Christensen v. Harris County: When Rejecting Chevron Deference, the Supreme Court Correctly Clarified an Unclear Issue
Loading...
Authors
Goosmann, Jeana L.
Issue Date
2001
Volume
34
Issue
3
Type
Journal Article
Language
Keywords
Alternative Title
Abstract
INTRODUCTION|Congress delegates power to agencies under broad-spectrum directives. Agencies utilize this power to pass rules. Agencies pass two types of rules: interpretations that do not carry the force of law, and legislative rules that carry the force of law. Originally, the United States Supreme Court held that courts should grant deference to administrative rules because of the agency's expertise and experience. In 1984, in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme Court veered away from granting deference based on administrative experience and instead linked deference to the clarity of the statute. After Chevron, the question of the deference to be afforded agency interpretations not promulgated pursuant to the formal methods of rulemaking remained. |Recently, in Christensen v. Harris County, the Supreme Court answered this Chevron question. In Christensen, Harris County, Texas, imposed a policy on its employees forcing them to take accrued compensatory time. The United States Department of Labor ("DOL") issued an opinion letter stating that a public employer could direct employees to take accrued compensatory time only if a prior agreement provided for such. The Christensen Court determined that the DOL opinion letter and similar agency interpretations lacked the force of law and did not warrant Chevron deference. Instead, the Court applied the form of deference applied in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., which was a lesser form of deference than Chevron deference. The Court determined that Harris County's policy was not prohibited....
Description
Citation
34 Creighton L. Rev. 753 (2000-2001)
Publisher
Creighton University School of Law