Using Insurance to Regulate Civil Forfeiture
dc.contributor.author | Keblesh, Michael J. | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-06-02T21:09:03Z | |
dc.date.available | 2017-06-02T21:09:03Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2017-06 | |
dc.date.year | 2017 | |
dc.description.abstract | INTRODUCTION|Civil forfeiture is a powerful tool that allows law enforcement to seize property if there is probable cause that it is related to, or proceeds from, criminal activity, without regard for the guilt or innocence of the owner. This can be beneficial in some circumstances because it simultaneously deprives criminals of the tools they need to operate while providing law enforcement with resources to combat crime. However, concomitant with this power is the potential for abuse, especially in the context of shrinking budgets, since law enforcement agencies that seize assets are often allowed to keep and use them... | en_US |
dc.description.issue | 3 | |
dc.description.pages | 455-478 | en_US |
dc.description.volume | 50 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10504/113271 | |
dc.publisher | Creighton University School of Law | en_US |
dc.publisher.location | Omaha, Nebraska | en_US |
dc.rights.holder | Creighton University | en_US |
dc.title | Using Insurance to Regulate Civil Forfeiture | en_US |
dc.title.work | Creighton Law Review | en_US |
dc.type | Journal Article | en_US |
Files
Original bundle
1 - 1 of 1
No Thumbnail Available
- Name:
- 50.3 Keblesh.pdf
- Size:
- 100.24 KB
- Format:
- Adobe Portable Document Format
- Description: