, this study did have limitations. While this study used a purposeful sampling strategy, the small sample size suggests the findings may not support generalizing of the study findings beyond this group of DIA civilians who were all in the analyst career field. However, the extensive literature reviewed for this study may be sufficient to illustrate the potential connections of the findings to offer practical applications to all 11 JIOCs and also to private and non-profit organizations, which are also comprised of complex, bureaucratic, matrixed organizational structures. Finally, this study did not include a comprehensive overview of ways JIOC leadership can incorporate adaptive behaviors apart from leading deliberate planning and execution for re-organizations, which did not include adaptive behaviors for ad hoc or unplanned change.

Summary of Dissertation in Practice

Study participants used the metaphor “we are flying this plane as we are building it.” By this, they meant that during their re-organizations, they were not only maintaining awareness and learning more about their defense topic areas, but also unlearning previous processes and cultural methods, and simultaneously learning new processes and cultural methods and means to get work done. Members are required to maintain high analytic production and learn how to work in new structures in new roles, while continuously supporting the defense and national missions to safeguard the units they support and the nation. In order to conduct a comprehensive re-organization and build trust and confidence with the workforce, implementing the proposed solutions offered in this chapter can have a positive, practical effect on JIOC culture aimed at improving DIA civilians’ experiences, effectiveness, and efficiency in successfully meeting the missions. When DIA civilians are involved in organizational change, they will feel valued and

empowered to raise concerns about how structure, work processes, and culture can be changed keeping in mind the subordinate workforce that they are leading from their middle positions. When DIA mid-level civilian leaders buy-into organizational change, they will be more likely to self-identify as champions for the change and support the change with how they interact throughout the course of their duties. They will be likely to lead the workforce through innovative critical thinking and will remain flexible and adaptable for the mission. Ultimately, JIOC leaders should understand the structure, culture, and the climate of the organizations they lead in order to keep experienced DIA civilians performing the defense and national security missions at the highest level to inform Combatant Commanders, Defense Officials, and National Policymakers.

References

- Abd-El-Salam, E. M., Shawky, A. Y., El-Nahas, T., & Nawar, Y. S. (2013). The relationship among job satisfaction, motivation, leadership, communication, and psychological empowerment: An Egyptian case study. *SAM Advanced Management Journal*, 78(2), 33–50.
- American Psychological Association. (2020). *Publication manual of the American Psychological Association* (7th ed.). <https://doi.org/10.1037/0000165-000>
- Anderson, C., & Brown, C. E. (2010). The functions and dysfunctions of hierarchy. *Research in Organizational Behavior*, 30, 55–89. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.riob.2010.08.002>
- Anderson, D., & Anderson, L. A. (2010). *Beyond change management: How to achieve breakthrough results through conscious change leadership* (2nd ed.). Pfeiffer Publications.
- Andersson, J., & Zbirenko, A. (2018). *Effect of organizational structure, leadership and communication on efficiency and productivity*. Umeå Universitet [Bachelor's thesis, Umeå School of Business and Economics]. <https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:735889/fulltext01.pdf>
- Andrews, R., Boyne, G., & Mostafa, A. M. S. (2017). When bureaucracy matters for organizational performance: Exploring the benefits of administrative intensity in big and complex organizations. *Public Administration*, 95(1), 115–139. <https://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12305>
- Army Study Guide (2020). *Duties, responsibilities and authority explained*. https://www.armystudyguide.com/content/army_board_study_guide_topics/nco_duties/duties-responsibilities-authority-of-nco.shtml

- Babbie, E. (2017). *The basics of social research* (7th ed.). Cengage Learning.
- Bakker, A., van Emmerik, H., & Euwema, M. (2006). Crossover of burnout and engagement in work teams. *Work and Occupations, 33*(4), 464–489.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0730888406291310>
- Bass, B. M. (1985). *Leadership and performance beyond expectations*. Free Press.
- Bass, B. M. (1990). From transactional to transformational leadership: Learning to share the vision. *Organizational Dynamics, 18*(3), 19–31. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0090-2616\(90\)90061-S](https://doi.org/10.1016/0090-2616(90)90061-S)
- Berger, D. (2020). The case for change: Meeting the principal challenges facing the Corps. *Joint Intermediate Force Capabilities Office*. <https://jnlwp.defense.gov/Press-Room/In-The-News/Article/2302640/the-case-for-change/>
- Birt, L., Scott, S., Cavers, D., Campbell, C., & Walter, F. (2016). Member checking: A tool to enhance trustworthiness or merely a nod to validation? *Qualitative Health Research, 26*(13), 1802–1811. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1049732316654870>
- Bottomley, P., Mostafa, A. M. S., Gould-Williams, J. S., & León-Cázares, F. (2016). The impact of transformational leadership on organizational citizenship behaviours: The contingent role of public service motivation. *British Journal of Management, 27*(2), 390–405.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8551.12108>
- Bowers, D. G., & Seashore, S. E. (1966). Predicting organizational effectiveness with a four-factor theory of leadership. *Administrative Science Quarterly, 11*(2), 238–263.
<https://doi.org/10.2307/2391247>
- Burke, W. (2018). *Organization change: Theory and practice* (5th ed.). SAGE.

