

**BEFORE THE NEBRASKA TAX EQUALIZATION  
AND REVIEW COMMISSION**

WAL-MART STORES, INC.,	)	
	)	
Appellant,	)	Case No. 07C-134
	)	
v.	)	DECISION AND ORDER
	)	AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF
DAKOTA COUNTY BOARD OF	)	THE DAKOTA COUNTY BOARD OF
EQUALIZATION,	)	EQUALIZATION
	)	
Appellee.	)	

The above-captioned case was called for a hearing on the merits of an appeal by Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. ("the Taxpayer") to the Tax Equalization and Review Commission ("the Commission"). The hearing was held in the Holiday Inn Express, 920 S 20th st., Norfolk, Nebraska, on October 8, 2008, pursuant to an Order for Hearing and Notice of Hearing issued July 29, 2008. Commissioners Wickersham, Warnes and Salmon were present. Commissioner Warnes was the presiding hearing officer. Commissioner Hotz was excused by the presiding hearing officer. A panel of three commissioners was created pursuant to 442 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 4, §011 (10/07).

Peggy A. Everett, Property Tax Manager of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., was present at the hearing. No one appeared as legal counsel for the Taxpayer.

Kim Watson, County Attorney for Dakota County, Nebraska, was present as legal counsel for the Dakota County Board of Equalization ("the County Board").

The Commission took statutory notice, received exhibits, and heard testimony.

The Commission is required to state its final decision and order concerning an appeal, with findings of fact and conclusions of law, on the record or in writing. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-

5018 (Cum. Supp. 2006). The final decision and order of the Commission in this case is as follows.

**I.  
ISSUES**

The Taxpayer has asserted that actual value of the subject property as of January 1, 2007, is less than actual value as determined by the County Board. The issues on appeal related to that assertion are:

Whether the decision of the County Board determining actual value of the subject property is unreasonable or arbitrary; and

The actual value of the subject property on January 1, 2007.

The Taxpayer has asserted that taxable value of the subject property as of January 1, 2007, is not equalized with the taxable value of other real property. The issues on appeal related to that assertion are:

Whether the decision of the County Board determining the equalized taxable value of the subject property is unreasonable or arbitrary;

Whether the equalized taxable value of the subject property was determined by the County Board in a manner and an amount that is uniform and proportionate as required by Nebraska's Constitution in Article VIII §1; and

The equalized taxable value of the subject property on January 1, 2007.

**II.  
FINDINGS OF FACT**

The Commission finds and determines that:

1. The Taxpayer has a sufficient interest in the outcome of the above captioned appeal to maintain the appeal.
2. The parcel of real property to which this appeal pertains ("the Subject Property") is described in the table below.
3. Actual value of the subject property placed on the assessment roll as of January 1, 2007, ("the assessment date") by the Dakota County Assessor, value as proposed in a timely protest, and actual value as determined by the County Board is shown in the following table:

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Description: LOT 1 SOUTH SIOUX CITY PLAZA ADDITION 8.73 ACRES, Dakota County, Nebraska.

	Assessor Notice Value	Taxpayer Protest Value	Board Determined Value
Land	\$550,000.00	\$550,000.00	\$550,000.00
Improvement	\$2,412,650.00	\$850,000.00	\$2,412,650.00
Total	\$2,962,650.00	\$1,400,00.00	\$2,962,650.00

4. An appeal of the County Board's decision was filed with the Commission.
5. The County Board was served with a Notice in Lieu of Summons and duly answered that Notice.
6. An Order for Hearing and Notice of Hearing issued on July 29, 2008, set a hearing of the appeal for October 8, 2008, at 8:00 a.m. CDST.
7. An Affidavit of Service which appears in the records of the Commission establishes that a copy of the Order for Hearing and Notice of Hearing was served on all parties.
8. Actual value of the subject property as of the assessment date for the tax year 2007 is:

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Land value	\$ 550,000.00
Improvement value	<u>\$2,412,650.00</u>
Total value	<u>\$2,962,650.00.</u>

**III.  
APPLICABLE LAW**

1. Subject matter jurisdiction of the Commission in this appeal is over all questions necessary to determine taxable value. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5016(7) (Supp. 2007).
2. “Actual value is the most probable price expressed in terms of money that a property will bring if exposed for sale in the open market, or in an arm’s length transaction, between a willing buyer and a willing seller, both of whom are knowledgeable concerning all the uses to which the real property is adapted and for which the real property is capable of being used. In analyzing the uses and restrictions applicable to real property the analysis shall include a full description of the physical characteristics of the real property and an identification of the property rights valued.” Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-112 (Reissue 2003).
3. Actual value may be determined using professionally accepted mass appraisal methods, including, but not limited to, the (1) sales comparison approach using the guidelines in section 77-1371, (2) income approach, and (3) cost approach. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-112 (Reissue 2003).
4. “Actual value, market value, and fair market value mean exactly the same thing.” *Omaha Country Club v. Douglas County Board of Equalization, et al.*, 11 Neb.App. 171, 180, 645 N.W.2d 821, 829 ( 2002).

5. Taxable value is the percentage of actual value subject to taxation as directed by section 77-201 of Nebraska Statutes and has the same meaning as assessed value. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-131 (Reissue 2003).
6. All taxable real property, with the exception of agricultural land and horticultural land, shall be valued at actual value for purposes of taxation. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-201(1) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
7. “Taxes shall be levied by valuation uniformly and proportionately upon all real property and franchises as defined by the Legislature except as otherwise provided in or permitted by this Constitution.” *Neb. Const.*, Art. VIII, §1.
8. Equalization to obtain proportionate valuation requires a comparison of the ratio of assessed to actual value for the subject property and comparable property. *Cabela's Inc. v. Cheyenne County Bd. of Equalization*, 8 Neb.App. 582, 597 N.W.2d 623 (1999).
9. Uniformity requires that whatever methods are used to determine actual or taxable value for various classifications of real property that the results be correlated to show uniformity. *Banner County v. State Board of Equalization*, 226 Neb. 236, 411 N.W.2d 35 (1987).
10. Taxpayers are entitled to have their property assessed uniformly and proportionately, even though the result may be that it is assessed at less than the actual value. *Equitable Life v. Lincoln County Bd. of Equal.*, 229 Neb. 60, 425 N.W.2d 320 (1988); *Fremont Plaza v. Dodge County Bd. of Equal.*, 225 Neb. 303, 405 N.W.2d 555 (1987).

11. The constitutional requirement of uniformity in taxation extends to both rate and valuation. *First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. County of Lancaster*, 177 Neb. 390, 128 N.W.2d 820 (1964).
12. In the evaluation of real property for tax purposes, where buildings and improvements are taxable as a part of the real estate, the critical issue is the actual value of the entire property, not the proportion of that value which is allocated to the land or to the buildings and improvements by the appraiser. *Bumgarner v. Valley County*, 208 Neb. 361, 303 N.W.2d 307 (1981).
13. If taxable values are to be equalized it is necessary for a Taxpayer to establish by clear and convincing evidence that valuation placed on his or her property when compared with valuations placed on similar property is grossly excessive and is the result of systematic will or failure of a plain legal duty, and not mere error of judgement. There must be something more, something which in effect amounts to an intentional violation of the essential principle of practical uniformity. *Newman v. County of Dawson*, 167 Neb. 666, 94 N.W.2d 47 (1959).
14. A presumption exists that the County Board has faithfully performed its duties and has acted on competent evidence. *City of York v. York County Bd. Of Equalization*, 266 Neb. 297, 64 N.W.2d 445 (2003).
15. The presumption in favor of the county board may be classified as a principle of procedure involving the burden of proof, namely, a taxpayer has the burden to prove that action by a board of equalization fixing or determining valuation of real estate for tax purposes is unauthorized by or contrary to constitutional or statutory provisions

