Rishor v. Ferguson: The Ninth Circuit Erred in Holding That Rule 59(e) Motions Are Not Subject to the Restrictions of AEDPA When Those Motions Do Not Present Entirely New Claims for Habeas Corpus Relief
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Authors
Wilson, Cory
Issue Date
2018-06
Volume
51
Issue
3
Type
Journal Article
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Abstract
INTRODUCTION|Congress's passage of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") severely limits the subject matter jurisdiction of federal judges in reviewing habeas corpus applications made to the federal courts by state prisoners. Perhaps the most notable limitation placed on a federal judge's jurisdiction is the ability to review a second or successive habeas corpus petition made by a state prisoner. In Gonzalez v. Crosby the United States Supreme Court held that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b) motion for relief from the judgment of a district court is to be treated as a second or successive petition when that motion asserts or reasserts an attack on the state trial court's ruling. Since the Gonzalez decision, circuit courts of appeals faced the task of determining if the analysis used by the Court to determine if Rule 60(b) motions for relief from judgment should also apply to Rule 59(e) motions to alter or amend a judgment. This question has ultimately resulted in differing opinions between the circuit courts of appeals...
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Publisher
Creighton University School of Law