- Burke, W. W., & Litwin, G. H. (1992). A causal model of organizational performance and change. *Journal of Management*, *18*(3), 523–545.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/014920639201800306>
- Burns, J. M. (1978). *Leadership*. Harper & Row.
- Calendly. (2021). *Calendly*. <https://calendly.com/>
- Callahan, R. F. (2017). Bureaucracy and leadership. In A. Farazmand (Ed.), *Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance*. Springer.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_622-1
- Carzo, R., Jr., & Yanouzas, J. N. (1969). Effects of flat and tall organization structure. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, *14*(2), 178–191. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2391096>
- Casimir, G., & Ng, Y. N. (2010). Combinative aspects of leadership style and the interaction between leadership behaviors. *Leadership & Organization Development Journal*, *31*(6), 501–517. <https://doi.org/10.1108/01437731011070005>
- Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), (2022). Browse CIA jobs: Intelligence scholar.
<https://www.cia.gov/careers/jobs/intelligence-scholar/>
- Chamorro-Premuzic, T. (2014, August 27). Curiosity is as important as intelligence. *Harvard Business Review*. <https://hbr.org/2014/08/curiosity-is-as-important-as-intelligence>
- Christian, J., Porter, L. W., & Moffitt, G. (2006). Workplace diversity and group relations: An overview. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, *9*(4), 459–466.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430206068431>
- Cilliers, F., & Greyvenstein, H. (2012). The impact of silo mentality on team identity: An organisational case study. *South African Journal of Industrial Psychology*, *38*(2), 1–9.
<https://doi.org/10.4102/sajip.v38i2.993>

- Costa, K. J. (2006). Officials: JIOCs will improve agility, coordination: Cultural shift under way as Pentagon revamps defense intelligence. *Inside the Air Force*, 17(35), 13–16.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/24793895>
- Creswell, J. W. (2012). *Educational research: Planning, conducting, and evaluating quantitative and qualitative research*. Pearson.
- Creswell, J. W., & Creswell, J. D. (2018). *Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches* (5th ed.). SAGE.
- Creswell, J. W., & Poth, C. N. (2018). *Qualitative inquiry & research design: Choosing among five approaches* (4th ed.). SAGE.
- Dalton, D. R., Todor, W. D., Spendolini, M. J., Fielding, G. J., & Porter, L. W. (1980). Organization structure and performance: A critical review. *Academy of Management Review*, 5(1), 49–64. <https://doi.org/10.5465/AMR.1980.4288881>
- Davis, J. (1995). Defining the analytic mission: Facts, findings, forecasts, and fortune-telling. *Studies in Intelligence*, 39(3), 25–30.
<https://www.cia.gov/static/183591adb1b84cd9762f9418e761d85b/facts-findings-forecasts-fortunes.pdf>
- Davoren, J. (2019, January 25). Functional structure organization strength & weakness. *Chron*.
<https://smallbusiness.chron.com/functional-structure-organization-strength-weakness-60111.html>
- Day, D. V. (2000). Leadership development: A review in context. *Leadership Quarterly*, 11(4), 581. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S1048-9843\(00\)00061-8](https://doi.org/10.1016/S1048-9843(00)00061-8)
- Deal, T. E., & Kennedy, A. A. (1982). *Corporate cultures: The rites and rituals of corporate life*. Addison-Wesley.

Defense Intelligence Agency. (2020). *Frequently asked questions*.

<https://www.dia.mil/About/FAQs/>

Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General (DoD IG). (2018). Evaluation of combatant command intelligence directorate internal communications processes (DODIG-2019-032). *U.S. Department of Defense*.

<https://media.defense.gov/2018/Dec/11/2002071181/-1/-1/1/DODIG-2019-032.pdf>

DeVine, M. E. (2019, November 6). Intelligence community spending: Trends and issues.

Congressional Research Service. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R44381.pdf>

DeVine, M. E. (2020, January 24). Defense primer: National and defense intelligence (Version 8). *Congressional Research Service*. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IF10525.pdf>

Dewey, J. (1910). *How we think*. Heath & Co.

Dickel, C. T. (2011). *Reflection: A taxonomy and synthesis of descriptions of reflexive practice/reflexive inquiry*. Creighton University.

Earley, P. C., & Mosakowski, E. (2000). Creating hybrid team cultures: An empirical test of transnational team functioning. *Academy of Management Journal*, 43(1), 26–49.

<https://doi.org/10.2307/1556384>

Eisenstein, L. (2019, December 20). *10 basic responsibilities of board members*. Board Effect.

<https://www.boardeffect.com/blog/10-basic-responsibilities-board-members/>

Erwin, M. C., & Belasco, A. (2013, September 5). Intelligence spending and appropriations: Issues for Congress. *Congressional Research Service*, 1–17.

<https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA604126.pdf>

Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. (1981), *reprinted as amended* in Exec. Orders 13,284 (2003), 13,335 (2004), and 13,470 (2008). <https://dodsioo.defense.gov/Library/EO-12333/>

Fayol, H. (1949). *General and industrial management*. Pitman.

Federal Pay. (2020). *Army ranks to civilian GS paygrades*. Federalpay.org.

<https://www.federalpay.org/military/army-ranks-to-gs-grade>

Fernandez, S., & Pitts, D. W. (2007). Under what conditions do public managers favor and pursue organizational change? *The American Review of Public Administration*, 37(3), 324–341. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0275074006293467>

Fox-Wolfgramm, S. J., Boal, K. B., & Hunt, J. G. (1998). Organizational adaptation to institutional change: A comparative study of first-order change in prospector and defender banks. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 43(1), 87–126.

<https://doi.org/10.2307/2393592>

Friebel, G., & Raith, M. (2004). Abuse of authority and hierarchical communication. *The RAND Journal of Economics*, 35(2), 224–244. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1593689>

Gajduschek, G. (2003). Bureaucracy: Is it efficient? Is it not? Is that the question? Uncertainty reduction: An ignored element of bureaucratic rationality. *Administration & Society*, 34(6), 700–723. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095399702239171>

Garamone, J. (2017, January 31). Dunford: Speed of military decision-making must exceed speed of war. *U.S. Department of Defense News*.

<https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1066045/dunford-speed-of-military-decision-making-must-exceed-speed-of-war/igphoto/2001875933/>

Garamone, J. (2018, July 2). Global integration seeks to buy leaders decision time, increase ‘speed of relevance’. *U.S. Department of Defense*.

<https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1565240/global-integration-seeks-to-buy-leaders-decision-time-increase-speed-of-relevan/>

Garbulo, M., & Lin, N. (2018, January 14). The appeal of the 'flat' organisation – Why some firms are getting rid of middle managers. *The Conversation*.