- governing taxation. *Gordman Properties Company v. Board of Equalization of Hall County*, 225 Neb. 169, 403 N.W.2d 366 (1987).
16. The presumption disappears if there is competent evidence to the contrary. *Id.*
  17. The order, decision, determination, or action appealed from shall be affirmed unless evidence is adduced establishing that the order, decision, determination, or action was unreasonable or arbitrary. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5016 (8) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
  18. Proof that the order, decision, determination, or action was unreasonable or arbitrary must be made by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g. *Omaha Country Club v. Douglas Cty. Bd. of Equal.*, 11 Neb.App. 171, 645 N.W.2d 821 (2002).
  19. "Clear and convincing evidence means and is that amount of evidence which produces in the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction about the existence of a fact to be proved." *Castellano v. Bitkower*, 216 Neb. 806, 812, 346 N.W.2d 249, 253 (1984).
  20. A decision is "arbitrary" when it is made in disregard of the facts and circumstances and without some basis which could lead a reasonable person to the same conclusion. *Phelps Cty. Bd. of Equal. v. Graf*, 258 Neb 810, 606 N.W.2d 736 (2000).
  21. A decision is unreasonable only if the evidence presented leaves no room for differences of opinion among reasonable minds. *Pittman v. Sarpy Cty. Bd. of Equal.*, 258 Neb 390, 603 N.W.2d 447 (1999).
  22. A corporate officer or other representative of an entity, must be shown to be familiar with the property in question and have a knowledge of values generally in the vicinity to be qualified to offer an opinion of value. *Kohl's Dept. Stores v. Douglas County Bd. of Equal.*, 10 Neb.App. 809, 638 N.W.2d, 881 (2002).

23. The County Board need not put on any evidence to support its valuation of the property at issue unless the taxpayer establishes the Board's valuation was unreasonable or arbitrary. *Bottorf v. Clay County Bd. of Equalization*, 7 Neb.App. 162, 580 N.W.2d 561 (1998).
24. A Taxpayer, who only produced evidence that was aimed at discrediting valuation methods utilized by the county assessor, failed to meet burden of proving that value of property was not fairly and proportionately equalized or that valuation placed upon property for tax purposes was unreasonable or arbitrary. *Beynon v. Board of Equalization of Lancaster County*, 213 Neb. 488, 329 N.W.2d 857 (1983).
25. A Taxpayer must introduce competent evidence of actual value of the subject property in order to successfully claim that the subject property is overvalued. Cf. *Lincoln Tel. and Tel. Co. v. County Bd. Of Equalization of York County*, 209 Neb. 465, 308 N.W.2d 515 (1981); *Arenson v. Cedar County*, 212 Neb. 62, 321 N.W.2d 427 (1982) (determination of equalized taxable value) *Josten-Wilbert Vault Co. v. Board of Equalization for Buffalo County*, 179 Neb. 415, 138 N.W.2d 641 (1965) (determination of actual value).

#### **IV. ANALYSIS**

The subject property is an improved commercial parcel which includes a 65,542 square foot building, 275,000 square feet of asphalt paving, a 4,130 square foot roof/slab canopy, and a 910 square foot solid wall porch on 8.73 acres of land. (E11:2). The property tax manager for the Taxpayer testified that the subject property was 18 years old and had been used as a discount store until vacated on July 19, 2006.



The Taxpayer is the Lessee of the subject property which is owned by a private party who purchased the parcel prior to 2007 and the private party was assigned the lease from the grantor in January, 1990. (E12:26-27). The terms of the lease to the tenant of the subject property is shown in Exhibit 12 pages twenty eight to forty four. The assumed lease by the private owner is for a period of 25 years and provides for payments by the Taxpayer to the owner in the amount of \$234,204.22 per year for years 11 through 25 which includes the years 2001 to 2015. (E12:29). The First Amendment to the Lease does not affect the original terms of the lease through January 31, 2016. (E12:49-50). The terms of the lease provides for the Tenant (Taxpayer) to “...pay any real property taxes ...”, Item 8 (a), and to “... contest any tax or assessment... .”, Item 8(c). (E12:31).

**VALUATION -  
CALCULATION OF NET OPERATING INCOME**

The property manager for the Taxpayer testified that she had used an income approach to value the subject property as shown on her Exhibit 6 pages one to three. Her testimony was that Exhibit 6 page one utilized for income the “actual rent” currently paid by the Taxpayer under the terms of the lease, Exhibit 6 page two used for income the “asking rent” and Exhibit 6 page three used for income the “most likely rent that would be achieved”. Upon further testimony by the property manager for the Taxpayer, the income used in Exhibit 6 page one was corrected to that rent requirement as shown in Exhibit 12 page twenty seven, \$234,204 per year. (E12:27).

