Characteristics of Fuzzy Social Choice Functions
This paper considers the strategic manipulation of fuzzy social choice functions where both individuals and groups can choose alternatives to various degrees. Past efforts to model fuzzy social choice and strategic manipulation have allowed individual preferences to be fuzzy but still required groups to select only one alternative. Under this new framework, the author ﬁnds, with very minimal assumptions on individual preferences, strategy-proof fuzzy social choice functions satisfy fuzzy versions of peak-only, weak Paretianism, and monotonicity. In addition, the only type of strategy-proof fuzzy choice function corresponds to the traditional augmented median rule. Further, the paper illustrates the implications of this framework in the spatial model. The paper suggests that social choice can be both strategy-proof and non-dictatorial if alternatives are chosen to various degrees.
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