<https://theconversation.com/the-appeal-of-the-flat-organisation-why-some-firms-are-getting-rid-of-middle-managers-88942>

Gardner, D. (2021). Leaders build cultures: Action steps for leaders to build successful organizational cultures. *Journal of Leadership, Accountability and Ethics*, 18, 37–53.

<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/349608698>

George, J. M., & Jones, G. R. (1995). *Understanding and managing organizational behavior*. Addison-Wesley.

Gersick, C. J. G. (1991). Revolutionary change theories: A multilevel exploration of the punctuated equilibrium paradigm. *Academy of Management Review*, 16, 10–36.

<https://doi.org/10.5465/AMR.1991.4278988>

Gilmore, G. J. (2006, April 12). DoD to set up Joint Intelligence Operations Centers worldwide. *U.S. Department of Defense*.

<https://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=15475>

Gleibs, I. H., & Haslam, S. A. (2016). Do we want a fighter? The influence of group status and the stability of intergroup relations on leader prototypicality and endorsement. *The Leadership Quarterly*, 27(4), 557–573. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2015.12.001>

<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2015.12.001>

Goold, M., & Campbell, A. (2003). Making matrix structures work: Creating clarity on unit roles and responsibility. *European Management Journal*, 21(3), 351–363.

[https://doi.org/10.1016/S0263-2373\(03\)00048-3](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0263-2373(03)00048-3)

Graen, G. B., & Uhl-Bien, M. (1995). Relationship-based approach to leadership: Development of leader-member exchange (LMX) theory of leadership over 25 years: Applying a multi-

level multi-domain perspective. *The Leadership Quarterly*, 6, 219–247.

[http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/1048-9843\(95\)90036-5](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/1048-9843(95)90036-5)

Greenberg, J., & Baron, R. A. (2003). *Behavior in organizations* (8th ed.). Upper Saddle River.

Gutermann, D., Lehmann-Willenbrock, N., Boer, D., & Born, M. (2016). Why engaged leaders have engaged employees: A multilevel study of engagement, LMX, and follower performance. *Academy of Management Proceedings*, 1, 1–39.

<https://doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2016.14896abstract>

Harter, J. K., Schmidt, F. L., & Hayes, T. L. (2002). Business-unit-level relationship between employee satisfaction, employee engagement, and business outcomes: A meta-analysis.

Journal of Applied Psychology, 87, 268–279. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.87.2.268>

Haslam, S. A., Reicher, S. D., & Platow, M. J. (2011). *The new psychology of leadership: Identity, influence, and power*. Psychology Press.

Hearns, R. (2019, December 8). How the federal government actually works: The reflective experiences of a university research administrator who took a federal government job (VA). *Society of Research Administrators International*.

<https://www.srainternational.org/blogs/srai-jra1/2019/12/08/how-the-federal-government-actually-works>

Heifetz, R., Grashow, A., & Linsky, M. (2009). *The practice of adaptive leadership: Tools and tactics for changing your organization and the world*. Cambridge Leadership Associates.

Heifetz, R. A. (1994). *Leadership without easy answers*. Belknap Press.

Heifetz, R. A., & Laurie, D. L. (2001, December). The work of leadership. *Harvard Business Review*, 79(11), 131–141. <http://www.kwli.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Heifetz-Laurie-2001.pdf>

- Heuer, R. J., Jr. (1999). *Psychology of intelligence analysis*. Center for the Study of Intelligence.
- Hur, Y., Van Den Berg, P. T., & Wilderom, C. (2011). Transformational leadership as a mediator between emotional intelligence and team outcomes. *The Leadership Quarterly*, 22(4), 591–603. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2011.05.002>
- Husserl, E. (1931). *Ideas: General introduction to pure phenomenology* (W. R. Boyce, Trans.). Allen & Unwin.
- Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004. Pub L. No. 108–458 (2004).
- Ivancevich, J. M., & Donnelly Jr., J. H. (1975). Relation of organizational structure to job satisfaction, anxiety-stress, and performance. *Administrative Science Quarterly* 20(2), 272–80. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2391699>
- Janis, I. L. (1972). *Victims of groupthink: A psychological study of foreign-policy decisions and fiascoes*. Houghton Mifflin.
- Jeszenszky, E. (1992). The Defense Intelligence Agency: Jointness is goodness. *American Intelligence Journal*, 13(3), 79–83. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/44326209>
- Jo, S., & Shim, S. W. (2005). Paradigm shift of employee communication: The effect of management communication on trusting relationships. *Public Relations Review*, 31(2), 277–280. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pubrev.2005.02.012>
- Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2013). *Joint publication 2-0: Joint intelligence* (JP 2-0). Department of Defense. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp2_0.pdf
- Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2020). *Joint publication 5-0: Joint planning* (JP 5-0). Department of Defense. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp5_0.pdf

- Jones, A. M. (1973). [Review of *Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign Policy Decisions and Fiascoes*, by I. L. Janis]. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 407, 179–180. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1038763>
- Jung, C. S., & Kim, S. E. (2014). Structure and perceived performance in public organizations. *Public Management Review*, 16(5), 620–642.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2012.743576>
- Kafle, N. (2011). Hermeneutic phenomenological research method simplified. *Bodhi: An Interdisciplinary Journal*, 5(1), 181–200. <https://doi.org/10.3126/bodhi.v5i1.8053>
- Kahn, W. A. (1990). Psychological conditions of personal engagement and disengagement at work. *Academy of Management Journal*, 33(4), 692–724. <https://doi.org/10.2307/256287>
- Kahneman, (2011). *Thinking, fast and slow*. Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.
- Kamara, H. M. (2018). Military transformation: Applying the Kotter eight-step methodology for change on the U.S. Armed Services. *JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly*, 91, 74–81.
<https://bit.ly/3xavFnT>
- Kanter, R.M. (1983). *The change masters*. Simon & Schuster.
- Kaufmann, W., Borry, E. L., & DeHart-Davis, L. (2018). More than pathological formalization: Understanding organizational structure and red tape. *Public Administration Review*, 79(2), 236–245. <https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.12958>
- Kessler, E. H. (2013). *Encyclopedia of management theory*. SAGE.
- Kiefer, T. (2005). Feeling bad: Antecedents and consequences of negative emotions in ongoing change. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 26(8), 875–897.
<https://doi.org/10.1002/job.339>
- Kotter, J. P. (1990). *A force for change: How leadership differs from management*. Free Press.