The income approach to valuation of property is one of the accepted methods to value property specified in Nebraska Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-112 (Reissue 2003). The income approach is

a professionally accepted method. *The Appraisal of Real Estate*, 12th Edition, 2001, The Appraisal Institute, page 50.

It is the potential income that is critical to a determination of income as was stated in *In re Assessment of OL & B Ry. Co.*, 213 Neb. 71, 75-76, 327 N.W.2d 108, 111 (1982): "It is the earning capacity of the railroad that is of greater importance. Earning capacity and actual earnings are not the same thing. It is what the property, efficiently managed, should have earned that throws light on value." *Spencer Holiday House, Inc., v. Board of Equalization of Hall County*, 220 Neb. 607, 611, 371 N.W.2d 286, 288 (1985).

The income approach to valuation requires a stabilization of the variable income and expense pattern. *Income Property Valuation*, Jeffrey D. Fisher and Robert S. Martin, Dearborn Financial Publishing, Inc., 1994, p. 170. It is then necessary to compare the stabilized income and expenses to the market rents and expenses. "Market rent is the rental income a property would probably command in the open market. It is indicated by the current rents that are either paid or asked for comparable space with the same division of expenses as of the date of the appraisal." *The Appraisal of Real Estate*, 12th Edition, 2001, The Appraisal Institute, p. 476. The Taxpayer did not provide evidence of either the market rent or expenses for comparable parcels nor stabilized net operating income for the subject property. The property tax manager for the Taxpayer did testify to the market rent of other parcels, but did not provide evidence of the market rent for comparable parcels or the property record files for those alleged comparable parcels.

A percentage expense reduction was used by the property tax manager for the Taxpayer rather than market expenses for comparable parcels. (E6:1). The testimony of the Taxpayer was that this percentage expense represented actual expenses for the subject property.

The Taxpayer's reliance on actual expenses of the subject property is not in accordance with generally accepted appraisal practice. "The income and expenses that are proper and acceptable for income tax purposes are not the same as those that are appropriate for the income approach. Only the reasonable and typical expenses necessary to support and maintain the income-producing capacity of the property should be allowed." *Property Assessment Valuation*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed., International Association of Assessing Officers, 1996, p. 204. That position has also been adopted by Nebraska Courts. See, *In re Assessment of OL & B Ry. Co.*, 213 Neb. 71, 327 N.W.2d 108 (1982) and *Spencer Holiday House, Inc., v. Board of Equalization of Hall County*, 220 Neb. 607, 371 N.W.2d 286 (1985).

The actual operating history of a subject property can be considered for appraisal purposes. *The Appraisal of Real Estate* 12<sup>th</sup> Edition, The Appraisal Institute, 2001, pp. 509 - 511. An analysis using the actual operating expenses of a parcel requires a multi-year analysis that is then used as a basis for comparison only, with comparable properties. *Id.* The Taxpayer did not provided income and expense information for any comparable parcels.

### **CAPITALIZATION RATE**

A second critical factor in the determination of valuation using the income valuation method is the capitalization rate. "The overall capitalization rate is an income rate that reflects the relationship between a single year's net operating income and the total property price or

value”. *The Appraisal of Real Estate*, 12th Edition, 2001, The Appraisal Institute, p. 489. The property manager for the Taxpayer utilized a 10% capitalization rate, but the Commission finds that there was not sufficient evidence by the Taxpayer in support of this rate for the subject property for the tax year in dispute. The Commission is unable to determine if the Taxpayer has expensed the taxes for the subject property. Neither can the Commission determine if the capitalization rate utilized by the Taxpayer has been loaded.

A “loaded” capitalization rate includes the effective tax rate. *Property Assessment Valuation, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed.*, International Association of Assessing Officers, 1996, p. 233.

When property is valued for ad valorem tax purposes, taxes should not be considered an expense item.” *Property Assessment Valuation, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed.*, International Association of Assessing Officers, 1996, p. 240.

