A World of Doubt: Criminal Standards of Proof in the Common Law, Islamic, and East Asian Legal Traditions
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Authors
Rosendahl, Matthew
Issue Date
2024-06
Volume
14
Issue
1
Type
Journal Article
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Abstract
“Beyond a reasonable doubt” is synonymous with the Anglo-American criminal justice system. But what does the phrase actually mean? How and why did we adopt it? And does the standard serve a truth-seeking, or some ulterior, purpose? A comparison with other legal traditions can help answer these questions. This Article considers the development of doubt-based standards of proof in criminal proceedings across the globe, and in particular, three of the largest legal traditions: the common law, Islamic law, and East Asian law. To ground the comparative exercise in real terms, this Article looks at the development of so-called “doubt standards” in the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and Japan, three countries that have adopted their own versions of doubt standards for distinct and overlapping reasons, and with varying results. Through this comparative experiment, several lessons become apparent: doubt-based standards have often arisen from moral trepidation in convicting the innocent born of religious teachings on unjust bloodshed; doubt standards are also a tool of the political elite to either enforce or resist the state’s monopolization on power; and doubt standards have been expressed in more probabilistic terms in those traditions that include laypersons in the adjudication of guilt. Together, these lessons help illuminate why doubt-based standards of proof have grown organically in separate parts of the globe, while also providing an opportunity for introspection regarding the practical impact of “beyond a reasonable doubt” in the criminal justice system. Ultimately, this Article leaves the reader to consider whether the standards of proof used in criminal trials are worthy of their sacrosanct status.
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Publisher
Creighton University School of Law
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