Kotter, J. P. (2012). *Leading change*. Harvard Business School Press.

Kotter, J. P., & Cohen, D. S. (2012). *The heart of change: Real-life stories of how people change their organizations*. Harvard Business School Press.

Lam, B. (2016, January 15). Why are so many Zappos employees leaving? *The Atlantic*.

<https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/01/zappos-holacracy-hierarchy/424173/>

Lei, D., Slocum, J. W., & Pitts, R. A. (1999). Designing organizations for competitive advantage: The power of unlearning and learning. *Organizational Dynamics*, 27(3), 24–38. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0090-2616\(99\)90019-0](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0090-2616(99)90019-0)

Lewis, L. K., & Seibold, D. R. (1993). Innovation modification during intraorganizational adoption. *The Academy of Management Review*, 18(2), 322–354.

<https://doi.org/10.2307/258762>

Lichtenstein, B. B., Uhl-Bien, M., Marion, R., Seers, A., Orton, J. D., & Schreiber, C. (2006). Complexity leadership theory: An interactive perspective on leading in complex adaptive systems. *Emergence: Complexity & Organization*, 8(4), 2–12.

<https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/managementfacpub/8/>

Lipponen, J., & Leskinen, J. (2006). Conditions of contact, common in-group identity, and in-group bias toward contingent workers. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 146(6), 671–684.

<https://doi.org/10.3200/SOCP.146.6.671-684>

Leroy, H., Palanski, M. E. & Simons, T. J. (2012). Authentic leadership and behavioral integrity as drivers of follower commitment and performance. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 107(3),

255–264. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-011-1036-1>

Lowenthal, M. M. (2020). *Intelligence: From security to policy* (8th ed.). CQ Press.

- Marasi, S., Bennett, R. J., & Budden, H. (2018). The structure of an organization: Does it influence workplace deviance and its dimensions? And to what extent? *Journal of Managerial Issues*, 30(1), 8–27. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/45176566>
- Marion, R. (1999). *The edge of organization: chaos and complexity theories of formal social organization*. Sage.
- Marion, R., & Uhl-Bien, M. (2001). Leadership in complex organizations. *Leadership Quarterly*, 12(4), 389. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S1048-9843\(01\)00092-3](https://doi.org/10.1016/S1048-9843(01)00092-3)
- Marion, R., & Uhl-Bien, M. (2007). Complexity and strategic leadership. In R. Hooijberg, J. Hunt, J. Antonakis, K. Boal, & N. Lane (Eds.), *Being there even when you are not: Leading through structures, systems, and processes*. Elsevier.
- Marlon, R., & McGee, P. (2006). Leadership, complex theory of. In F. W. English, *Encyclopedia of Educational Leadership and Administration* (pp. 562–565). SAGE.
- Maslach, C., & Leiter, M. P. (1997). *The truth about burnout: How organizations cause personal stress and what to do about it*. Jossey-Bass
- Maslach, C., Schaufeli, W. B., & Leiter, M. P. (2001). Job burnout. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 52(1), 397–422. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.52.1.397>
- Mattox, J. M. (2013). Values statements and the profession of arms: A reevaluation. *National Defense University Press*, 68(1), 59–63.
https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-68/JFQ-68_59-63_Mattox.pdf
- MAXQDA. (2020). *MAXQDA: The art of data analysis*. <https://www.maxqda.com/>
- Maxwell, J. C. (2011). *The 360° leader: Developing your influence from anywhere in the organization*. HarperCollins.

- McGarry, B. W., & Peters, H. M. (2020, January 28). Defense primer: Future years defense program (FYDP). *Congressional Research Service*.
<https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10831>
- McKelvey, B., & Boisot, M. H. (2003) Transcendental organizational foresight in nonlinear contexts. *Paper presented at the INSEAD Conference on Expanding Perspectives on Strategy Processes*, Fontainebleau, France.
- McKelvey, B., & Lichtenstein, B. B. (2007). Chapter five: Leadership in the four stages of emergence. In J. K. Hazy, J. A. Goldstein, & B. B. Lichtenstein (Eds.), *Complex systems leadership theory: New perspectives from complexity science on social and organizational effectiveness* (pp. 93–107). ISCE Publishing.
- Meehan, C. L. (2019, February 12). *Flat vs. hierarchical organizational structure*.
<https://smallbusiness.chron.com/flat-vs-hierarchical-organizational-structure-724.html>
- Meredith, L. S., Sims, C. S., Batorsky, B. S., Okunogbe, A., Bannon, B. L., & Myatt, C. A. (2017). Identifying promising approaches to U.S. Army institutional change: A literature review on organizational culture and climate. *RAND*.
<https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1054034.pdf>
- Mertens, D. M. (2015). *Research and evaluation in education and psychology*. SAGE.
- Meyer, E. (2013). Case report: Military subcultural competency. *Military Medicine*, 178(7), e848–50. <https://doi.org/10.7205/MILMED-D-13-00027>
- Moustakas, C. (1994). *Phenomenological research methods*. SAGE.
- Nemfakos, C., Rostker, B., Conley, R., Young, S., Williams, W., Engstrom, J., Bicksler, B., Elson, S. B., Jenkins, J., Kennedy-Boudali, L., & Temple, D. (2013). Understanding