### **Cost Approach by County**

The Taxpayer criticized the County’s approach to valuation using the cost approach, especially the depreciation reduction determined by the County Board. Using the professionally accepted mass appraisal methodologies, the Cost Approach includes six steps: “(1) Estimate the land (site) value as if vacant and available for development to its highest and best use; (2) Estimate the total cost new of the improvements as of the appraisal date, including direct costs, indirect costs, and entrepreneurial profit from market analysis; (3) Estimate the total amount of accrued depreciation attributable to physical deterioration, functional obsolescence, and external (economic) obsolescence; (5) Subtract the total amount of accrued depreciation from the total cost new of the primary improvements to arrive at the depreciated cost of improvements; (5) Estimate the total cost new of any accessory improvements and site improvements, then estimate

and deduct all accrued depreciation from the total cost new of these improvements; (6) Add site value to the depreciated cost of the primary improvements, accessory improvements, and site improvements, to arrive at a value indication by the cost approach.” *Property Assessment Valuation*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed., International Association of Assessing Officers, 1996, pp. 128 - 129.

That “Physical deterioration is the loss in value due to wear and tear in service and the disintegration of an improvement from the forces of nature. All man made objects begin a slow process of deterioration as soon as they are created. . . Among the most common causes of physical deterioration are wear and tear through use, breakage, negligent care, infestation of termites, dry rot, moisture, and the elements. *Property Assessment Valuation*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed., International Association of Assessing Officers, 1996, p. 154.

### **EQUALIZATION**

“Equalization is the process of ensuring that all taxable property is placed on the assessment rolls at a uniform percentage of its actual value. The purpose of equalization of assessments is to bring assessments from different parts of the taxing district to the same relative standard, so that no one part is compelled to pay a disproportionate share of the tax. Where it is impossible to secure both the standards of the true value of a property for taxation and the uniformity and equality required by law, the latter requirement is to be preferred as the just and ultimate purpose of the law. If a taxpayer's property is assessed in excess of the value at which others are taxed, then the taxpayer has a right to relief. However, the burden is on the taxpayer to show by clear and convincing evidence that the valuation placed upon the taxpayer's property when compared with valuation placed on other similar property is grossly excessive.” *Cabela's*

*Inc. v. Cheyenne County Bd. of Equalization*, 8 Neb.App. 582, 597, 597 N.W.2d 623, 635 (1999).

“In an appeal to the county board of equalization or to the district court, and from the district court to this court, the burden of persuasion imposed on the complaining taxpayer is not met by showing a mere difference of opinion unless it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the valuation placed upon his property when compared to valuations placed on other similar property is grossly excessive and is the result of a systematic exercise of intentional will or failure of plain duty, and not mere errors of judgment.” *US Ecology, Inc. v. Boyd County Bd of Equalization*, 256 Neb. 7, 15, 588 N.W.2d 575, 581 (1999). The Commission finds that the Taxpayer has not provided evidence that the valuation placed upon his property when compared to valuations placed on other similar property is grossly excessive and is the result of a systematic exercise of intentional will or failure of plain duty, and not mere errors of judgment.

The Taxpayer did not provide the property record files for other parcels which it claimed were comparable to the subject property. The Commission is not able to make a comparison of the subject property with any other parcels alleged to be comparable for uniformity or proportionality.

The Commission finds that the Taxpayer has not rebutted the presumption that the County Board of Equalization faithfully performed its duties and that it had sufficient competent evidence for its decision both as to its decision as to valuation and equalization. Despite this fact, the Commission has reviewed all of the evidence presented and further finds that the Taxpayer has not shown by clear and convincing evidence that the County Board’s decision was either arbitrary or unreasonable nor has it shown by the reasonableness of the evidence a new

valuation or that the subject property was not equalized with the taxable value of other real property. The appeal of the Taxpayer is denied.

**V.  
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW**

1. The Commission has subject matter jurisdiction in this appeal.
2. The Commission has jurisdiction over the parties to this appeal.
3. The Taxpayer has not produced competent evidence that the County Board failed to faithfully perform its official duties and to act on sufficient competent evidence to justify its actions.
4. The Taxpayer has not adduced sufficient, clear and convincing evidence that the decision of the County Board is unreasonable or arbitrary and the decision of the County Board should be affirmed.

