The Creighton Law Review is a legal journal published by the students of the Creighton University School of Law.
Founded in 1967, the Creighton Law Review published its first edition in the spring of 1968. As then Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote in that first issue, the purpose of a Law Review is to provide a "forum in which able minds subject existing legal principles to critical analysis within the context of changing conditions and in which imaginative alternatives to today's solutions are aired and tested through vigorous informal debate."
Most significantly, the journal serves both practical and academic functions. The journal publishes pieces that provide practitioners with informative, well-drafted research. It also creates a forum for scholarly debate and presents an opportunity for students to participate in that debate. As such, this forum is highly structured and demands disciplined, self-critical writing in order to perform these two functions.
The mission of the Creighton Law Review is to inform, educate, and serve the legal community, emphasizing the legal issues impacting Nebraska and the Eighth Circuit, and to provide a forum dedicated to the development of academic, research, analytical, and scholarly writing skills among law students.
The Creighton Law Review is published in four annual editions. Each edition is dedicated to specific themes.
(Creighton University School of Law, 2023-09) Bellon, Peyton
This Note begins by exploring the history of the federal gasoline tax and its deficiencies when it comes to raising revenue for highway maintenance and the history of federal electric vehicle tax policy. This Note then outlines and analyzes the solutions that some states have proposed or adopted to raise highway revenue as electric vehicles gain in popularity and market share. The Note then recommends governments at the state and federal level refrain from taxing electric vehicles or at least tax electric vehicles at lower rates than gasoline-powered vehicles until electric vehicles gain a dominant market share relative to gasoline-powered vehicles, and once this market share threshold is reached, governments should implement a vehicle miles tax in place of the gasoline tax.
(Creighton University School of Law, 2023-09) Grossaint, Kevin
This Note will first discuss the current nature and use of HVAs. Second, this Note will survey applicable Fourth Amendment doctrine. Third, this Note will address the use of HVAs by private companies. Fourth, this Note will explore relevant case law that illustrates how courts have struggled to apply the Fourth Amendment to the use of HVAs. This Note will argue that Supreme Court precedent regarding the Binary Search Doctrine supports the position that HVAs are not considered searches under the Fourth Amendment when used to detect CP or other illegal digital contraband. This Note will then explain that if HVAs are not searches under the Fourth Amendment, the government would be able to use warrantless HVA searches to fight a more aggressive battle against the dissemination of CP. This Note will also explain how the future of private entities’ HVA use would remain largely unchanged and, following the decision in United States v. Wilson, there is a clear procedure that could be adopted to avoid Fourth mendment violations when private HVAs detect CP. Finally, this Note will explore the potential dangers involved in the warrantless use of HVAs.35 Ultimately, this Note proposes that (1) warrantless HVA searches Ashould be allowed for the detections of CP, (2) Congress should pass a law that restricts the use of warrantless HVAs to the detection of CP and other illegal digital contraband, and (3) Congress should update federal statutes to provide a clear reporting structure for CP discovered by private entity HVAs to avoid Fourth Amendment violations.
(Creighton University School of Law, 2023-09) Nunn, Henry
This Note explores the current state of federal consumer data privacy laws in the United States and proposes a comprehensive consumer data privacy law—one that includes a right to be forgotten — that would not violate the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Section II of this Note provides a background of federal data privacy laws in the United States and identifies the need for a comprehensive consumer data privacy law at the federal level. Section III contends that such a law would be justified as an exercise of Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce and proposes a federal consumer data privacy law designed to respect the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech.
(Creighton University School of Law, 2023-09) Hingorani, Ana
This Note advocates for comprehensive educational reform that takes into account the characteristics of the teacher labor market and the implications of the Cobweb Model. Part II of this Note introduces the concept of a teacher shortage, explains issues contributing to the current teacher shortage, and analyzes OPS’ attempt at solving the teacher shortage. Part II of this Note also summarizes the economic theorem known as the Cobweb Model and its applicability to the teacher labor market. Part III of this Note analyzes common attempts to solve the teacher shortage, identifies how these attempts ignore the implications of the Cobweb Model, and argues these measures are ineffective in creating a long-term solution to teacher shortages. Lastly, using the successful case study of Ontario, Canada, this Note makes suggestions for policy implementation in the United States going forward.
(Creighton University School of Law, 2023-09) Smith, Michael L.
Originalism claims to provide answers, or at least assistance, for those hoping to interpret a Constitution filled with wide-ranging, morally loaded terminology. Originalists claim that looking to the original public meaning of the Constitution will constrain interpreters, maintain consistency and predictability in judicial decisions, and is faithful to ideals like democratic legitimacy. This essay responds with the inevitable, tough question: whether originalism can tell interpreters what the Seventh Amendment’s reference to “twenty dollars” means — both as a matter of original meaning and for interpreters today.
While this appears to be an easy question, I demonstrate that rather than telling modern legal actors what “twenty dollars” means, originalism instead leads to a range of highly divergent possibilities. The original meaning of “twenty dollars” — applied today — may mean anything from twenty modern dollars, to a little under four hundred dollars, to just about seven thousand dollars.
In doing so, I illustrate high-level debates between originalists and their critics, and how these debates tend to stray away from the needs of real-world actors. Originalist appeals to construction and distinguishing semantic and legal meaning are cold comfort to the hapless attorney or judge who just wants to know what “twenty dollars” means. Moreover, if originalism cannot tell modern legal actors what “twenty dollars” means, there’s little hope that it will provide meaningful assistance in resolving questions over broader, loaded terms like “due process,” “cruel and unusual punishment,” “equal protection,” and other provisions that draw the bulk of scholarly attention and constitutional litigation.