- supply. In workforce planning in the Intelligence Community: A retrospective (pp. 19–32). *RAND*. <http://www.jstor.org/cuhs1.creighton.edu/stable/10.7249/j.ctt5hhvdj.11>
- Northouse, P. G. (2019). *Leadership: Theory and practice* (8th ed.). SAGE.
- Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). (2007). *Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) Number 203: Analytic standards (ICD 203)*.
<https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICD/ICD%20203%20Analytic%20Standards%20pdf-unclassified.pdf>
- Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). (2013). *U.S. national intelligence: An overview*. https://www.odni.gov/files/documents/USNI%202013%20Overview_web.pdf
- Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). (2019). *National intelligence strategy of the United States of America: 2019*.
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/National_Intelligence_Strategy_2019.pdf
- Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). (2020). *What we do*.
<https://www.dni.gov/index.php/what-we-do>
- Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). (2021, January 8). *DNI Ratcliffe welcomes U.S. Space Force as 18th Intelligence Community Member*.
<https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/press-releases-2021/item/2179-dni-ratcliffe-welcomes-u-s-space-force-as-18th-intelligence-community-member>
- Olson, A. K., & Simerson, B. K. (2015). *Leading with strategic thinking: Four ways effective leaders gain insight, drive change, and get results*. John Wiley & Sons.
- Opendakker, R. (2006). Advantages and disadvantages of four interview techniques in qualitative research (abstract). *Forum: Qualitative Social Research*, 7(4).
<https://dx.doi.org/10.17169/fqs-7.4.175>

- Park, S. (2018). Dusk for the pyramid-shaped bureaucracy: Examining the shape of the U.S. federal bureaucracy in the twenty first century. *Quality & Quantity*, 53(3), 1565–1585.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s11135-018-0827-1>
- Qualtrics © XM. (2022). <https://www.qualtrics.com/>
- Reid, K., Flowers, P., & Larkin, M., (2005). Exploring lived experiences (abstract). *The Psychologist*, 18, 20–23. <https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2005-02203-005>
- Ricoeur, P. (1981). *Paul Ricoeur hermeneutics and the human sciences*. (J. B. Thompson, Ed.). Cambridge University Press.
- Robbins, S. P., & Judge, T. A. (2018). *Essentials of organizational behavior* (14th ed.). Pearson.
- Rogers, E. (2003). *Diffusion of innovations* (5th ed.). Free Press.
- Saldaña, J. (2009). *The coding manual for qualitative researchers*. SAGE.
- Satell, G. (2015, June 8). *What makes an organization “networked”?* Harvard Business Review.
<http://hbr.org/2015/06/what-makes-an-organization-networked>
- Saunders, B., Sim, J., Kingstone, T., Baker, S., Waterfield, J., Bartlam, B., Burroughs, H., & Jinks, C. (2017). Saturation in qualitative research: Exploring its conceptualization and operationalization. *Quality & Quantity*, 52(4), 1893–1907.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s11135-017-0574-8>
- Schein, E. H. (1990). Organizational culture. *The American Psychologist*, 45(2), 109–119.
<https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.45.2.109>
- Sherman, J. (2005). Plan creates ‘Military Intelligence Program’: Rumsfeld approves consolidation of major defense intel efforts. *Inside the Air Force*, 16(38), 1–14.
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/24793124>

Sion, L. (2016). Ethnic minorities and brothers in arms: Competition and homophily in the military. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 39(14), 2489–2507.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2016.1160138>

Slade Shantz, A. F., Kistruck, G. M., Pacheco, D. F., & Webb, J. W. (2020). How formal and informal hierarchies shape conflict within cooperatives: A field experiment in Ghana. *Academy of Management Journal*, 63(2), 503–529.

<https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2018.0335>

Smith, J. A., Flowers, P., & Larkin, M. (2009). *Interpretative phenomenological analysis: Theory, method, research*. SAGE.

Starr, P. (1982). Military socialization in the university: The role of subcultures in Navy-Marine ROTC. *Human Organization*, 41(1), 64–69. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/44125606>

Stephenson, C. (2011, August). *How leadership has changed*. Ivy Business Journal.

<https://iveybusinessjournal.com/publication/how-leadership-has-changed/>

Svyantek, D. J., & Brown, L. L. (2000). A complex-systems approach to organizations. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 9(2), 69–74. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8721.00063>

Tan, H., Wilson, A. & Olver, I. (2009). Ricoeur's theory of interpretation: An instrument for data interpretation in hermeneutic phenomenology. *International Journal of Qualitative Methods*, 8(4), 1–15. <https://doi.org/10.1177/160940690900800401>

Tichy, N. M. (1983). Managing organizational transformations. *Human Resource Management*, 22(1–2), 45–60. <https://doi.org/10.1002/hrm.3930220108>

Tilghman, A. (2015, September 15). McCain: Poorly managed PCS system costs DoD millions.

Military Times. <https://www.militarytimes.com/2015/09/15/mccain-poorly-managed-pcs-system-costs-dod-millions/>

Thompson, J. D. (1967). *Organizations in action*. McGraw-Hill.

Torrance, E. P. (1955). Some consequences of power differences on decision making in permanent and temporary three-man groups. In A. P. Hare, E. F. Borgatta, & R. F. Bales (Eds.), *Small groups: Studies in social interaction* (pp. 482–492). Knopf.