**VI.  
ORDER**

**IT IS ORDERED THAT:**

1. The decision of the County Board determining actual value of the subject property as of the assessment date, January 1, 2007, is affirmed.
2. Actual value, for the tax year 2007, of the subject property is:

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Land value	\$ 550,000.00
Improvement value	<u>\$2,412,650.00</u>
Total value	<u>\$2,962,650.00.</u>

3. This decision, if no appeal is timely filed, shall be certified to the Dakota County Treasurer, and the Dakota County Assessor, pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5018 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
  4. Any request for relief, by any party, which is not specifically provided for by this order is denied.
  5. Each party is to bear its own costs in this proceeding.
  6. This decision shall only be applicable to tax year 2007.
  7. This order is effective for purposes of appeal on February 11, 2009.
- Signed and Sealed. February 11, 2009.

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Nancy J. Salmon, Commissioner

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William C. Warnes, Commissioner

**SEAL**

**APPEALS FROM DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSION MUST SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF NEB. REV. STAT. §77-5019 (CUM. SUPP. 2006), OTHER PROVISIONS OF NEBRASKA STATUTES, AND COURT RULES.**

I concur in the result.

The Commission is an administrative agency of state government. See, *Creighton St. Joseph Regional Hospital v. Nebraska Tax Equalization and Review Commission*, 260 Neb. 905, 620 N.W.2d 90 (2000). As an administrative agency of state government the Commission has only the powers and authority granted to it by statute. *Id.* The Commission is authorized by statute to review appeals from decisions of a county board of equalization, the Tax



Commissioner, and the Department of Motor Vehicles. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5007 (Supp. 2007). In general the Commission may only grant relief on appeal if it is shown that the order, decision, determination, or action appealed from was unreasonable or arbitrary. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5016(8) (Supp. 2007).

Nebraska courts have held that the provisions of section 77-5016(8) of the Nebraska Statutes create a presumption that the County Board has faithfully performed its official duties and has acted upon sufficient competent evidence to justify its actions. *City of York v. York County Board of Equalization*, 266 Neb. 297, 664 N.W.2d 445 (2003). The presumption cited in *York* has roots in the early jurisprudence of Nebraska. See, *State v. Savage*, 65 Neb. 714, 91 N.W. 716 (1902) (citing *Dixon Co. v. Halstead*, 23 Neb. 697, 37 N.W. 621 (1888) and *State v. County Board of Dodge Co.* 20 Neb. 595, 31 N.W. 117 (1887)). As early as 1903 Nebraska Statutes provided for review of County Board assessment decisions by the district courts. Laws 1903, c. 73 §124. The statute providing for review did not state a standard for that review. *Id.*

In 1959 the legislature provided a statutory standard for review by the district courts of county board of equalization, assessment decisions. 1959 Neb Laws, LB 55, §3. The statutory standard of review required the district Court to affirm the decision of the county board of equalization unless the decision was arbitrary or unreasonable or the value as established was too low. *Id.* The statutory standard of review was codified in section 77-1511 of the Nebraska Statutes. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-1511 (Cum. Supp. 1959). Review of district court decisions made pursuant to section 77-1511 was de novo. *Future Motels, Inc. v. Custer County Board of Equalization*, 252 Neb. 565, 563 N.W.2d 785 (1997). The presumption functioned as a standard of review. See, e.g. *Gamboni v. County of Otoe*, 159 Neb. 417, 67 N.W.2d 492 (1954).

The Tax Equalization and Review Commission was created in 1995. 1995 Neb. Laws, LB 490 §153. Section 77-1511 of the Nebraska Statutes was made applicable to review of county board of equalization assessment decisions by the Commission. *Id.* In 2001 section 77-1511 of Nebraska Statutes was repealed. 2001 Neb. Laws, LB 465, §12. After repeal of section 77-1511 the standard for review to be applied by the Commission in most appeals was stated in section 77-5016 of the Nebraska Statutes. Section 77-5016 requires a finding that the decision being reviewed was unreasonable or arbitrary. The basis for that determination is the evidence presented to the Commission in a new record. See, Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5016 (Cum. Supp. 2006). Commission decisions are reviewed for error on the record. See, Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-5019(5) (Cum. Supp. 2006). The statutory basis for Commission review and the review of its decisions is analogous to district courts review of decisions made by administrative agencies. The basis for district court review of decisions made by administrative agencies is de novo on the record. *Tyson Fresh Meats v. State*, 270 Neb. 535, 704 N.W.2d 788 (2005). The decisions of the district court examining the administrative decision are reviewed for error on the record. *Thorson v. Nebraska Dept. of Health & Human Servs.*, 274 Neb. 322, 740 N.W.2d 27 (2007). The similarities are enough to suggest that the framework for review applied to district court decisions could be made applicable to decisions of the Commission.

