Creighton Law Review

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https://cdr.creighton.edu/handle/10504/34368

The Creighton Law Review is a legal journal published by the students of the Creighton University School of Law.

Founded in 1967, the Creighton Law Review published its first edition in the spring of 1968. As then Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote in that first issue, the purpose of a Law Review is to provide a "forum in which able minds subject existing legal principles to critical analysis within the context of changing conditions and in which imaginative alternatives to today's solutions are aired and tested through vigorous informal debate." Most significantly, the journal serves both practical and academic functions. The journal publishes pieces that provide practitioners with informative, well-drafted research. It also creates a forum for scholarly debate and presents an opportunity for students to participate in that debate. As such, this forum is highly structured and demands disciplined, self-critical writing in order to perform these two functions. The mission of the Creighton Law Review is to inform, educate, and serve the legal community, emphasizing the legal issues impacting Nebraska and the Eighth Circuit, and to provide a forum dedicated to the development of academic, research, analytical, and scholarly writing skills among law students.

The Creighton Law Review is published in four annual editions. Each edition is dedicated to specific themes.

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Now showing 1 - 5 of 2658
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    Public Appropriations, Private Accountability: School Choice Under Nebraska's Opportunity Scholarships Act
    (Creighton University School of Law, 2024-07) Thies, Anthony G.
    After the conclusion of editing on this Note, the Nebraska Legislature passed Legislative Bill 1402. This new bill, signed into law by Governor Pillen on April 24, 2024, effectively repealed L.B. 753 and preempted the referendum vote on L.B. 753 that was set to occur in the November 2024 election. L.B. 1402 serves the same purpose as L.B. 753 but with one major change: instead of providing tax credits for donations to scholarship granting organizations, L.B. 1402 cuts out scholarship granting organizations entirely and directly appropriates $10,000,000 per year from the General Fund to subsidize education scholarships for students to use at private schools. L.B. 1402 retains the tiered system for eligible students, the same requirements for qualified schools, and protects the autonomy of participating private schools. The arguments made in this Note concerning L.B. 753 are applicable to L.B. 1402. First, the funding scheme in L.B. 1402 is even more likely to be unconstitutional under article VII, section 11 of the Nebraska Constitution and the relevant case law discussed herein. Second, schools receiving public funds under L.B. 1402 will not be considered state actors for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 purposes. Finally, L.B. 1402 will appropriate public funds to private schools but not require accountability on the part of participating private schools, leaving students unprotected from potential discriminatory conduct.
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    NFL Penalty Enforcement and the Clean Hands Doctrine in Comparative Perspective
    (Creighton University School of Law, 2024-07) Ermann, David Gardy
    This article seeks to draw connections between the principles that underscore remedies within the jurisprudential system and the principles of penalty enforcement for fouls committed in NFL games. After which, this article analyzes whether enforcement of certain penalties in the NFL are consistent and fair, and subsequently proposes improvements to certain areas of NFL penalty enforcement. Finally, this article discusses whether the system of granting relief in the jurisprudential system could be improved by looking towards the NFL’s system of penalty enforcement.
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    Cyberattacks on Lunar (and Other Non-Earth Orbiting) Satellites: Legal Issues.
    (Creighton University School of Law, 2024-07) Giannoni-Crystal, Francesca
    This paper delves into the legal complexities surrounding the protection of non-Earth satellites, specifically lunar satellites within the expanding cislunar space, and focuses on the emerging cyberthreats confronting these satellites within the burgeoning lunar economy, drawing parallels with Earth’s satellite security to anticipate future challenges. Highlighting the intricate nature of cyber threats and their impact on both governmental and commercial satellites, this paper examines cyberattacks as potential international wrongful acts and armed attacks. This paper evaluates the right of affected states to self-defense and scrutinizes Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty (“OST”), alongside other pertinent treaties’ provisions. This paper concludes that Article IV of the OST should not be interpreted as to impede the right of self-defense for lunar satellites, and claims that the inherent right of self-defense overrides the OST’s restrictions, allowing for protection for lunar satellite assets.
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    The NextGen Bar: Pressing the ABA Standards for Legal Education and Beyond.
    (Creighton University School of Law, 2024-08) Wu, Edieth Y.
    This essay explores the NextGen Bar (“NG-Bar”) requirements and its correlation to several American Bar Association (“ABA”) Standards for American Law School’s Legal Education Programs. The ABA provides Standards and Interpretations that are intended to guide and assist law schools with compliance. These Standards have always been at the forefront for faculty members’ preparation. Faculty members are constantly developing innovative methods not only to comply with the requisites but also to impact student preparedness beyond the bar exam. Skills have always been an integral part of law school curriculum. Law faculty understands the need to design, engage, and inspire students in a manner that provides the necessary rigor and participation to move their thought processes from a strictly theory mindset to the how-to process—students are prompted to consider how the information impacts their future law practice; that is, they start early on thinking about how to think like lawyers and how to practice like lawyers.
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    True Threat Recklessness
    (Creighton University School of Law, 2024-07) Strasser, Mark
    The United States Supreme Court has discussed true threats in several cases but has provided too little guidance about which acts constitute threats that are not protected by the First Amendment. One case stands in contrast to the others—Virginia v. Black, where the Court offered a definition of “true threats.” However, the Court’s application of the definition in that very case caused separate conceptual difficulties. Since the Black opinion was issued, the Court has undermined or modified the definition of “true threat” in ways that are confusing and self-contradictory. A majority of the justices on the current Supreme Court reject that a statement counts as a true threat merely because a reasonable person might construe that statement as threatening. However, the Court has had great difficulty articulating what counts as a threat, and the Court’s conflation of differing standards not only makes true threat jurisprudence murky, but muddies the waters as a general matter with respect to which statements are afforded constitutional protection. Part II of this article discusses the development of true threat jurisprudence, noting some of the Court’s difficulties in defining what counts as a true threat. Part III discusses how the Court’s jurisprudence has been changing recently. The Court is clearly trying to limit what counts as a true threat but has offered a test that is confusing and poorly thought out. That is regrettable for a number of reasons. Precisely because such threats are not protected by the First Amendment, both private individuals and society as a whole need a definition of “true threat” that is clear and easily applied. This article concludes that the current standard not only does not give adequate notice about what counts as a true threat, but also will likely result in greater uncertainty about which expressive activity is protected under the First Amendment as a general matter. Claims to the contrary notwithstanding, the Court’s recent attempt to prevent the chilling of speech illustrates that the Court does not appreciate some of the very difficult issues facing the country and is unlikely to provide much insight into what the Constitution protects during these incendiary times.