Tourish, D. (2019). Is complexity leadership theory complex enough? A critical appraisal, some modifications and suggestions for further research. *Organization Studies*, 40(2), 219–238. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840618789207>

Uhl-Bien, M. (2006). Relational leadership theory: Exploring the social processes of leadership and organizing. *The Leadership Quarterly*, 17(6), 654–676. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2006.10.007>

Uhl-Bien, M., & Marion, R. (2009). Complexity leadership in bureaucratic forms of organizing: A meso model. *The Leadership Quarterly*, 20(4), 631–650. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2009.04.007>

Uhl-Bien, M., Marion, R., & McKelvey, B. (2007). Complexity leadership theory: Shifting leadership from the industrial age to the knowledge era. *The Leadership Quarterly*, 18(4), 298–318. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2007.04.002>

Uhl-Bien M., Marion R., & McKelvey B. (2011) Complexity leadership theory: Shifting leadership from the industrial age to the knowledge era. In P. Werhane & M. Painter-Morland (Eds.) *Leadership, Gender, and Organization* (Issues in Business Ethics, pp. 109–138). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9014-0_8

UpWork.com. (2021). UpWork. <https://www.upwork.com>

USAGov. (2020). *Branches of the U.S. government*. <https://www.usa.gov/branches-of-government>

U.S. Department of Defense. (2018). *National defense strategy*.
<https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=807329>

U.S. Department of Defense. (2008, March 18). *Defense of Defense Directive: Defense Intelligence Agency* (DoDD 5105.21).
<https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/510521p.pdf>

U.S. Department of Defense. (2020). *U.S. military rank insignia*. <https://www.defense.gov/Our-Story/Insignias/>

U.S. Department of Defense. (2022). *Combatant Commands*.
<https://www.defense.gov/About/Combatant-Commands/>

U.S. Office of Personnel Management. (2019). *Federal employee viewpoint survey: Governmentwide management report*.
<https://www.opm.gov/fevs/reports/governmentwide-reports/governmentwide-management-report/governmentwide-report/2019/2019-governmentwide-management-report.pdf>

Van Dam, K., Oreg, S., & Schyns, B. (2008). Daily work contexts and resistance to organisational change: The role of leader-member exchange, development climate, and change process characteristics. *Applied Psychology: An International Review*, 57(2), 313–334. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1464-0597.2007.00311.x>

Vanderslice, V. J. (1988). Separating leadership from leaders: An assessment of the effect of leader and follower roles in organizations. *Human Relations*, 41(9), 677–696.

<https://doi.org/10.1177/001872678804100903>

Vargas, CMSgt. (2016, August 12). *The chain of command*. U.S. Air Force.

<https://www.airman.af.mil/Products/PACEsetter-tools/Heritage-and-Protocol/>

Von Stumm, S., Hell, B., & Chamorro-Premuzic, T. (2011). The hungry mind: Intellectual curiosity is the third pillar of academic performance. *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, 6(6), 574–588.

<https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691611421204>

Walumbwa, F. O., Avolio, B. J., Gardner, W. L., Wernsing, T. S., & Peterson, S. J. (2008).

Authentic leadership: Development and validation of a theory-based measure. *Journal of Management*, 34, 89–126. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206307308913>

Walumbwa, F. O., Luthans, F., Avey, J. B., & Oke, A. (2011). Authentically leading groups: The mediating role of collective psychological capital and trust. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 32, 4–24.

<https://doi.org/10.1002/job.653>

War and National Defense Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C., Ch. 343, § 1, 61 Stat. 495 (July 26, 1947), as reclassified as section 3002 of this title (2004).

<https://uscode.house.gov/statviewer.htm?volume=118&page=3638>

Wiles, R., Crow, G., Heath, S., & Charles, V. (2008). The management of confidentiality and anonymity in social research. *International Journal of Social Research Methodology*,

11(5), 417–428. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13645570701622231>

Williamson, P. J., Wu, X., & Yin, E. (2019, May/June). *Learning from Huawei's superfluidity*.

Ivy Business Journal. <https://iveybusinessjournal.com/learning-from-huaweis-superfluidity/>

Yukl, G. (2005). *Leadership in organizations*, (6th ed.). Prentice Hall.

Zember, C., & Khooshabeh, P. (2020, September 25). Defense innovation is falling short. *War on the Rocks*. <https://warontherocks.com/2020/09/defense-innovation-is-falling-short/>

Zhou, X., & Schriesheim, C. A. (2009). Supervisor–subordinate convergence in descriptions of leader–member exchange (LMX) quality: Review and testable propositions. *The Leadership Quarterly*, 20(6), 920–932. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2009.09.007>

Zhu, Y., & Akhtar, S. (2014). How transformational leadership influences follower helping behavior: The role of trust and prosocial motivation. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 35(3), 373–392. <https://doi.org/10.1002/job.1884>

Appendix A

Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOCs)

The United States Department of Defense intelligence apparatus is comprised of 11 Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOCs) (U.S. Department of Defense, 2022).

JIOCs are the intelligence centers for the following Combatant Commands (CCMDs):

- U.S. Africa Command
- U.S. Central Command
- U.S. Cyber Command
- U.S. European Command
- U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
- U.S. Northern Command
- U.S. Southern Command
- U.S. Space Command
- U.S. Special Operations Command
- U.S. Strategic Command
- U.S. Transportation Command

Appendix B

U.S. Intelligence Community

The United States Intelligence Community is comprised of 18 members and is led by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DeVine, 2020; ODNI, 2020, 2021).

Statutory IC Elements in DOD:

- Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
- National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)
- National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
- National Security Agency (NSA)
- U.S. Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (AF/A2)
- U.S. Army Intelligence (G2)
- U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Enterprise (MCISR-E)
- U.S. Naval Intelligence (N2)
- U.S. Space Force Intelligence (S2)

Non-DOD Elements:

- Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)
- Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
- Department of Energy (DOE) intelligence component:
 - Office of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence (I&CI)
- Department of Homeland Security (DHS) intelligence components:
 - Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)
 - U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence (CG-2)
- Department of Justice (DOJ) intelligence components:

- Drug Enforcement Agency’s Office of National Security Intelligence (DEA/ONSI)
- Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Intelligence Branch (IB)
- Department of State (DOS) intelligence component:
 - Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)
- Department of Treasury (DOT) intelligence component:
 - Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA)

Appendix C

Intelligence Community Directives (ICDs)

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence ([ODNI], 2007) issued Intelligence Community Directives (ICDs) to establish policies for the Intelligence Community to follow.