Many appeals of decisions made pursuant to section 77-1511 were decided without reference to the statutory standard of review applicable to the district courts. See, e.g. *Grainger Brothers Company v. County Board of Equalization of the County of Lancaster*, 180 Neb. 571, 144 N.W.2d 161 (1966). As noted however review was de novo and the reviewing court was not bound by the standard of review imposed on district court. *Loskill v. Board of Equalization of*

*Adams County*, 186 Neb. 707, 185 N.W.2d 852 (1971). In *Hastings Building Co., v. Board of Equalization of Adams County*, 190 Neb. 63, 206 N.W.2d 338 (1973), the Nebraska Supreme Court acknowledged that two standards of review existed for the district courts; one statutory, and the other judicial stated as a presumption that the county board of equalization faithfully performed its official duties and acted upon sufficient competent evidence. No attempt was made by the *Hastings* Court to reconcile the two standards of review that were applicable to the district courts.

The possible results from application of the presumption and the statutory standard of review by the Commission are: (1) the presumption is not overcome and the statutory standard is not overcome; (2) the presumption is overcome and the statutory standard is not overcome; (3) the presumption is not overcome and the statutory standard is overcome; (4) and finally the presumption is overcome and the statutory standard is overcome. The first possibility does not allow a grant of relief, neither standard of review has been met. If the presumption is overcome the statutory standard remains. See, *City of York v. York County Bd of Equal.*, 266 Neb. 297, 664 N.W.2d 445 (2003). The second possibility does not therefore allow a grant of relief even though the presumption is overcome. The third possibility requires analysis. The presumption and the statutory standard of review are different legal standards, one remaining after the other has been met. See. *City of York v. York County Bd of Equal.*, 266 Neb. 297, 664 N.W.2d 445 (2003). The burden of proof to overcome the presumption is competent evidence. *City of York*, *Supra*. Clear and convincing evidence is required to show that a county board of equalization's decision was unreasonable or arbitrary. See, e.g. *Omaha Country Club v. Douglas Cty. Bd. of Equal.*, 11 Neb.App. 171, 645 N.W.2d 821 (2002). Competent evidence that the county board of

equalization failed to perform its duties or act upon sufficient competent evidence is not always evidence that the county board of equalization acted unreasonably or arbitrarily because the statutory standard of review remains even if the presumption is overcome. *City of York, Supra*. Clear and convincing evidence that a county board of equalization's determination, action, order, or decision was unreasonable or arbitrary, as those terms have been defined, may however overcome the presumption that the county board of equalization faithfully discharged its duties and acted on sufficient competent evidence. In any event the statutory standard has been met and relief may be granted. Both standards of review are met in the fourth possibility and relief may be granted. Each analyses of the standards of review allowing a grant of relief requires a finding that the statutory standard has been met.

Use of the presumption as a standard of review has been criticized. See, G. Michael Fenner, *About Presumptions in Civil Cases*, 17 *Creighton L. Rev.* 307 (1984). In the view of that author the presumption should be returned to its roots as a burden of proof. *Id.* Nebraska's Supreme Court acknowledged the difficulty of using two standards of review and classified the presumption in favor of the county board of equalization as a principle of procedure involving the burden of proof, namely, a taxpayer has the burden to prove that action by a board of equalization fixing or determining valuation of real estate for tax purposes is unauthorized by or contrary to constitutional or statutory provisions governing taxation. See, *Gordman Properties Company v. Board of Equalization of Hall County*, 225 Neb. 169, 403 N.W.2d 366 (1987). Use of the *Gordman* analysis allows consideration of both the presumption and the statutory standard of review without the possible conflict or difficulties inherent in the application of two standards of review. The *Gordman* analysis requires the Commission to consider all of the evidence

produced in order to determine whether there is clear and convincing evidence that the decision, action, order, or determination being reviewed was unreasonable or arbitrary. It is within that framework that I have analyzed the evidence.

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Wm R. Wickersham, Commissioner