Populist Retribution and International Competition in Financial Services Regulation
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Pritchard, A. C.
FIRST PARAGRAPH(S)|The pattern of regulatory reform in financial services regulation follows a predictable pattern in democratic states. A hyperactive market generates a bubble, the bubble deflates, and much financial pain ensues for those individuals who bought at the top of the market. The financial mess brings the scrutiny of politicians, who vow "Never again!" A political battle ensues, with representatives of the financial services industry fighting a rearguard action to preserve its prerogatives amidst cries for the bankers' scalps. Regulations, carefully crafted to win the last war, are promulgated. Memories fade of the foolish enthusiasm that fed the last bubble. Slowly, greed once again comes to displace fear as the primary motivating influence in the marketplace. And as night follows day, another market run-up occurs, leading to a correction, and another round of calls for retribution against the greedy money changers who brought on the crisis...
43 Creighton L. Rev. 335 (2009-2010)
Creighton University School of Law