The ICDs include specific guidance on:

- Civil Liberties and Privacy
- Congressional Notification
- Intelligence Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Evaluation System (PPB&E)
- Whistleblower Protection
- Analytic Standards
- Human Intelligence
- Foreign Disclosure and Release of Classified National Intelligence
- Protection of National Intelligence
- Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified National Security Information
- Protection of Classified National Intelligence (Lowenthal, 2020)

Appendix D

Study Participant Information Letter

May 3, 2021

Dear Participant:

Greetings! I trust this correspondence finds you well. I am contacting you to gauge your interest in participating in a research study exploring the lived experiences of civilian employees of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) during major, complex re-organization in Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOCs). I am a doctoral candidate in the Doctor of Education in Interdisciplinary Leadership program at Creighton University. I currently serve as the Chief of Intelligence Services and Resources and Analyst Career Development Officer (CDO) at U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), Intelligence Directorate (J2) in Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska. Prior to arriving in USSTRATCOM in June 2016, I served at U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) JIOC-Europe Analytic Center (JAC) from 2003-2016. My last position at JAC was the Senior Intelligence Analyst (SIA) for Russia (2011-2016).

Throughout my career, I myself have experienced several re-organizations in JIOCs and each one has informed my leadership style and the way in which I engage with employees, colleagues, and seniors. Leadership is the key to organizations operating on a daily and long-term basis. Executing a re-organization of a bureaucratic, matrixed organization further complicates communications, job satisfaction, and employee turn-over, all of which affect daily and long-term operations which cannot be interrupted due to national security concerns. I believe there is room to explore how leaders, specifically JIOC commanders or directors, can best engage with DIA civilian employees to strategize before a re-organization, communicate throughout the process, and ensure there are champions within the organization for success.

I serve as the project's principle investigator and will conduct one (60 minute) individual interview via Zoom with 15 DIA civilian employees who work in JIOCs. As none of the participants work for me, I confirm that I have no influence over your work, benefits, or promotions. Study participant names and identifying information (e.g. the ministry name and/or location) will remain anonymous and will be masked with the use of pseudonyms in the reporting of the data.

The audio-video recordings will be stored on my personal computer with a secure password and not be accessible to anyone else. The recordings will be destroyed after the dissertation defense is completed, which will protect against unintended voice recognition of the participants.

I am eager to illuminate the lived experiences of DIA civilian employees within JIOCs. I am hopeful that it will better inform leadership in the context of how to succeed in re-organizations and provide best practices for others in similarly bureaucratic, matrixed organizations.

Important things to know:

- Taking part in research is voluntary. You can take part in this study or stop any time.
- If you decide not to be in this study, your choice will not affect your relationship with me, the primary investigator of this study. There will be no penalty to you.

If you agree to participate in this study:

- The participant group will comprise females and males employed by DIA and who work in JIOCs.
- All participants involved in the study will be over 19 years of age.
- One (1) interview visit (via Zoom) is required of each participant.
- There will be no compensation for the interviews.
- These interviews will last between 60 minutes (the block schedule will be for 90 minutes to allow for any technical set-up or issue resolution).
- The potential benefits of participating in this study is to assist a colleague in the completion of their doctoral degree and to contribute to new knowledge on the topic of leadership in bureaucratic, matrixed organizations.
- The potential risks to be in this study are minimal. Perhaps the largest risk is some emotional distress upon recalling experiences of JIOC re-organizations. If you experience these feelings during the interview, know that we can stop immediately and resume when you feel ready. Additionally, you can refuse to answer any questions for any reason and you can withdraw from the study at any time for any reason.

Confidentiality and Anonymity:

- I will do everything I can to keep your records confidential. However, it cannot be guaranteed. I may need to report certain information to agencies as required by law. I intend to take care to protect confidentiality and anonymity to include ensuring all recordings, transcripts, and dissertation drafts are stored on password protected devices; to which only I use and have access. Research records that identify you may be looked at by others, including the following list of people:
 - My dissertation committee and support staff in the Creighton Interdisciplinary Leadership program, and
 - The Creighton University Institutional Review Board (IRB) and other internal departments that provide support and oversight at Creighton University.
- We may present the research findings at professional meetings or publish the results of this research study in relevant journals. However, we will always keep your name and other identifying information private.
- When reviewing and analyzing the data, I plan to use pseudonyms (the Greek alphabet corresponding to the interview order, i.e. interview 1 = pseudonym will begin with Alpha). I will refrain from using descriptors related to your job location or other relationships that might expose your identity. Finally, when using direct quotes, I will make generic any phrases, key words, or examples that might reveal your identity.

If you are interested in being interviewed for this research project, or know another colleague who might be interested, please contact me at KaraleePicard@creighton.edu.

Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,
Karalee G. Picard, EdD (c), CDASA-I
Creighton University

Attachment: Creighton University Bill of Rights for Research Participants

Appendix E

Bill of Rights for Research Participants

As a participant in a research study, you have the right:

1. To have enough time to decide whether or not to be in the research study, and to make that decision without any pressure from the people who are conducting the research.
2. To refuse to be in the study at all, or to stop participating at any time after you begin the study.
3. To be told what the study is trying to find out, what will happen to you, and what you will be asked to do if you are in the study.
4. To be told about the reasonably foreseeable risks of being in the study.
5. To be told about the possible benefits of being in the study.
6. To be told whether there are any costs associated with being in the study and whether you will be compensated for participating in the study.
7. To be told who will have access to information collected about you and how your confidentiality will be protected.
8. To be told whom to contact with questions about the research, about research-related injury, and about your rights as a research participant.
9. If the study involves treatment or therapy:
 - a. To be told about the other non-research treatment choices you have.
 - b. To be told where treatment is available should you have a research-related injury, and who will pay for research-related treatment.

Appendix F

Semi-Structured Interview Protocol

Questions:

1. Tell me about your role & responsibilities in your organization.
2. Please talk to me about your organization's level of complexity. (how do you get your work done?)
3. How did you experience your most recent workplace re-organization? (what feelings did you have about it?)
4. How did your leadership communicate the re-organization to the unit?
5. How did you feel about the re-organization? (any time)
6. Please talk about how your leadership engaged with you and your colleagues during the re-organization.
7. What best practices did your leadership display during the re-organization?
8. What behaviors did your leadership that helped the workforce embrace the change?
9. Was there any leader that stuck out during the re-organization that was a champion or a trustworthy advocate?
10. Is there anything else you would like to add?

Thank you for participating in this interview.

Appendix G**Participant Survey**

Gender:

- Male
- Female
- Other _____

Paygrade:

- GG-13
- GG-14
- GG-15

Position After Re-Org:

- Team Senior Analyst
- Branch Senior Analyst
- Senior Intelligence Analyst
- Senior Intelligence Officer
- Division Chief
- Other _____

Years of Service with DIA (please indicate if you also have experience with DIA in uniform):

- _____

Years of Service at a Combatant Command (distinguish both DIA and military):

- _____

Currently Employed by DIA:

- Yes
- No

Appendix H

IRB Approval



Office of the Provost
Research Compliance

DATE: 17-July-2021

TO: Picard, Karalee
FROM: Social / Behavioral IRB

PROJECT TITLE: Leadership Behaviors and Employee Engagement: A Qualitative Study of U.S. Defense Joint Intelligence Operations Centers
REVIEW CATEGORY: Expedited
RISK LEVEL: Minimal

SUBMISSION #: 2001950-01
SUBMISSION TYPE: Initial (Response to IRB Requests)
REVIEW METHOD: Expedited Review
DETERMINATION: Approved
EXPIRATION DATE: 27-Apr-2022

Thank you for your submission of Response/Follow-up materials for this project. The following items were reviewed in this submission:

- Creighton University HS eForm
 - Research Protocol – Clean
 - Research Protocol – Tracked
 - Data Collection Sheet
 - Interview Questions
 - Information Letter – Clean
 - Information Letter – Tracked
 - Application for Response to IRB Requests

The changes to the research protocol, information letter, and Creighton University HS eForm satisfy the concerns of the Board as expressed in the IRB letter dated April 28, 2021. Therefore, this project is fully approved. This approval is based on an appropriate risk/benefit ratio and a project design wherein the risks have been minimized. All research must be conducted in accordance with this approved submission.

An approval email was received from the Department of Defense on July 15, 2021.

Institutional Review Board

☎ 402.280.2126 | ☎ 402.280.3200
Dr. C.C. and Mabel L. Criss Health Sciences Complex I
2500 California Plaza Omaha, NE 68178

creighton.edu
creighton.edu/researchservices/irbcommittee/irb

Creighton UNIVERSITY

Office of the Provost

Research Compliance

The consent documentation has been waived as per 45 CFR 46.117 because the research presents no more than minimal risk of harm to participants and involves no procedures for which written consent is normally required outside of the research context.

1. Please note that any revision to previously approved materials must be approved by this Board prior to initiation. Please use the 'Request for Modification' form for this procedure. You must track all changes in the documents affected by the Modification so that the Board can appropriately review and approve the submission.
2. All unanticipated problems involving risks to subjects or others and serious and unexpected adverse events must be reported promptly to this office. All non-compliance issues or complaints regarding this project must be reported promptly to this office. Please use the 'Reportable New Information' form for this procedure.
3. Advertisements, letters, internet postings, any other media for subject recruitment, and information given to subjects for use in this study require approval before posting or distribution. Please use the 'Request for Modification' form when requesting review for supplemental documents.
4. This project has been determined to be a MINIMAL RISK project. Based on the risks, this project requires review by this Board on an annual basis. Please use the 'Annual, Continuing, or Project Termination' form for this procedure. Your documentation for ANNUAL REVIEW must be received with enough time for review and continued approval before the expiration date of April 27, 2022. If you complete this project within the year, you are required to close the study and submit a final report before the expiration date.

If you have any questions, please contact the IRB Office at 402-280-2126 or irb@creighton.edu. Please include your project title and reference number in all correspondence with this Board.

This letter has been electronically signed in accordance with all applicable regulations, and a copy is retained within Creighton University IRB-02 Social Behavioral records.

Institutional Review Board

☎ 402.280.2126 | ☎ 402.280.3200
Dr. C. C. and Mabel L. Criss Health Sciences Complex I
2500 California Plaza Omaha, NE 68178

creighton.edu
creighton.edu/researchservices/researchcommittees/irb

Appendix I
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Approval

RE: Dissertation Research Approval

Evitt, Brentin V CIV DIA (US) <Brentin.Evitt@dodiis.mil>



Thu 7/15/2021 11:01 AM

To: Picard, Karalee

Cc: Seskin, Leah B CIV DIA (US) <Leah.Seskin@dodiis.mil>; Speranza, Carly R; Nowatzke, Patsy A +3

Karalee:

Thank you for your patience as we rebuild the human subjects research program here at DIA.

OOC has no objection to you conducting the dissertation survey, as you set out in the attached documents and as reviewed through the university's IRB process. You now have DoD's approval through DIA.

As Heather McCreary had previously advised you, please don't forget that this survey cannot be conducted on government time. Even the time spent setting up the survey with participants must be your own. You should not create any cost to the government from this activity.

Please let me know if you have any questions or concerns.

Best wishes,

Brent Evitt

Brentin V. Evitt, Director
Office of Oversight and Compliance
Defense Intelligence Agency
200 MacDill Boulevard
Joint Base Anacostia Bolling
Washington, DC 20340-5100

Tel. 202-231-6895 (Washington, DC office)

Tel. 703-735-6292 (Reston, Virginia office)

Tel. 703-599-8833 (cell phone)

